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ABSTRACT
Most of the large-N empirical studies on the liberal commercial peace theory
demonstrate that, in general, trade has a robust pacifying effect in reducing the
probability of dyadical militarized interstate disputes. However, why trade’s pacifying
effect varies across time and space remains a puzzle that previous research has not yet
solved. The liberal commercial peace literature suggests the following questions are in
need of answers: Why does trade promote peace mainly in inter-region dyads but not in
intra-region dyads? What are the preconditions that make trade’s pacifying effect work or
not work? In this research, I argue that there are two critical preconditions for trade’s
pacifying effect to work: first, the benefits of trade must be substantively important, and
second, important social actors who have stakes on trade must be able to influence the
leaders when they are making foreign policy decisions. These two preconditions can be
measured by countries’ degree of democracy and degree of development. Therefore,
regionally, the pacifying effect of trade is stronger in regions where the countries are
more democratic and more developed, and it gets weaker in regions where the countries
are less democratic and less developed; temporally, because countries’ degree of
democracy and degree of development vary from time to time, the pacifying effect of
trade changes over time accordingly. I then extend this overarching framework to
investigate the role of trade in the regional peace of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and
the European Union countries, arguing that the variations of the regional peace can be
predicted by looking at how trade affects the most important political issues in each of the
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regions. By finding out more nuanced preconditions, this research advances our
knowledge toward the liberal commercial peace theory in the contemporary international
relations research.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1 The unsolved puzzles
The topic of the dissertation is “The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional
Considerations: International Relations of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the
European Union Countries.” The goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, I construct a
theory to explain several puzzles remaining unsolved in literature about trade’s unstable
pacifying effect (Chapter 2). Second, I propose a theoretical framework which links
leaders’ political survival with the role that trade plays in each of the regions in
investigation to explain the regional peace in Southeast Asia (Chapter 3), Latin America
(Chapter 4), and the European Union countries (Chapter 5). Although the four main
empirical chapters of the dissertation are disjointed, they share a similar framework
which addresses how regions become peaceful and how to explain the within-region
variation of the regional international relations in the viewpoint of trade.
I begin with defining what the so-called “liberal commercial peace” is. The
simplest definition of the liberal commercial peace is that: trade promotes peace.
Although there are contradicting findings in literature regarding whether trade leads to
peace or conflict, 1 generally speaking, most of the large-N research confirms that,
dyadically, with the increase of trade in proportion to both sides’ gross domestic product
1

Refer to Barbieri (2002), Mansfield and Pollins (2003), and Crescenzi (2005) to see a more complete
literature review about the relationship between trade and conflict.
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(GDP), the probability that they engage in militarized conflict will decrease (Oneal &
Russett, 1997, 2001; Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010).
As for why trade should have a pacifying effect, scholars of the liberal
commercial peace theory point out three main causal mechanisms to link trade with the
reduction of conflict occurrence (Kastner, 2005). The constraint arguments state that as
interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also increases due to the loss of
valuable assets and trade flows. The informational arguments claim that interdependence
enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve through threatening to
use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of dangerous
miscalculations about each other’s resolves. The transformative arguments posit that
interdependence can reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’
interests and preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives
or through changing the balance of domestic political coalitions. According to these three
causal mechanisms along with the findings of most of the large-N empirical research, the
pacifying effect of trade should be a stable and universal one that works around the world.
However, several findings have put trade’s pacifying effect into doubt. First,
Barbieri (1996, 2002) demonstrates that trade leads to conflict rather than reduces it, 2
and Pevehouse (2004) demonstrates that trade actually makes conflict more likely to
happen, while it simultaneously restrains the number of conflict from going rampant.
Second, many demonstrate that trade’s pacifying effect varies across time and space, that
is, during some periods and in some countries trade leads to peace, while during another
periods and in another countries trade leads to conflict (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998;
2

Although Xiang, Xu, and Keteku (2007) have demonstrated that Barbieri’s research committed an omitted
variable bias – not controlling for states’ power.
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Zorn, 2001). Third, if trade does have a pacifying effect, why except for the European
Union countries (Ripsman, 2005), when it comes to regional peace, are there few scholars
attribute it to trade? For example, the Middle East, Latin America, the West Africa, and
Southeast Asia are known to gradually become a peaceful region since the end of the
World War II (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998; Acharya, 2001; Miller, 2005). However, trade is
seldom been mentioned as the main reason that stabilizes the regions. Lastly, Goldsmith
(2006) demonstrates that if we separate the world into five regions according to the
classification of the Correlates of War database – the West, Latin America, Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia, we will find that trade actually increases the probability of
militarized conflict in all of them, even including the West. If trade does have a pacifying
effect, how could we explain these empirical puzzles?

2 The argument in short
To solve these puzzles, this dissertation is composed of four independent articles
as each of the empirical chapters. The first article (Chapter 2) serves as the overarching
theory, in which I propose a set of unified preconditions that explain the regional
variations of trade’s pacifying effect around the world. In short, I argue that trade’s
pacifying effect is a conditional one, which is simultaneously mediated by countries’
degree of democracy and degree of development. The facts that trade’s pacifying effect is
the most evident in the European Union countries and that it is not as evident in any other
region around the world strongly suggest that trade would lead to peace only in
“developed” “democracies.” Therefore, I posit that for the liberal commercial peace to
work, dyadically, both countries must reach a domestic consensus on the benefits of trade
so that both the leaders and the people in both countries would take trade into
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consideration when dealing with international affairs. Only when all the important
domestic political actors have a stable preference for the benefits of trade do “the three
causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace” work in reducing the probability of
militarized conflict. This is because “development” and “democracy” together suggest
that the benefits of trade is substantively important and that people who have stake on
trade could have the power to influence the leaders when they are making foreign policy
decisions. These are the critical preconditions that make the three causal mechanisms
work. Thus, all the four puzzles remaining in literature can be explained by my theory:
First, because countries’ degree of democracy and degree of development change from
time to time, as a consequence, the pacifying effect of trade varies accordingly as well.
Second, due to proximity, countries in the same region tend to have similar degree of
democracy and development resulting from shared geography and history, and countries
in different regions tend to have different degree of democracy and development.
Therefore, trade’s pacifying effect varies from region to region. Thus my argument
solves the four puzzles.
Aside from the first article (Chapter 2), the following three articles (Chapter 3~5)
extend the findings in Chapter 2 to investigate how trade and economic concerns relate to
regional peace in three different regions, respectively. In Chapter 2 I demonstrate that,
higher degree of democracy and higher degree of development are the critical
preconditions that make trade’s pacifying effect work. Then, what is the role of trade in
regions where the countries are less democratic and less developed and where the “old”
liberal commercial peace theory would predict a pacifying effect?

4

I select two regions that matches this requirement – Southeast Asian and Latin
America. Theoretically, trade should have an evident pacifying effect in these two
regions. 3 However, empirical findings in literature demonstrate that trade is never the
main reason that contributes to the regional peace. In Southeast Asia, the security
management of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been argued to
be the most important factor that maintain the regional peace based on a process of
consensus building. In Latin America, the hegemonic stability effect managed by the
United States is a well-known but controversial phenomenon. I propose a theoretical
framework to explain the role of trade in these regional peace. I link trade with regional
peace by looking at what the main domestic political issues are among countries in these
two regions, because the main controversies in the domestic political arena also represent
the leaders’ ruling foundation. To make sure their political survival is unthreatened,
leaders must satisfy the demand of their winning coalition (Putnam, 1988; Bueno de
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). Therefore, to understand the role of trade
in the regional peace, we should look at how trade may affect the balance of the key
domestic political coalitions the leaders rely upon. In the Southeast Asian countries,
keeping a good economic performance is the key for leaders to maintain their ruling
legitimacy due to their special historical background; in the Latin American countries, the
domestic threat of coup d’état, the international threat of their enduring rivalries, and
their relationship with the United States are the critical concerns for leaders to survive.
Thus, I argue, we can predict the regional international relations by looking at how trade

3

I will further elaborate the reasons why trade should have an evident pacifying effect in these two regions
in the next section.
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may affect the political coalitions that the leaders must rely upon in order to keep
incumbent.
Then, in Chapter 5, I extend this theoretical framework to investigate the
international relations between the European Union countries. The European Union
countries are the richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated region in the world
where militarized conflict has been disappeared since 1986 and trade’s pacifying effect is
the most prominent. I demonstrate that this theoretical framework is still useful to
understand how trade affects the international relations between countries that are the
least-likely ones to have conflict by looking at the balance between their domestic
internationalizing and backlashing coalitions.
In the next section, I will explain the theoretical reasons why I select these three
regions to be investigated. By solving these four puzzles and proposing this theoretical
framework, this research not only finds out more nuanced preconditions of the liberal
commercial peace effect, but also enriches our knowledge toward how regions become
peaceful and what the influence of trade is on regional peace.

3 Case selection
In this research I dig out how the regional characteristics affect the effectiveness
of the liberal commercial peace effect by comparing three different regions around the
world – Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the European Union countries. I select these
three regions for investigation for four theoretical reasons. First, these three regions are
known to have very peaceful international relations by many studies (Mitrany, 1948;
Haas, 1964; Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, & Lee, 1957; Deutsch, 1961; Kacowicz 1995;
Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2001; Ray 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Ripsman 2005;
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Miller 2005; Solingen 2007; Tønnesson 2009; Kivimäki 2011), therefore, they are the
most suitable regional cases to be tested to see whether the liberal commercial peace
effect has contributed to the formation of the regional peace in terms of the reduction of
militarized conflict.
Second, based on the concern of research design, these three regions are the mostlikely cases that may enjoy the liberal commercial peace. The European Union countries
have long been recognized as the most successful case of peace through interdependence
and international integration, and their experiences to achieve peace are also the origin
where scholars build the liberal commercial peace theory from. For the Southeast Asian
countries, after decolonization since the end of World War II, state building and national
prosperity have been their most important goals, and the establishment of ASEAN is
meant to promote regional stability to attract badly needed foreign direct investment to
stimulate economic development (Haftel, 2010; Tang, 2012). Thus, theoretically, the
liberal commercial peace effect should be very prominent in the region as well. Lastly,
Latin America is the most economically open region in the world during the 1990s when
almost all of the countries adopted the Washington consensus of structure reform
(Williamson, 1990). Therefore, theoretically, it should be the region with the most salient
liberal commercial peace effect. In sum, based on the logic of the most-likely case study
design (Eckstein, 1975; McKeown, 1999), these three regions should be the most likely
ones to embody the liberal commercial peace effect. Thus investigating the regional
variations of trade’s pacifying effect across these three regions should give us the most
leverage to find out the preconditions of the liberal commercial peace.

7

Third, all the three regions have important regional intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) to facilitate their intensive interaction between member states.
Although the degree of regional integration varies across these three regions, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the European Union (EU) have long been recognized to play an important
role in promoting regional integration and conflict resolution in these three regions. In
addition, the functionalists (Mitrany, 1948; Haas, 1958, 1964; Abbott & Snidal, 1998)
and the liberals (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986; Russett, Oneal, & Davis, 1998; Oneal &
Russett, 2001) all highlight the contribution of international organizations in conflict
resolution and international coordination, whether in security issues or in trade issues.
Therefore, due to the development of the three important IGOs, these three regions
should be the most- likely ones to enjoy liberal commercial peace than any other regions.
Fourth, many scholars find that weak or failed states radically change the
adaptability of international relations theories (Weiss & Kessler, 1991; Job, 1992; Ayoob,
1999; Miller, 2005) which implicitly assume that every state is the same unity with
similar functions (Waltz, 1979). For example, the international security dilemma
emphasized by mainstream international relations theories is not the main focus of this
kind of states; instead, internal security dilemma is what they pay attention to due to their
lack of legitimacy, functioning coercive capacity, and a capable bureaucracy (Kelly, 2007,
pp. 216–217). Unlike other regions which are full of weak states, in lack of populations,
or geographically isolated, such as some regions in Africa, Middle East, and the Oceania
countries, the three regions under investigation in this research (Southeast Asia, Latin
America, and the European Union countries) are regions composed of modern national
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states with sufficient state capability to function as normal national states, thus they
should be suitable for the liberal commercial peace theory to apply.
For these four reasons above, I contend that investigating these three regions are
proper to explore how the regional characteristics condition the liberal commercial peace
effect. In the next section, I will summarize the content of the dissertation and point out
how this research could make up the deficiency in literature as the contribution.

4 Organization of investigation
The topic of chapter 2 is “The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional
Considerations.” As an overarching theory of the whole dissertation, I argue that trade’s
pacifying effect is simultaneously conditioned on the degree of democracy and the degree
of development, and that it embodies not in reducing all levels of conflict, but in reducing
the conflicts that would cause fatality. I use data concerning the onset of militarized
interstate dispute (MID) 3.10 (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates of
War dataset to test my argument. The finding of this chapter also bridges the long debate
between the democratic peace theories and the capitalist peace theories by demonstrating
that both the degree of democracy and the degree of development are independent and
mutually reinforcing (rather than mutually exclusive) moderators of trade’s pacifying
effect.
The topic of chapter 3 is “ASEAN and Southeast Asian Peace: National Building,
Economic Growth, and ASEAN’s Conflict Management.” In this chapter I plan to solve
an unsolved debate in the literature, that is, whether ASEAN’s security management in
the region keeps the peace. I argue that the pacifying effect of ASEAN should be
understood as a conditional one, which hinges on Southeast Asian countries’ economic
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performance. For decades, national building and economic growth are the main goals of
the Southeast Asian countries as well as their leaders’ ruling foundation. When the
leaders are not able to maintain good economic performance, they tend to emphasize the
national building issues, such as territorial disputes, to keep their ruling legitimacy, thus
compromising ASEAN’s security management. Empirical analysis of the onset of
militarized interstate disputes from 1950 to 2001 confirms my argument. My finding also
contributes to the long debate about whether we need non-Western international relations
theories to understand the international relations of the Asia-Pacific countries.
The topic of chapter 4 is “Latin American Peace: Hegemonic Stability during the
Cold War and Capitalist Peace after the Cold War.” In this chapter I plan to solve an
unsolved debate in the literature, that is, what the role the United States was in the
formation of the regional peace. Generally speaking, there are three competing models
about it: the hegemonic stability argument emphasizes that it is the United States’ peace
keeping that stabilizes the region, the whirlpool model argues that the United States is
only involved when its interests are compromised and it disengages soon after the events
are solved, and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the one
who provokes conflicts in the region. I argue that Latin American peace should attributes
to the United States’ hegemonic stability effect; however, this does not mean that the
United States has sufficient policy tools to constrain the conflictual behavior of all the
Latin American countries. In countries that have higher degree of economic dependence
on the United States, the United States has enough influence and economic leverage on
the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in countries that have lower
degree of economic dependence on the United States, the United States does not have
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sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the hegemonic stability effect
of the United States’ security management becomes less evident in these countries.
Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the region is
a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough economic
leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior. Besides,
my argument also implies that after the end of the Cold War the regional peace should
follow a “capitalist peace” trajectory when the region had lost its strategic value of
geopolitics to the United States.
The topic of chapter 5 is “Embedded Liberalism and International Relations
between the European Union Countries.” In this chapter I want to highlight a
phenomenon that is not well-explained by relative literature. That is, how to explain the
variation of conflict and cooperation between the European Union countries after the
Cold War. The European Union countries are the richest, the most democratic, and the
most integrated countries in the world without any single militarized interstate conflict
since 1986, so previous research has trouble measuring the cooperation and conflict
among them since there is no variation in the popularly-used datasets. By applying Gary
King and Will Lowe’s “10 Million International Dyadic Events (IDE)” dataset (King &
Lowe, 2003), 4 I am able to investigate the international relations between the European
Union countries. I argue that due to the logic of the embedded liberalism – the
relationship between market opening and governments’ welfare spending, among the
European Union countries, their degree of interdependence and degree of domestic

4

King, Gary; Lowe, Will, 2003, "10 Million International Dyadic Events",
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA UNF:3:dSE0bsQK2o6xXlxeaDEhcg== IQSS Dataverse
Network [Distributor] V5 [Version].
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compensation jointly will determine the number of their international conflicts. Among
the EU countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and
domestic compensation are both at a high level will have the least number of conflicts
with their trade partners; countries whose degree of interdependence and domestic
compensation are both at a low level will have few conflicts with their trade partners;
countries who have low degree of interdependence and high degree of domestic
compensation will have a few conflicts with their trade partners; and countries who have
high degree of interdependence and low degree of domestic compensation will have the
most number of conflicts with their trade partners.
Table 1.1 summarizes the plan of the previous three chapters. Among the three
most-likely regions that may embody trade’s pacifying effect, according to the literature
about the regional peace, 5 only in in the European Union countries does trade have a
meaningful contribution to regional peace. In the other two regions – Southeast Asia and
Latin America, the pacifying effect of trade is not considered to help much in stabilizing
the regions. According to literature, in Southeast Asia, regional peace is largely
maintained by ASEAN’s security management through a way of consensus building; in
Latin America, the hegemonic stability effect in terms of the United States’ security
management is known as one of the main reasons that stabilize the region. However, the
role of ASEAN and the United States in regional security does not go without challenge.
Both ASEAN’s ability of security management in Southeast Asia and the United States’
ability of security management in Latin America vary case by case from time to time, and
the literature has not yet offered a satisfying explanation. Even in the European Union
5

More detailed discussion regarding the literature about each regional peace will be presented in each of
the chapters.
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Table 1.1 Plan of the dissertation

13

Regions
Southeast Asia
Latin America
European Union

How regions became peaceful
Security community
American hegemony
Interdependence and Integration

Explaining the within-region variations
Economic growth rate
The United States’ economic leverage
Domestic compensation

Dissertation Chapter
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5

countries where interdependence has known as the main reason that promotes the
regional peace, how to account for the variation of the international relations among the
richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated countries remains an untouched part
in literature. My arguments in each of the three chapters supplement the missing part of
the literature and enrich our knowledge toward the regional peace by offering a
theoretical viewpoint through the influence of trade on the domestic coalitions that the
leaders must rely upon in order to keep incumbent.
Lastly, Chapter 6 is the conclusion, in which I discuss how my findings could
contribute to our understanding toward how the rise of China may affect the international
security in contemporary international system, the most important event of international
relations in our time. Will a large-scale conflict between China and the United States or
between China and other East Asian countries become unavoidable with the rise of China
as the realists claimed? Or will the increased interdependence between China and the
United States or between China and other East Asian countries largely reduce the
probability of a large-scale conflict as the liberals claimed? My theory offers some
answers to this critical question by specifying more nuanced preconditions and their
influence on China’s rising and international security.
Overall, by investigating the regional variances of the liberal commercial peace
effect, this research not only solves the puzzles of the global-regional and the temporal
discrepancies regarding trade’s pacifying effect, but also advances our understanding
about the liberal commercial peace theory in terms of the Lakatosian criteria (Lakatos,
1978) by finding out more nuanced preconditions and theoretical implications.
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CHAPTER 2
The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional Considerations
1 Introduction
Although there is a large literature about whether trade brings peace or conflict,
most studies have reached a conclusion explicitly or implicitly stating that, overall,
commercial ties have a net pacifying effect (Oneal & Russett, 1999; Maoz, 2009; Hegre,
Oneal, & Russett, 2010; Choi, 2010); while, at the same time, the literature also points
out that this liberal commercial peace effect may vary across time and space. For example,
the Western European countries after World War II are the ideal type of the liberal
commercial peace model, where trade interdependence “spilled over” (Haas, 1958, 1964)
to political and social domains and so facilitated regional integration and a wellfunctioned security community (Deutsch, 1961; Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, & Lee, 1957);
Adler and Barnett 1998; Bellamy 2004). However, these spill-over and integration effects
of the liberal commercial peace in other regions of the world are not as evident as in
Western Europe. For instance, although most of the countries in Southeast Asia and Latin
America have welcomed market liberalization policies for decades, the liberal
commercial peace effect has never been deemed as the main reason to explain the
regional peace in these regions (Kacowicz, 1995; Acharya, 2001; Ray, 2002; Miller, 2005;
Johnston, 2012). Accordingly, there are several questions in need of answers. Why does
the liberal commercial peace appear to operate in the Western Europe but not in other
regions? How do we account for the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace
15

effect? Is there a universal theory of the liberal commercial peace? If the pacifying effect
of trade is actually mediated by specific regional preconditions, what are they? Could we
have a general theory to guide us about how to find out the regional preconditions that
make the liberal commercial peace work? The goal of this research is to answer these
questions by investigating the relationship between regionally-distinguished
characteristics and the liberal commercial peace.
The liberal commercial peace theory holds the view that interdependence,
specifically trade, should have a strong pacifying effect that can constrain both states
from engaging in militarized interstate conflict, and that this pacifying effect should
increase with the increase of interdependence. However, while the large-N research
stably confirms the liberal commercial peace effect between the global dyads, empirical
evidences between the intra-region dyads do not always support it. To explain the
different effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace across different regions, I make
two arguments in this research. First, I argue that looking at all levels of conflict is not
proper to understand the liberal commercial peace effect, especially between the intraregion dyads. Because trade is demonstrated as also a measurement of interaction
between both sides, countries that trade more intensively are also those who are most
likely to have disputes due to their intensive interaction. Therefore, the pacifying effect of
trade should embody in the reduction of high-level conflicts (those that cause fatality),
not the low-level ones (those that do not cause fatality). Because countries in the same
region tend to have more intensive interaction than countries between different regions,
therefore they tend to have more conflicts simply due to intensive interaction. As a
consequence, to test the effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace effect between the
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intra-region dyads, we should look at only the high-level conflicts instead of looking at
all the recorded conflicts indifferently.
Second, I argue that there are three regionally-distinguished characteristics that
not only differentiate one region from all the others but also affect the three causal
mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace, therefore making the effectiveness of the
liberal commercial peace vary across regions. Besides, these three factors also help point
out what conditions the pacifying effect of trade, that is, why in some regions trade
reduces the probability of conflict and in others vice versa. These three regionallydistinguished characteristics, I argue, are their differing degree of intra-regional
interdependence, degree of development, and degree of democracy. These three factors
are universal ones that explain the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace
effect. Thus, my theory proposes a generalizable framework that bridges the contradicting
findings at the global level and the regional level. 6
To access my argument, the structure of the research is as follows. In the next
section, I first elaborate on what remains a puzzle in the literature about the liberal
commercial peace phenomenon, that is, how to explain the regional variations of the
liberal commercial peace effect, which is the question I want to answer in this research.
Then, in the third section I construct my theory to solve this question, arguing that my
theory can explain what conditions the liberal commercial peace effect both at the global
level and at the regional level. I test my theory with statistical models using data from
1950 to 2001 in the fourth section, in which the empirical results show robust support for
6

In this research I use “at the global level,” “global dyads,” and “inter-region dyads” interchangeably to
describe all the dyadic country combinations around the world, and use “at the regional level,” “regional
dyads,” and “intra-region dyads” interchangeably to describe only the intra-region dyadic country
combinations.
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my theory. Overall, by bringing the regional concerns back in, this research largely
enriches the liberal commercial peace theory not only in finding out more nuanced
preconditions but also in extending more theoretical implications.

2 The Puzzle: Regional variations of the liberal commercial peace effect
As Kastner (2005) had reviewed, there are at least three arguments commonly
used to link economic interdependence with a reduced likelihood of military conflict in
liberal commercial peace literature as causal mechanisms: the constraint arguments, the
informational arguments, and the transformative arguments. The constraint arguments
state that as interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also increases due to
the loss of valuable assets and trade flows (Papayoanou, 1996; Oneal & Russett, 2001b;
Gelpi & Grieco, 2003; Smith, 2014). The informational arguments claim that
interdependence enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve
through threatening to use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of
dangerous miscalculations about each other’s resolves (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999;
Morrow, 1999, 2003; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Powell, 2002; Gartzke & Li, 2003;
Gartzke, 2003; Stein, 2003). The transformative arguments posit that interdependence can
reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’ interests and
preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives or through
changing the balance of domestic political coalitions (Mitrany, 1948, 1966; Haas, 1958,
1964; Deutsch et al., 1957; Deutsch, 1961; Adler & Barnett, 1998a; Solingen, 2001, 2003,
2007; Simmons, 2003). Although the pacifying effect of the liberal commercial peace is
not always a positive one, since in a dyadic level of analysis peace may result from the
fact that the target state is successfully coerced by the sender state so that there is no overt
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conflict; however, by and large, as a final phenomenon, trade does reduce the probability
of conflict.
According to these three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace
theory, the pacifying effect of trade should be universal and ubiquitous across the whole
world since these three causal mechanisms, no matter one, two, or all of them, should be
found in any pair of countries with sufficient economic ties. However, two empirical
evidences have put the liberal commercial peace effect into doubt. First, although the
liberal commercial peace effect has been empirically supported as very prominent in
many studies (Oneal & Russett, 1999, 2001a; Maoz, 2009; Hegre et al., 2010), it is
interesting that when it comes to the regional peace, few scholars attribute it to
interdependence. For example, regional security research seldom confirms the
contribution of the liberal commercial peace effect outside the Western European
countries, especially the long peace in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle
East (Lake & Morgan, 1997; Acharya, 2001; Lemke, 2002; Ray, 2002; Buzan & Wæver,
2003; Miller, 2005; Goldsmith, 2007). Second, in statistical models, the liberal
commercial peace effect usually does not hold in regional subsamples. For instance, by
dividing the world into five different regions – the West, the Middle East, Africa, Asia,
and Latin America, Goldsmith (2006) finds that at odds with the liberal commercial
peace literature, interdependence is actually positive with the probability of the onset of
dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID) in all the five regions, even including the
West. As a result, the pacifying effect of interdependence demonstrated in most of the
literature may be very likely resulting from the inter-regional commercial peace rather
than the intra-regional one. In other words, intra-regional trade leads to conflict rather
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than reduces it, and inter-regional trade vice versa. Although it should be quite reasonable
that countries tend to have more trade and conflict with neighboring ones than with those
who are far away, this still arouses an inquiry of why the liberal commercial peace effect
does not work, especially at the regional level. If trade only reduces the probability of
conflict between pairs of countries between different regions but not between those in the
same region, the substantive effect of the liberal commercial peace may be trivial and
over-emphasized by the liberals since it cannot promote peace for countries that interact
the most frequently.
Does the fact above result from some specific outlier states in each region that
nullify the liberal commercial peace effect? Or does it result from the regional-specific
characteristics that affect all the states in the region? In the monadic level of analysis, it is
easier to understand why the liberal commercial peace effect does not work in certain
countries because not all countries have the same characteristics. Since the goal of a
scientific theory is to predict the central tendency, it is not surprising if we have some
states as outliers against the prediction of the liberal commercial theory due to omitted
variable bias such as other special preconditions. However, at the regional level of
analysis, if the outliers are at the regional level, which means that most of the states in the
region are outliers, a revision or a reconsideration of the liberal commercial theory may
be a necessity. This can be done by two different ways. First, it is possible that the liberal
commercial peace theory is not a universally generalizable one because it is derived only
from the experience of the modern European countries after 1816, especially after the end
of World War II, so that it may not well account for the international relations in other
regions. Therefore, we need new theories (adding new causal mechanisms) to explain the
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relationship between trade and conflict. Another way is to accept the three main causal
mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace theory, but reconsider the regional
preconditions that mediate the effectiveness of them, which, I argue, may be a more
informative way since we have abundant literature of liberal commercial peace research
and regional studies that help. In the next two sections, I will demonstrate why paying
attention to the regional level of analysis is more helpful than looking at the monadic
level of each outlier state, bringing the regional factors back in to enrich our
understanding of the liberal commercial peace theory as well as the regional peace across
the world.

3 Bridging the global-regional gap of the liberal commercial peace effect
How do we account for the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace
effect? Is there a universal theory of the liberal commercial peace? If the pacifying effect
of trade is actually mediated by specific regional preconditions, what are they? Could we
have a general theory to guide us about how to find out the regional preconditions that
make the liberal commercial peace work? In this section, I make two arguments to bridge
the gap between the general liberal commercial peace theory and its regional variances.
First, I argue that looking at all kinds of MIDs to conceptualize conflict is not a proper
way to investigate the liberal commercial peace effect. Because the pacifying effect of
trade works not in the reduction of all kinds of conflicts, but in the reduction of conflicts
that would cause fatality. Second, I argue that there are two universal factors that
condition the liberal commercial peace effect – countries’ degree of democracy and
development. As a consequence, the regional variances of the liberal commercial peace
effect around the world are due to the regional variation of these two factors. By making
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these two arguments, I offer a unified theory to explain the global-regional differences of
the liberal commercial peace effect, instead of pointing out ad hoc explanations for every
specific region around the world.
3.1 Why using all recorded MIDs is not proper for investigating the liberal commercial
peace effect at the regional level
There are many debates about whether using all the recorded conflict events is
proper to test the liberal commercial peace theory, especially regarding the most popular
militarized interstate dispute (MID) data of the Correlates of War dataset (Barbieri, 2003;
Pevehouse, 2003; Reuveny, 2003). Generally speaking, there are mainly two kinds of
concerns about it: The first one is the concern of data quality, and the second one the
concern of theory.
The first concern regards data quality. Not all levels of MIDs that happened will
be recorded due to information availability, especially the low-level MIDs that happened
in the third world countries where there is a lack of media coverage. Moreover, high-level
MIDs tend to be recorded more correctly because they arouse more attention and give
more information, especially those involved with casualties.
MID includes a series of events that are defined as “a set of interactions between
or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or
actual uses of military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). Among these three
categories, there are conflict events with casualties and without casualties. Thus, displays
of military force that involved with casualties may actually be more severe and arouse
more attention than actual uses of military force that caused no fatality. Therefore, many
researchers promote the claim that looking at the MIDs that caused fatality is more proper.
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For example, Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre (2000, p. 984) insist that the use of fatality
MIDs helps avoid both coding irregularities and “attention bias” on low-level disputes.
Souva and Prins (2006) also echo Toset et al. (2000) that “fatal MIDs offer greater
temporal and spatial consistency in the historical recording of these events. Plus, they
avoid very low-hostility disputes that may not reach the attention of policymakers”
(Souva & Prins, 2006, p. 191). Given the fact that MIDs are very rare events, 7 a slightly
difference of the coding methods may result in a huge bias in a large-N research. For data
quality concern, looking at only the MIDs that caused fatality gives us a more consistent
measurement than taking all the MIDs into concern.
The second concern regards theory. Not all theories that predict the reduction of
conflict have the causal mechanisms that cover all levels of conflict, and it is misleading
to give all levels of conflict the same weight, either, simply by looking at the frequency
of all levels of conflict.
The three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace theory – the
constraint argument, the informational argument, and the transformative argument –
implicitly assume that trade’s pacifying effect should embody in the reduction of
conflicts which are important enough to trigger the three causal mechanisms to work. In
other words, low-level conflicts may not be salient enough to make trade be taken into
consideration by leaders or any other influential social actors. In this situation, the three
causal mechanisms may not work in low-level conflicts even though both sides have
7

For example, there are only 1,289 MIDs (2.28%) in the total 56,647 politically relevant (involving at least
one major power, contingency, or separated by less than 400 miles of water) non-directed dyad-year
observations in the sample period from 1950 to 2001. Among the total 1,289 MIDs, there are only 945
MIDs (1.67%) that involved the actual use of force, and only 439 MIDs (0.77%) that caused fatality. Given
MIDs are such rare events, the estimated outcomes will be sensitive to the coding rules, which may change
the number of MIDs in a large-N research.
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significant trade. In addition, the degree of trade is also a measurement of the degree of
interaction between both sides. It should not be surprising at all that countries who
interact more often tend to have more conflictual issues simply due to their intensive
interaction. For example, by using the COPDAB and the WEIS data, 8 Pevehouse (2004)
demonstrates that measurements of trade are also the measurements of the density of
bilateral interaction. As a result, trade tends to make the presence of small amounts of
conflict more likely due to intensive interaction, but simultaneously restrain the number
of conflicts from going rampant due to the liberal commercial peace effect. Moreover, by
using the MID data, Hegre (2009) also demonstrates that when investigating the tradeconflict relationship, it is imperative to control for interaction density between both
countries due to the same reason. 9
In the other situations, some low-level MIDs are actually caused by trade issues or
geological reasons, such as the fishery disputes and the natural resource disputes between
countries who share the same fishing ground or mineral vein. Those countries may well
have a very closed economic interdependence relationship due to proximity, just like the
U.S.-Canada fishery disputes or the China-Japan territorial disputes on the small islands

8

Refer to Azar (1980) about the COPDAB data, and Goldstein (1992) about the WEIS data. As for the
comparison across the COPDAB, WEIS, and MID datasets, refer to Vincent (1983), Pevehouse (2003), and
Reuveny (2003).

9

Besides, Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) find that although trade may not inhibit conflict, it does appear to
shorten the spells of conflict, and Zorn (2001) finds that high levels of interdependence generally lower the
probability of conflict, but in the short term trade increases the chance of conflict. Pevehouse (2004) and
Hegre’s (2009) explanations here also offer a good causal mechanism to account for Beck et al. (1998) and
Zorn’s (2001) findings that the pacifying effect of trade tends to be mixed if we do not differentiate the
density of interaction between both sides.
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in the East China Sea (Downs & Saunders, 1998; Hickey, 2014). 10 Thus leaders in
countries that have more intensive commercial interactions may also use militarized
measures such as the demonstration of force to show their concern about the issues and to
tell their people they did do something, but at the same time they do not really want to
cause fatality since this will very likely destroy their current cooperative relationship.
Therefore, this kind of conflicts that happens from time to time do not necessary mean
that the liberal commercial peace effect does or does not work. Due to these reasons
above, I argue that when using the MID data to test the liberal commercial peace effect, it
is more proper to use MIDs that caused causality rather than to use all kinds of MIDs.
Many “cheap MIDs” which involved only the low-level conflicts such as “threat to use
force without casualties,” “display of force without casualties,” or even “actual uses of
military force but without casualties” may not arouse attentions that are sufficient enough
for the liberal commercial peace effect to work. Therefore, trade may play no role in
these kind of cheap MID events. But this is not equal to saying that trade does have or
does not have a pacifying/conflictual effect. Looking at fatal MIDs instead of all kinds of
MIDs can help avoid conflicts that very likely have nothing to do with the liberal
commercial peace effect, and thus is a more proper measurement of the conflicts that the
liberal commercial peace effect should have prevented (or should have prevented but
failed). 11

10

For example, according to the MID 3.1 data, from 1950 to 2001, there are 6 MIDs happened between the
United States and Canada and also 6 MIDs happened between China and Japan. However, none of the
above caused fatality.
11

A good example is the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which is a series of missile tests conducted by
China in the waters surrounding Taiwan including the Taiwan Strait from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996.
The first set of missiles fired in mid-to-late 1995 by China were allegedly intended to send a strong signal
to Taiwan’s president Tenghui Lee, who had been seen as moving Taiwan’s foreign policy away from the
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In sum, if we use at all kinds of MIDs as the dependent variable to conceptualize
international conflict, the liberal commercial peace effect will be significant only at the
global level, not the regional level. This is because countries in the same region tend to
have higher degree of interdependence due to proximity and more MIDs due to intensive
interaction, and because the liberal commercial peace effect works not in reducing the
occurrence of all kinds of MIDs, but in reducing the occurrence of the fatal ones. For
these reasons, using only the MIDs that caused fatality to conceptualize international
conflict is more proper to investigate the liberal commercial peace effect, and this effect
should work both at the global level and at the regional level.
Due to the two main concerns above – the data quality concern and the theory
concern, I posit that the liberal commercial peace effect is more prominent between
global dyads than between intra-region dyads if we use all levels of MIDs to measure the
reduction of conflict. Because the degree of trade is also a measurement of the degree of
interaction, with the increase of interaction comes with more chances for both sides to
have disputes. Countries in the same region tend to interact more intensively thus have
more issues to dispute. As a consequence, trade does not have a significant pacifying
effect if we look at all levels of MIDs in which many of them have nothing to do with
trade or actually are triggered by trade. Instead, among countries in the same region who
have substantive trade relations, although they tend to have more issues to dispute, it is

One-China policy. The second set of missiles were fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the
Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. This crisis was coded as a MID that
involved actual use of force without fatality in the COW MID 3.1 dataset, which is a MID that happened in
spite of the high degree of interdependence between both sides and had no negative effect on bilateral trade
later on. The trade flows between both sides still kept increasing very quickly after the missile crisis
(Kastner 2007; 2009). This case shows that not all MIDs are relevant to the liberal commercial peace effect,
even those in which force is actually used by one or both sides.
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not their real interest to cause fatality to each other since doing so will compromise their
interests for cooperation in the future. As a consequence, trade’s pacifying effect
embodies in reducing the probability of fatal MID, and this phenomenon should be
evident both between global dyads and between intra-region dyads.
Based on these reasons, my argument proposes two hypotheses to be tested:
Hypothesis 1: If we look at all levels of MIDs, higher trade is associated with
lower conflict occurrence only when including all dyads, not when limiting the analysis
to intra-region dyads.
Hypothesis 2: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs),
higher trade is associated with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all
dyads, but also when limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads.
Furthermore, as a theoretical implication of my argument, there are two more
phenomena that should also be observed if my argument is robust enough. First, since the
pacifying effect of trade between intra-region dyads is expected to be not statistically
significant if we use all levels of MIDs to conceptualize it (due to the fact that intraregion dyads interact more intensively and so have more disputed issues), it should be
statistically significant once the degree of bilateral interaction is put into control. And,
second, since the pacifying effect of trade mainly embodies in reducing the conflict that
may cause fatality despite how many disputed issues there are between both sides, this
effect should still be statistically significant even though the degree of bilateral
interaction is put into control. Thus, my theory proposes another two hypotheses to be
tested:
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Hypothesis 3: If we look at all levels of MIDs, higher trade is associated with
lower conflict occurrence whether including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intraregion dyads, once the degree of bilateral interaction is put into control.
Hypothesis 4: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs),
higher trade is associated with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all
dyads but also when limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads, whether the degree of
bilateral interaction is controlled or not.
3.2 Universal and regional preconditions of the liberal commercial peace effect
3.2.1 Why the intra-region dyads are different from the inter-region dyads
Just like the methodological debate between the quantitative school and the
qualitative school (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Brady & Collier, 2010), large-N
empirical research of international relations theories is typically regarded by nonquantitative scholars as too general to be useful when applied to explain the details of
each specific event or the regional differences, especially the latter. Scholars who focus
on the regional level of analysis make many arguments to justify the necessity of the
regional level variables against traditional IR theories which typically assume
universalism (Thompson, 1973; Lake & Morgan, 1997; Lemke, 2002; Buzan & Wæver,
2003; Hoogensen, 2005). 12 Among the many pro-regional-centered arguments, all of
them would agree with the claim that traditional international relations theories insist too
much on parsimony, therefore it is too abstract and distant to capture real world regional
dynamics (Hentz & Bas, 2003). A good example is Shambaugh’s (2004) critique of
Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism that, “(i)t is a classic example of an international
12

Refer to Kelly's (2007) review article about these arguments that emphasize the necessity of the regional
level of analysis in the research of international relations.
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relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying
a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence”
(Shambaugh, 2004, p. 94). At the cost of parsimony, bringing regional variables back into
concern can enrich our understanding of the regional variance of general international
relations theories. In terms of statistics, failing to take regional characteristics into
concern when building international relations theory is equal to committing an “omitted
variable bias” (King et al., 1994, p. 170). As Johnston (2012) has noted:
“it is clear that whether because of geographic characteristics, cultural
traits, the density of social network linkages, variation in the loss of
strength gradient, or limits on other pathways for the diffusion of
similarities, there is considerable variation across regions in the
conduct of their international relations……Even important large-N
work suggests regional variation matters for overall findings”
(Johnston, 2012, p. 58).
Therefore, I posit that the variation of the effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace
across different regions is due to some regionally different “omitted variables” that
influence the three main causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace but are
neglected by general international relations theorists.
Since regional omitted variables may bias statistical results, using regional
dummy variables to roughly capsule all the possibly neglected omitted variables of each
region is the most popular way to fix the statistical models. For example, Goldsmith
(2006) argues that the regional omitted variables are very difficult or impossible to be
reduced to “discrete causally independent variables because regions comprise very
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complex sets of path-dependent interactions” (Goldsmith, 2006, p. 536). Therefore, he
proposes two arguments to justify why for some purposes we should understand
international relations based on “regions” and we should not further disaggregate
“regions” into state level of analysis:
“I suggest that regions imply: (1) more similar internal political and
socioeconomic characteristics, both institutions and political culture;
and (2) increased frequency of shared interactions and even shared
perceptions, often leading to similar expectations and patterns of
interaction embodied in regional norms or institutions. These are based
not only on proximity, but on regional identity as well (and so apply
even within the subset of contiguous but inter-Intra-region Dyads…)”
(Goldsmith, 2006, pp. 536–537).
For these reasons, which mainly result from the path-dependence phenomenon
(Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2003; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003), Goldsmith (2006)
argues that “using regions as a manifest indicator for what appear to be complex
interactions between numerous unmeasured latent factors is reasonable empirically and
theoretically” (Goldsmith, 2006, p. 538). Because the regional independent variables are
too complicated and entangled to be further specifically identified, as Goldsmith’s
argument, using regional dummy variables is the simplest way to take regional
characteristics into concern.
Although using regional dummy variables may to some degree alleviate the
omitted variable bias problem in large-N research, it does not help if we want to further
dig out what the regional factors are that make a difference. In other words, using
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regional dummy variables does not advance our knowledge about what causes the
regional variations of the liberal commercial peace. Do these regional variations result
from different regionally specific variables in each of the regions respectively? Or are
they caused by some universal variables that vary in each of the regions respectively?
Using regional dummy variables to model the liberal commercial peace does not enable
us to answer these questions.
Echoing Goldsmith’s argument, I argue that it is the different regional
characteristics that cause the variation of the effectiveness of the liberal commercial
peace across regions. But different from Goldsmith, I neither plan to stop here only by
arguing that there are regional differences of the liberal commercial peace nor make a
strong assumption that there must be some regionally-specific variables that are neglected
by large-N research. Instead, according to the suggestions of literature, I try to look for
the universal factors that vary across different regions rather than look for ad hoc
regionally-specific reasons that condition trade’s pacifying effect. Besides, I also try to
design a general analytical framework based on literature that can guide us to find out
how to make the liberal commercial peace effect work in different regions. In other words,
I neither simply treat regional characteristics as an unmodelable or inseparable set of
many entangled independent variables nor directly use regional dummy variables to catch
all these regional characteristics as Goldsmith did in his research. Instead, according to
literature, I enumerate the specific factors that differentiate one region from the others
and construct an overarching theory to explain the regional variations of the liberal
commercial peace effect. As such, the contribution of this research is to advance a
theoretical progress of the liberal commercial peace theory.
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3.2.2 The universal factors of the liberal commercial peace that vary regionally
Literature of regional international relations research suggests that, due to their
intensive interactions with other neighbor countries in the same region, countries in the
same region tend to have very similar political, economic, and cultural characteristics,
which result from their proximate geography and history and are then later “locked-in” by
the path-dependent effect (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Pierson 2000). By the same
token, countries in different regions tend to have more divergent political, economic, and
cultural characteristics than their intra-region counterparts. Because of this within-region
and between-region difference, I posit that the different outcomes of trade’s pacifying
effect in different regions are due to this within-region and between-region difference as
well. So the next question to ask is, what are the specific factors which remain “similar
within-region” but “dissimilar between-region” that make trade’s pacifying effect vary
across regions? As mentioned before, the liberal commercial peace theory points out
three causal mechanisms that explain how trade can reduce the probability of conflict. A
review of the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace is informative as a
beginning: The constrain argument highlights the importance of opportunity cost, the
informational argument emphasizes on the process of costly signaling, and the
transformative argument accentuates the influence of domestic political coalitions and the
national goals that political leaders pursue. Starting from these three causal mechanisms,
I posit that the key to searching for the specific factors that make trade’s pacifying effect
vary across different regions is in looking for the specific factors that are related with
these causal mechanisms and vary across regions. Based on literature, I argue that it is the
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degree of intra-regional interdependence, the degree of democracy, and the degree of
development that together condition the pacifying effect of trade.
Degree of intra-regional interdependence affects the three causal mechanisms in a
very intuitive way. Higher intra-region interdependence means higher opportunity cost of
cutting of trade as well as higher threshold of the sender state to threaten to cut off trade.
Besides, higher intra-regional interdependence also indicates higher third-party trade and
lower exit cost when the target state is threatened of cutting off trade (Crescenzi, 2003,
2005; Peterson, 2011). Therefore, strategically, higher intra-regional interdependence
enhances the pacifying effect of trade in the region by (1) positively, increasing the
opportunity cost of loss of trade or increasing the threshold of using economic coercion,
or (2) negatively, sender state’s successfully coercing target state by revealing a strong
resolute to use economic sanction (Drezner, 1999; Gartzke, 2003). In addition, higher
intra-regional interdependence itself may also be a consequence of good mutual
relationship, denoting that both the national goals and domestic coalitions are
internationalizing rather than backlashing, which also contributes to regional peace
(Solingen, 2001, 2003, 2007).
Degree of democracy is another factor that conditions the pacifying effect of trade.
After all, leaders are those who make foreign policy decisions (Most & Starr, 1989;
Friedman & Starr, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). If the
leaders are not constrained by any of the three causal mechanisms, the links between
trade and foreign policy selection are disconnected. As the increase of institutional checks
and balances to the leaders as well as the inclusion of social actors who have stakes on
trade, the more likely that they are to be sensitive to the three causal mechanisms
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(Papayoanou 1996; Oneal and Russett 2001; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; 2008). Even in
nondemocracies, we can still find the effect that the more domestic constrains the leaders
face, the more cautiously they use force (Weeks, 2008, 2012). Besides, the more
democratic the regimes are, the more likely the costly signaling effect of trade will work
due to information transparency (Schultz, 2001). All in all, the literature suggests that the
effectiveness of the three liberal commercial peace causal mechanisms is conditioned on
the degree of democracy of each state.
Degree of development also conditions the pacifying effect of trade. Before taking
mutual trade into consideration, degree of development per se influences states’
calculation of using force mainly by two reasons (Rosecrance, 1986). First, if the
conflictual issue is about territory expansion, development can reduce the probability of
conflict because “the costs of seizing and holding a territory increase with increased
development, and the relative utility of occupying the territory decreases,” therefore, “the
chance that the expected utility of occupation exceeds the expected costs will decrease
with increased development” (Hegre, 2000). Second, “since the utility of trade increases
with increased development, then increased development also makes it more likely that
the expected costs of breaking the trade bonds will exceed the gains to be expected from
occupation” (Hegre, 2000, p. 9). From this opportunity cost and indifference curve
perspective, what states long for can be achieved either by military measures or by
economic ones, and increased development makes the former less attractive when the
utility-maximizing states are doing the calculation. Recently, the capitalist peace scholars
further demonstrate that a higher degree of development can largely enhance the
democratic peace effect (Mousseau, 2000, 2003, 2005; Mousseau, Hegre, & O’neal, 2003;
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Gartzke, 2007). When taking mutual trade into concern, given the fact that states with a
higher degree of development tend to trade more, the effects of opportunity cost and
costly signaling will tend to be more salient as well. By the same token, their national
goals and domestic coalition may very likely be pro-internationalizing, too.
Based on the literature I discussed above, both the pacifying effect of trade
“between countries in the same region” and “between countries between different regions”
should be conditioned simultaneously on both countries’ degree of development and
degree of democracy, because the degree of development and democracy can mutually
reinforce the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace. Therefore, overall,
based on the suggestions of previous research, I argue that the regional variances of the
liberal commercial peace effect result from, in terms of statistics, an “omitted variable
bias” or a “model miss-specification,” that is, the pacifying effect of trade should be a
conditional one, which hinges simultaneously on both the degree of democracy and the
degree of development. More specifically, a three-way interaction term of
interdependence multiplied by development and democracy should be the independent
variable instead of using interdependence as the only variable when modeling the liberal
commercial peace effect. Once we specify the model as such, the regional variances of
the liberal commercial peace effect should be disappear since these inter-region and intraregion differences have been caught up by the three-way interaction already. Hence, the
hypotheses to be tested are:
Hypothesis 5: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs),
trade’s pacifying effect is conditioned simultaneously on both the degree of development
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and the degree of democracy. That is, the three-way interaction of interdependence ×
development × democracy is associated with lower conflict occurrence.
Hypothesis 6: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs),
the three-way interaction of interdependence × development × democracy is associated
with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all dyads but also when limiting
the analysis to intra-region dyads.
What will happen if we try to predict all kinds of MIDs (instead of only the MIDs
that caused fatality) with the three-way interaction? According to my theory, the threeway interaction will not have a statistically significant pacifying effect, whether at the
global level or at the regional level. The reason is that, although the pacifying effect of
trade can be reinforced by both the higher degree of democracy and the higher degree of
development, higher degree of democracy and development also enhance the
intensiveness of bilateral interaction and therefore leading to more conflicts. As a
consequence, the pacifying effect of the three-way interaction resulting from the
enhancement of the three causal mechanisms will be offset by the simultaneouslyincreased intensiveness of bilateral interaction. Thus, the last two hypotheses my theory
proposes are:
Hypothesis 7: If we look at all kinds of MIDs, the three-way interaction of
interdependence × development × democracy is not associated with lower conflict
occurrence.
Hypothesis 8: If we look at all kinds of MIDs, the three-way interaction of
interdependence × development × democracy is not associated with lower conflict
occurrence whether including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads.
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To sum up, in this section, I argue that the pacifying effect of trade should be
understood as the following two points. First, trade will not decrease the probability of
conflict that does not cause fatality, but will reduce the probability of conflict that cause
fatality. Second, this liberal commercial peace effect is conditioned simultaneously on the
degree of democracy and the degree of development, which accounts for the regional
variances of the liberal commercial peace effect across different regions around the world.
I illustrate this unified theoretical framework of the liberal commercial peace effect at the
regional level of analysis in Figure 2.1 on the next page. All the eight hypotheses will be
tested with data of the onset of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from 1950 to 2001
in the next section.

4 Research design
4.1 Dependent variables and statistical models
Following most of the literature on the relationship between trade and conflict, I
use the onset of a new militarized interstate dispute (MID) between a pair of states each
year as the dependent variable. This is because the dyadic design can better take different
security threats that different countries face into concern. Thus the unit of analysis is
dyad-year. I use the MID 3.1 dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) of the Correlates
of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between or among states
involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of
military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). The new MID onset is a dichotomous
variable which is coded 1 for the first year of a new MID in a dyad and 0 otherwise. The
subsequent years of the same MID in the starting year is dropped from the data to reduce
the problem of temporal dependence, because the statistical model I employ in this study,
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Figure 2.1 A Unified theoretical framework of the liberal commercial peace effect between the intra-region dyads

the logit regression model, assumes that the conflict events being analyzed are
independent of each other. The temporal span of MID 3.1 data is from 1816 to 2001.
Because most of the trade and GDP data is available only after 1950, the temporal
coverage of this research is from 1950 to 2001.
For several reasons I mentioned above, in some models I look at only the MIDs
that caused fatality, the fatal MIDs, instead of all the recorded MIDs. Because MID onset
is a time-series cross-sectional binary variable across time (years) and space (dyads), in
order to produce accurate standard errors and consistent coefficients, I estimate the logit
regression model with the Huber/White robust standard error which assumes that
observations within the same dyad across years are correlated but those between different
dyads are uncorrelated, adjusting for clustering in dyads. I also adopt Carter and
Signorino’s (2010) method to include peace years between two MIDs or fatal MIDs that
happened in the same dyad (how long the dyad remains a peaceful relationship in years),
its square, and its cube into the model to control for temporal dependence. 13 As most of
the literature, I estimate all the models with the dependent variable at time t and
independent variables at time t − 1 to mitigate problems of reverse causality.
4.2 Independent variables and control variables
My theory predicts that the three-way interaction of interdependence ×
development × democracy has a strong pacifying effect, so in order to have a complete
model, my independent variables should include both this three-way interaction term as
well as all its constituencies of interdependence × development, interdependence ×

13

I also estimate all the models using Beck et al.'s (1998) peace years and cubic splines to control for
temporal dependence. The outcomes are almost identical to Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method I
adopted.
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democracy, and development × democracy. Like most literature of the liberal
commercial peace, I conceptualize interdependence, development, and democracy
following the “weak link” logic adopted by Dixon (1994) and Oneal and Russett (1997)
which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less
constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & Russett, 1997, p. 273). Typically,
countries which has lower degree of interdependence, democracy, and development are
regarded as the less constraint ones. Low dependence is the lower ratio of the sum of
State A’s imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP in each dyad-year, data
from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Low democracy is the lower
democracy score of the two states in each dyad-year, data from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). The Polity IV dataset’s democracy score ranges from 10 (the most autocratic) to 10 (the most democratic). Low GDP/pc is the logged GDP per
capita of the lower GDP per capita value in each dyad-year, data also from Gleditsch’s
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Thus the three-way interaction and all its
constituencies are made of the combinations of these three variables, respectively.
To compare with most of the liberal commercial peace studies, I control for the
following variables that had been demonstrated to have influences on conflict onset. I put
the number of joint intergovernmental organization memberships (IGOs) into the model
to include all the three Kantian peace components, and control for Polity difference,
Power ratio, Alliance, Cold war, Contiguity, Distance, and None major power dyad
in the models. IGOs is the number of total shared memberships of intergovernmental
organizations of the two states in each dyad year, data from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and
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Warnke (2004). 14 Polity difference is State A’s polity score minus State B’s polity score
in absolute value, considering interest (dis)similarity resulting from different political
regimes may influence the relationship between the two countries in each dyad (Bennett
& Stam, 2000b; Peceny, Beer, & Sanchez-Terry, 2002). Power ratio is the weaker state’s
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score (Singer, 1988) divided by that of
the stronger state and then logged (to catch the decreasing marginal advantage of
increasing power difference) to generate a power ratio which ranges from 0 (total
preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Alliance is a dummy variable
with a value of 1 if the two states in each dyad have signed a defense pact, neutrality, or
entente in the year, and with a value of 0 if otherwise. Cold war is a dummy variable,
taking a value of 1 between 1950 and 1989 to control for the change of international
structure which may have a systemic effect on conflict onset in the region. Contiguity is
a dummy variable which denotes whether the two countries of the dyad are contiguous by
land, predicted to be positively correlated with conflict onset. Distance is the logged
distance (in miles) between capitals of the two states in each dyad, predicted to be
negatively related with conflict onset. Because major power countries are more prone to
involve in international disputes (Bremer, 1992; Xiang, Xu, & Keteku, 2007), I create a
dummy variable None major power dyad to control for this influence of power, taking a
value of 1 is both states in the dyad are none major powers, and 0 if otherwise. The
summary of all the variables used is shown in Table 2.1.
14

Although I have noticed that previous research about IGOs’ pacifying effect is mixed as Dorussen and
Ward's (2008) review had demonstrated, and that the aggregated count variable of shared IGO membership
may mislead our understanding of IGOs’ role in promoting peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004),
I still include this aggregated count variable in my models in order to further confirm my argument by
considering all the Kantian peace variables at the same time. The statistical results are almost identical with
or without this variable.
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Although various variables are taken into control, the significance of my
independent variables, especially the three-way interaction term, is not sensitive
including or not including any of or all of these control variables above, whether
including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads.
4.3 Subsample variable: How to define a region
To investigate the relationship between trade and conflict at the regional level, it
is necessary to define what a region is, that is, they way to distinguish one region from all
the others by theoretical reasons according to the goal of theory. The literature points out
several theoretical methods to define a region. Generally speaking, regions can be defined
by two main factors – physical regions (categorized by geographical and strategic reasons)
and functional regions (categorized by economic, environmental, and cultural reasons)
(Väyrynen, 2003), the former is also referred to “space of places” and the latter “space of
flows” (Castells, 1996). For example, Goldsmith (2006) separates regions simply by
geography using the Correlates of War database’s default, while Lake and Morgan (1997),
Lemke (2002), and Buzan and Wæver (2003) define region mainly according to security
externality and power structure concerns, and Huntington (2011) distinguishes regions by
cultural factors and Buzan & Wæver (2003) somewhat also emphasize the concern of
social construction. Because the goal of this research is to investigate how the universal
factors that vary in different regions condition the pacifying effect of trade, mainly the
intra-region trade and the intra-regional conflict which includes both places and flows,
my position is somewhere between the physical and the functional approaches. That is, I
am looking for a definition of region that is composed of approximate countries who have
the most frequent interactions not only economically but also politically.
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Table 2.1 Summary of all the variables used
Variable

Observations
521,971
436,680
521,971
424,158
521,971
424,158
424,158

Mean
0.0003777
-4.237426
7.578194
0.000171
0.0032546
-31.0953
0.0035852

Standard Deviation
0.0023553
5.873694
0.8534986
0.0218834
0.0214277
46.00385
0.2046547

0
-10
5.639279
-1.263152
0
-106.778
-8.788939

Max
0.2143973
10
10.6778
1.55768
1.554244
102.0583
15.10027

IGOs
Polity difference
Power ratio
Alliance
Cold war
Contiguity
Distance
None major power dyad

539,106
436,680
545,231
528,033
546,178
546,178
546,178
546,178

21.64904
7.984609
-2.49345
0.0701055
0.6268671
0.0364588
8.250772
0.9270677

11.50687
6.537954
1.96174
0.2553249
0.4836374
0.187429
0.7804501
0.2600255

0
0
-11.97376
0
0
0
1.609438
0

108
20
0
1
1
1
9.421168
1

MID Peace years
MID Peace years
MID Peace years
Fatal MID peace years
Fatal MID peace years
Fatal MID peace years

546,178
546,178
546,178
546,178
546,178
546,178

17.76141
486.7549
15973.2
18.00594
497.1569
16406.92

13.08768
586.4473
25821.03
13.1508
593.472
26246.12

0
0
0
0
0
0

51
2601
132651
51
2601
132651

Low dependence
Low democracy
Low GDP/pc
Low dependence X Low democracy
Low dependence X Low GDP/pc
Low democracy X Low GDP/pc
Low dependence X Low democracy X Low GDP/pc

Min
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For a pair of countries to have trade and conflict, according to the opportunity and
willingness framework (Most & Starr, 1982, 1989), there must be a necessary condition
that these two countries must have sufficient capabilities to interact with each other. By
the same token, to investigate the pacifying effect of trade in different regions, it is
imperative to define a region by a set of countries who have sufficient interaction with
other countries in the same region but have rather insufficient interaction with countries
outside the region. To match this theoretical need, I find Lemke’s (2002) definition of
regions is the most ideal measurement available for my purpose. Based on Bueno de
Mesquita’s (1981) operationalization of Boulding’s (1962) loss-of-strength gradient,
Lemke (2002) defines regions as groups of proximate states all of which hold sufficient
capabilities to interact with each other. By applying a similar formula revised from
Boulding’s (1962), Lemke (2002) divides the world into 22 regions according to the
model results: North America and the Caribbean, Central America, South America,
Europe, West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, the Central Lowlands of Africa, The South
Atlantic Coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean region of Africa, the Central Highlands of
Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Maghreb, The Northern Rim of Africa,
The Arab-Israeli region of the Middle East, The Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, East
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, The Asian Archipelago, and Oceania. According to
Lemke’s categorizing method, a set of countries that interact with each other the most
intensively are categorized as a region. By this definition, a region contains countries that
the most likely to have trade and conflict with each other. Therefore, it is the most ideal
classification for the goal of this research: to investigate the variation of trade’s pacifying
effect in different regions.
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By adopting Lemke’s (2002) definition of regions, I define the intra-region dyads
as the dyadic country combinations that belong to the same region among the 22 regions
above. The reference group is the global dyads often-used in large-N empirical IR
research which are composed of the dyadic country combinations of all the countries
around the world. According to the data I generated from the Eugene software (Bennett &
Stam, 2000a), from 1950 to 2001, there are 417,773 none-directed dyad-year
observations (and 13,538 global dyads); while according to Lemke’s (2002) definition,
there are 32,372 none-directed dyad-year observations (and 1,177 intra-region dyads). 15
Since I have differentiated intra-region dyads from global dyads, here I
demonstrate some stylized facts to show that looking at intra-region dyads rather than
global dyads is more informative to understand interstate militarized conflict. Table 2.2 is
the tabulation of all the fatal MIDs occurred from 1950 to 2001 between all dyads. Table
2.2 shows that there are total 466 MIDs that caused fatality occurred among the 546,178
dyad-year observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID is
0.09%.
Table 2.3 is the tabulation of all the fatal MIDs that occurred between inter-region
dyads from 1950 to 2001. According to Table 2.3, 205 of the total 466 MIDs (44%) are
happened between inter-region dyads among the 502,248 inter-region dyad-year
observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID happened
between inter-region dyads is 0.04%.
Table 2.4 is the tabulation of the fatal MIDs that happened between intra-region
dyads from 1950 to 2001. According to Table 2.4, 261 of the total 466 fatal MIDs (56%)

15

Not counting in the dyads with missing values of the independent variables and the control variables.
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are happened between intra-region dyads among the 43,930 intra-region dyad-year
observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID happened
between intra-region dyads is 0.59%, which is 6 times higher than the baseline
probability of all the fatal MIDs between global dyads (0.09%) and 15 times higher than
the baseline probability of fatal MIDs between inter-region dyads (0.04%).
This tabulation analysis highlights the theoretical necessity of analyzing intra-region
dyads. As we see in Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 2.4, intra-region dyads are more
likely to undergo fatal MIDs than inter-region dyads, which confirms the effect that
countries that interact more tend to have more trade and conflict. Thus, for the liberal
commercial peace effect to be a meaningful phenomenon, it must work not only between
the global and inter-region dyads but also between the intra-region dyads. If trade’s
pacifying effect works only between the global dyads and inter-region dyads but not
between intra-region dyads, then there is a good reason to reconsider the liberal
commercial peace theory. In the next section, I will use statistical models to show that my
theory is more robust than the liberal commercial peace theory because the former does
not hold in intra-region dyads, while my theory offers a more consistent explanation for
both the global dyads and the intra-region dyads.
4.4 Interaction density control variables: Hegre’s (2009) approach
As for the control for the bilateral interaction density, I adopt Hegre’s (2009)
approach to conceptualize the bilateral “size dependence.” As many previous studies
have demonstrated (Tinbergen, 1962; Deardorff, 1997), “the volume of trade between
two countries is to a large degree proportional to the product of the two countries’ GDP
and inversely proportional to the distance between them” (Hegre, 2009, p. 28). At
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Table 2.2 The number of fatal MIDs between all dyads, 1950~2001
Frequency
545,712
466
546,178

No
Yes
Number of dyad-year observations
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Percentage
99.91
0.09
100.00

Table 2.3 The number of fatal MIDs occurred between inter-region dyads, 1950~2001
Frequency
502,043
205
502,248

No
Yes
Number of dyad-year observations
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Percentage
99.96
0.04
100.00

Table 2.4 The number of fatal MIDs occurred between intra-region dyads, 1950~2001
Frequency
43,669
261
43,930

No
Yes
Number of dyad-year observations
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Percentage
99.41
0.59
100.00

the same time, as for the interaction density in terms of interpersonal contact, Zipf (1946)
shows that the number of persons that move between any two cities is also in proportion
to the product of the number of populations of these two cities divided by the distance. In
other words, the bilateral interaction density, whether in trade or in interpersonal contact,
can be measured by similar methods, which is called “the gravity model” given that it has
the same structure as the gravity model in physics. Therefore, Hegre (2009) suggests that
to handle this kind of interference of “size dependence” on bilateral trade and conflict, we
should put in all the decomposed variables of trade and conflict – that is, their constituent
parts – to control for interaction density. These decomposed parts include both (logged)
populations, distance, and contiguity. Besides, Hegre (2009) also suggests to put in
(logged) GDP per capita and degree of democracy of both sides into the gravity model
because richer and more democratic countries have higher ability to interact with other
countries. Since I already have Contiguity and Distance in the control variables, in the
models which I control for interaction density, I include Country A’s population,
Country B’s population, Country A’s GDP per capita, Country B’s GDP per capita,
Country A’s polity score, and Country B’s polity score as the control variables of
bilateral interaction density.

5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Basic analysis
In Table 2.5 I test the first two hypotheses. Model 1 is the popular Russett and
Oneal model of the triangulating peace research (Russett and Oneal 2001), which takes
all the dyads into concern. The result is the same as the liberal commercial peace
literature that interdependence does reduce the probability of MID. However, Model 2

50

Table 2.5 Liberal commercial peace, global and regional, 1950~2001
[Dependent Variables t ]

All MID Onset

Fatal MID Onset

Test Hypothesis 1
Model 1
Model 2
All Dyads Intra-region Dyads

Test Hypothesis 2
Model 3
Model 4
All Dyads Intra-region Dyads

[Independent Variable t −1 ]
-63.513***
(18.841)

-20.008
(12.514)
P<0.110

-98.459*
(39.315)

-77.029*
(37.221)

-0.043**
(0.014)

-0.030
(0.019)

-0.035
(0.025)

-0.014
(0.027)

-0.097
(0.074)

-0.298**
(0.112)

-0.632***
(0.128)

-0.721***
(0.154)

IGOs

0.024***
(0.006)

0.008
(0.007)

0.024*
(0.010)

0.016
(0.012)

Polity difference

0.041***
(0.008)

0.043***
(0.013)

0.045***
(0.013)

0.034*
(0.017)

Power ratio

0.193***
(0.044)

0.127*
(0.056)

0.218**
(0.070)

0.238**
(0.085)

Alliance

-0.304**
(0.140)

-0.434***
(0.154)

-0.284
(0.186)

-0.592***
(0.210)

Cold war

0.253*
(0.113)

-0.199
(0.164)

0.353
(0.203)

0.458
(0.240)

Contiguity

2.779***
(0.169)

2.507***
(0.197)

3.451***
(0.295)

3.466***
(0.421)

Distance

-0.410***
(0.066)

-0.145*
(0.070)

-0.483***
(0.110)

-0.266*
(0.124)

None major power dyad

-1.758***
(0.172)

-0.775***
(0.217)

-1.864***
(0.284)

-0.428
(0.404)

1

-0.321***

-0.259***

-0.275***

-0.322***

(0.022)

(0.030)

(0.037)

(0.038)

0.011***

0.008***

0.009***

0.012***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

-0.000***

-0.000**

-0.000**

-0.000**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.343
(0.874)

-0.546
(1.071)

2.622
(1.514)

1.333
(1.644)

Low dependence

[Control Variables t −1 ]
Low democracy

Low GDP/pc

Peace years

Peace years

Peace years

Constant

2

3
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Pseudo R2
0.350
0.257
0.371
Log Likelihood
-6225.803
-2548.931
-2178.461
Chi-squared
2699.641
546.070
1487.689
Number of clusters
13,538
1,177
13,538
Number of observations
417,773
32,372
417,773
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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0.327
-972.497
378.777
1,177
32,372

demonstrates that this liberal commercial peace effect does not hold when we look at
only the intra-region Dyads. In Model 2, interdependence does not have a significant
pacifying effect anymore; in addition, its substantive effect shrinks by a great deal. The
result of Model 1 and Model 2 shows that, when looking at all levels of MIDs, the liberal
commercial peace effect only works inter-regionally, not intra-regionally, which suggests
that previous findings of the liberal commercial peace effect largely result from the interregional effects rather than from the inter-regional ones and that the substantive effect of
trade’s pacifying effect in reducing all levels of MIDs is over-emphasized by the liberals.
Model 3 and Model 4 test my argument about a correct understanding of the
liberal commercial peace effect: Trade does not always decrease the probability of lowlevel MIDs (those that do not cause fatality) due to the fact that trade is also a
measurement of interaction density, while trade does decrease the probability of highlevel MIDs (those that caused fatality). The result of Model 3 and Model 4 show that,
when looking at only the MIDs that caused fatality, the liberal commercial peace effect
holds stably whether at the global level or at the regional level.
In Table 2.6 I test the two extended hypotheses: Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.
Model 5 and Model 6 demonstrate that once controlling for interaction density, the liberal
commercial peace effect is significant in reducing all levels of MIDs at both the global
level and the regional level. Model 7 and Model 8 show that if we look at only the MIDs
that caused fatality, the liberal commercial peace effect is significant at both the global
level and the regional level, whether controlling for interaction density or not.
Table 2.7 is the test of the three-way interaction because my argument expects
that the pacifying effect of trade is conditioned simultaneously on the degree of
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Table 2.6 Liberal commercial peace, global and regional, with interaction density, 1950~2001
[Dependent Variable t ]

All MID Onset

Fatal MID Onset

Hypothesis 3
Model 5
Model 6
All Dyads
Intra-region Dyads
Yes
Yes

Hypothesis 4
Model 7
Model 8
All Dyads Intra-region Dyads
Yes
Yes

-57.921***
(16.872)

-22.095
(12.450)
P<0.076

-85.100*
(36.101)

-65.777*
(30.388)

Low democracy

-0.083***
(0.014)

-0.088***
(0.018)

-0.092***
(0.026)

-0.056*
(0.027)

Low GDP/pc

-0.338**
(0.110)

-0.344*
(0.153)

-0.877***
(0.160)

-0.696**
(0.215)

0.007
(0.005)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.006
(0.008)

0.005
(0.009)

0.191***
(0.041)

0.122
(0.068)

0.274***
(0.068)

0.220*
(0.097)

Alliance

0.053
(0.143)

-0.175
(0.159)

-0.011
(0.186)

-0.277
(0.205)

Cold war

0.628***
(0.133)

0.069
(0.188)

0.730***
(0.221)

0.658*
(0.296)

Contiguity

2.206***
(0.189)

2.174***
(0.208)

3.093***
(0.319)

3.054***
(0.437)

Distance

-0.670***
(0.093)

-0.350***
(0.084)

-0.694***
(0.147)

-0.444**
(0.143)

None major power dyad

-0.413*
(0.199)

-0.072
(0.274)

-0.431
(0.370)

0.119
(0.611)

Country A’s capability

6.474***
(1.597)

0.736
(2.319)

-0.249***
(0.037)

-0.306***
(0.039)

Country B’s capability

0.593
(2.272)

0.556
(3.652)

0.007***
(0.002)

0.011***
(0.003)

Country A’s population

0.243***
(0.045)

0.217***
(0.063)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000**
(0.000)

Country B’s population

0.218***
(0.049)

0.170*
(0.073)

8.871**
(2.785)

-3.893
(6.587)

Country A’s GDP/pc

0.207***
(0.057)

-0.021
(0.090)

-2.180
(4.193)

-7.698
(10.839)

Interaction density
[Independent Variable t −1 ]
Low dependence

[Control Variables t −1 ]

IGOs

Power ratio

54

Country B’s GDP/pc

0.220**
(0.068)

0.229**
(0.084)

0.201**
(0.073)

0.262**
(0.101)

Country A’s polity score

0.036***
(0.009)

0.044**
(0.014)

0.137
(0.078)

0.185
(0.097)

Country B’s Polity score

0.017
(0.010)

0.020
(0.016)

0.264***
(0.076)

-0.173
(0.161)

1

-0.285***

-0.237***

0.154

0.304**

(0.021)

(0.030)

(0.087)

(0.102)

0.009***

0.007***

0.050***

0.021

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.014)

(0.019)

-0.000***

-0.000*

0.020

0.016

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.017)

(0.019)

-3.515
(2.036)
0.391
-2110.438
1734.142
13,538
417,773

-5.980**
(2.160)
0.342
-951.620
552.058
1,177
32,372

Peace years

Peace years

Peace years

2

3

Constant

-8.111***
-6.821***
(1.356)
(1.777)
Pseudo R2
0.372
0.272
Log Likelihood.
-6020.258
-2495.520
Chi-squared
2757.497
714.652
Number of clusters
13,538
1,177
Number of observations
417,773
32,372
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 2.7 Three-way interaction of liberal commercial peace, global and regional, 1950~2001
Fatal MID Onset

[Dependent Variables t ]

Interaction Density

Test Hypothesis 5
Model 9
Model 10
All Dyads
Intra-region Dyads
No
No

Test Hypothesis 6
Model 11
Model 12
All Dyads
Intra-region Dyads
Yes
Yes

[Independent Variables t −1 ]
Low dependence

734.302***
(177.010)

427.002*
(181.729)

726.865***
(183.555)

437.039*
(198.029)

Low Democracy

0.043
(0.158)

0.006
(0.166)

-0.136
(0.148)

-0.072
(0.146)

Low GDP/pc

-0.589***
(0.166)

-0.660**
(0.183)

-0.740***
(0.174)

-0.609*
(0.227)

Low dependence
Low democracy

84.331***
(21.890)

68.925***
(21.266)

81.877***
(23.631)

59.752**
(23.429)

Low dependence
Low GDP/pc

-114.610***
(27.457)

-70.813*
(28.273)

-110.768***
(28.118)

-71.491*
(30.605)

Low democracy
Low GDP/pc

-0.006
(0.020)

-0.000
(0.021)

0.009
(0.019)

0.005
(0.019)

-12.434***
(3.275)

-10.080**
(3.108)

-11.725***
(3.443)

-8.881**
(3.345)

IGOs

0.027**
(0.010)

0.018
(0.012)

0.008
(0.008)

0.006
(0.009)

Polity difference

0.041**
(0.013)

0.031
(0.017)

Power ratio

0.228**
(0.070)

0.252**
(0.085)

0.279***
(0.068)

0.220*
(0.096)

Alliance

-0.274
(0.180)

-0.613**
(0.207)

-0.003
(0.183)

-0.283
(0.204)

Cold war

0.422*
(0.204)

0.488*
(0.243)

0.756***
(0.220)

0.696*
(0.294)

Contiguity

3.396***
(0.289)

3.512***
(0.433)

3.071***
(0.314)

3.126***
(0.449)

Distance

-0.502***
(0.112)

-0.279*
(0.126)

-0.702***
(0.147)

-0.453**
(0.145)

None major power dyad

-2.017***
(0.275)

-0.590
(0.412)

-0.606
(0.380)

-0.231
(0.625)

Country A’s capability

8.332**
(3.040)

-6.278
(6.898)

Country B’s capability

-2.956
(4.217)

-9.668
(10.274)

Country A’s population

0.195**
(0.071)

0.264*
(0.103)

×
×
×

Low dependence
Low democracy
Low GDP/pc

×
×

[Control Variables t −1 ]
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Country B’s population

0.142
(0.079)

0.197*
(0.096)

Country A’s GDP/pc

0.259***
(0.077)

-0.175
(0.163)

Country B’s GDP/pc

0.146
(0.088)

0.311**
(0.104)

Country A’s polity score

0.049***
(0.014)

0.022
(0.018)

Country B’s polity score

0.019
(0.017)

0.015
(0.019)

Peace years

Peace years

Peace years

1

2

3

-0.274***

-0.319***

-0.250***

-0.304***

(0.036)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.039)

0.009***

0.012***

0.007***

0.011***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.003)

-0.000*

-0.000**

-0.000

-0.000*

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-4.117
(2.197)
0.394
-2100.422
1852.416
13,538
417,773

-6.465**
(2.260)
0.344
-947.792
591.801
1,177
32,372

Constant

2.728
1.170
(1.855)
(1.963)
Pseudo R2
0.376
0.331
Log likelihood
-2162.386
-967.650
Chi-squared
1596.129
388.190
Number of clusters
13,538
1,177
Number of observations
417,773
32,372
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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democracy and the degree of development. Model 9 and Model 10 test Hypothesis 5,
where the three-way interaction term is significant in reducing the MIDs that caused
fatality at both the global level and the regional level. That is, whether at the global level
or at the regional level, the pacifying effect of trade is conditioned on both the degree of
democracy and the degree of development.
Model 11 and Model 12 test Hypothesis 6, which states that the three-way
interaction term is significant in reducing the MIDs that caused fatality at both the global
level and the regional level, even though the interaction density is also taken into concern.
That is, whether at the global level or at the regional level, the pacifying effect of trade is
conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of development, and this
three-way conditional effect holds stably whether the interaction density is controlled for.
The statistical test for Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 is not shown for brevity. The test
shows that when looking at all levels of MIDs, the three-way interaction is not
statistically significant in reducing conflict, whether at the global level or at the regional
level. The reason is that the degree of democracy and the degree of development are also
the measurement of the intensiveness of bilateral interaction, and so countries interact
more frequently tend to have more low-level MIDs. This nullifies the pacifying effect of
the three-way interaction.
The three-way interaction also explains for the puzzle why in some regions trade
actually leads to conflict rather than reduce it. In all the three-way interaction models in
Table 2.7, one of the constituent variable, Low dependence, is significant with a positive
coefficient, which means that in dyads where the degree of democracy and development
is not high enough, trade actually increase the probability of fatal conflict. In other words,
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in regions where there are few democratic and rich countries, trade may lead to conflict
rather than promote peace. Thus my theory provides a unified explanation for the
regional contradicting variations of the liberal commercial peace effect.
In sum, all the hypotheses my theory proposed are well-supported by the
empirical evidences. These results confirm my arguments that, first, looking at all kinds
of MIDs is not a proper way to understand the liberal commercial peace effect, because
the pacifying effect of trade works not in reducing all kinds of MIDs, but in reducing the
MIDs that would cause fatality; and, second, the liberal commercial peace effect is
simultaneously conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of
development, that is, higher levels of democracy and development can reinforce trade’s
pacifying effect due to enhancing the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial
peace. My argument not only explains for why there are global and regional variations of
the liberal commercial peace effect, but also develops a unified theory, the three-way
conditional preconditions, that bridges the global-regional discrepancies of the liberal
commercial peace effect.
5.2 The outcome of the control variables
The results of the control variables are also very informative and important to my
theory. In Table 2.5, Table 2.6, and Table 2.7, I frame the control variables which have
different effects on the dependent variables between the global level and the regional
level.
In Model 1 and Model 2 where the dependent variable is the onset of all kinds of
MIDs, Low democracy, IGOs, and Cold war have significant influences at the global
level, not at the regional level; instead, Low GDP/pc has significant influence at the
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regional level, not at the global level. In other words, when considering all kinds of MIDs,
the increase of the degree of democracy reduces the probability of conflict mainly
between a pair of countries from different regions, not in the same region; the increase of
development (Low GDP/pc) reduces the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of
countries in the same region, not from different regions; the increase of IGO
memberships increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of countries
from different regions, not in the same region; and a pair of countries from different
regions are more likely to undergo MIDs during the Cold War period, but this
phenomenon does not exist between a pair of countries in the same region.
In Model 3 and Model 4 where the dependent variable is the onset of fatal MIDs
only, IGOs and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global level,
not at the regional level; instead, Alliance has significant influence at the regional level,
not at the global level. In other words, when considering only the fatal MIDs, the increase
of IGO memberships increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of
countries from different regions, not in the same region; a pair of countries in the same
region who are allies are less likely to undergo MIDs, but a pair of countries from
different regions who are allies are not; and none major power dyads from different
regions are less likely to undergo MIDs, but none major power dyads in the same region
are not.
In Model 5 and Model 6 where the dependent variable is the onset of all kinds of
MIDs and the interaction density of both sides is taken into concern, Power ratio, Cold
war, and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global level, not at
the regional level. In other words, when considering all kinds of MIDs, the increase of
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power ratio increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of countries from
different regions, not in the same region; a pair of countries from different regions are
more likely to undergo MIDs during the Cold War period, but this phenomenon does not
exist between a pair of countries in the same region; and none major power dyads from
different regions are less likely to undergo MIDs, but none major power dyads in the
same region are not. However, in Model 7 and Model 8 where the dependent variable is
the onset of fatal MIDs only and the interaction density of both sides is taken into
concern, this global-regional discrepancies disappear. Compared to Model 3 and Model 4
where the dependent variable is also fatal MID onset but not controlling for the
interaction density of both sides, the global-regional consistency of Model 7 and Model 8
implies that the global-regional discrepancies should result from different interaction
density, so once controlled for it the discrepancies no longer exist.
In Model 9 and Model 10 where the dependent variable is fatal MID onset, the
independent variable is the three-way interaction, and the interaction density is not
controlled, IGOs and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global
level, not at the regional level; instead, Alliance has significant influence at the regional
level, not at the global level. The outcome of Model 9 and Model 10 is very similar to
Model 3 and 4. The only difference between “Model 3 – Model 4” and “Model 9 – Model
10” is the independent variable (Low dependence vs. the three-way interaction). Again,
in Model 11 and Model 12 where the dependent variable is fatal MID onset, the
independent variable is the three-way interaction, and the interaction density is controlled,
this global-regional discrepancies disappear. The outcomes of Model 11 and Model 12
are very similar to Model 7 and Model 8. The only difference between “Model 7 – Model
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8” and “Model 11 – Model 12” is the independent variable (Low dependence vs. the
three-way interaction). Notice that in Table 2.7 the coefficients of the three-way
interaction hold stably at both the global level (-12.434 vs. -11.725) and the regional level
(-10.080 vs. -8.881) whether the interaction density of both sides is controlled for or not.
Compared to the very unstable result of the Low dependence independent variable
before and after controlling for the interaction density (-98.459 vs. -85.100; -77.029 vs. 65.777), this implies that the three-way interaction is a more proper way to model the
liberal commercial peace effect despite different levels of analysis.
In sum, many of the control variables have different effects between the global
level and the regional level, and once the interaction density is controlled for, this globalregional difference no longer exists. The results here confirms the methodological
necessity of the regional level of analysis that when testing general theories of
international relations, we should test it not only at the global level but also at the
regional level.
5.3 Substantive effects
To further interpret the substantive effect of the three-way interaction, in Figure
2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4 I plot the predicted probability of fatal MID onset based
on the estimation of Model 11 in Table 2.7, according to the change of Low dependence,
Low democracy, and Low GDP/pc, respectively, holding all other variables constant. 16
In each plot, I look at how the probability of fatal MID changes with the predictor under

16

I plot all the figures according to the method suggested by Dawson and Richter (2006) and Dawson
(2014). I first standardize all the independent variables and control variables, and re-run Model 11 to get
new coefficients. Then, I plot the figures according to the new coefficients. Therefore, the variation of the
predictor of each plot refers to the variation of each independent variable after it has been standardized.
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Figure 2.2 Predicted probability of fatal MID onset, using Low dependence (denoting as Dependence in the plot)

64
Figure 2.3 Predicted probability of fatal MID onset, using Low democracy (denoting as Democracy in the plot)
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Figure 2.4 Predicted probability of fatal MID onset, using Low GDP/pc (denoting as GDP/pc in the plot)

four different conditions: when both the other two moderators are at their high level,
when both of them are at their low level, when one of them is at its high level and the
other is at its low level, and when one of them is at its low level and the other is at its
high level. Low level or high level of each moderator is determined by their 1st or the
99th percentile of all the observations. 17
Figure 2.2 shows how the degree of democracy and the degree of development
condition trade’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as poor
autocracies, rich autocracies, poor democracies, and rich democracies. As we can see in
Figure 2.2, at the regional level, poor countries are more likely to have conflict than rich
countries. In poor autocracies, the probability of conflict decrease with the increase of the
degree of dependence; however, in poor democracies, the probability of conflict increases
with the increase of the degree of dependence. In rich countries, the pacifying effect of
trade is not as salient as in rich countries. In total, Figure 2.2 confirms my argument that
the pacifying effect of trade is conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the
degree of development.
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 demonstrate the three-way interaction based on the
point of view from democracy and from development, holding the degree of dependence
constant at its low and the high values.

17

Although Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) suggest that theories with interaction terms should be tested
with all the combinations of the lowest and highest values of all the variables, I do not demonstrate the
results when Low dependence, Low democracy, and Low GDP/pc are at their extreme values at both
ends, respectively. Instead, I present the results when these variables are very low and very high (at the 1st
and the 99th percentiles). This is because the real world data of these three variables have extreme outlier
values at both ends. Therefore, adopting the values of the 1st and the 99th percentiles will be a more proper
way to show the relative low and high values of these variables rather than adopting their lowest and
highest values.
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Figure 2.3 shows how the degree of dependence and the degree of development
condition democracy’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as
poor and highly-dependent countries, poor and low-dependent countries, rich and highlydependent countries, and rich and low-dependent countries. As we can see in Figure 2.3,
at the regional level, poor countries are more likely to have conflict than rich countries.
Counter-intuitively, the increase of the degree of democracy does not have salient
influence on the probability of conflict in three of the four situation; and, in poor and
highly-dependent countries, the increase of the degree of democracy actually increase the
probability of conflict. Put differently, the pacifying effect of trade in poor and highlydependent countries with increased degree of democracy is not evident as the liberal
commercial peace studies may contend.
Figure 2.4 shows how the degree of dependence and the degree of democracy
condition development’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as
low-dependent democracies, low-dependent autocracies, highly-dependent autocracies,
and highly-dependent democracies. As we can see in Figure 2.4, at the regional level, the
pacifying effect of development is remarkably stable under all of these four different
situations. That is, the increase of GDP per capita will consistently decrease the
probability of fatal MID despite the degree of dependence and the degree of democracy.
Comparing the results of Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4, we can find
several patterns of trade’s pacifying effect. First, trade’s pacifying effect is, exactly as my
theory predicts, a conditional one. In rich democracies and poor autocracies, trade
reduces the probability of conflict. However, in poor democracies, trade increases the
probability of conflict; and in rich democracies, the relationship between trade and

67

conflict is not very clear. These contradicting facts explain why the relationship between
trade and conflict has been a debatable issue for a long time: Because the pacifying effect
of trade alone is not strong enough compared to other liberal factors, and because the
pacifying effect of trade is further conditioned on other liberal factors, the pacifying
effect of trade is very sensitive to model specification, time, space, and the level of
analysis (global or regional). Therefore, as a consequence, it is very difficult for scholars
to reach a consensus when it comes to trade’s pacifying effect. Second, at odds with the
literature which argues that trade’s pacifying effect is augmented by the increase of the
degree of democracy, my findings demonstrate that this pacifying effect is actually more
complicated. For example, while Gelpi and Grieco (2003; 2008) find that trade constrains
the conflict behavior of democratic leaders but not autocratic leaders, I find that trade
does not constrain the conflict behavior of leaders in poor democracies and rich
autocracies. I find that there is no literature to account for these anomalies (trade leads to
conflict in poor democracies and barely has effect on peace or conflict in rich autocracies)
except for my theory. This suggests that when it comes to leaders’ conflict behavior in
different political regimes, looking at the domestic institutional constraints and audience
costs on political leaders 18 is not enough, if the country’s degree of development is not
taken into consideration. Third, in accordance with the capitalist peace theories, the
pacifying effect of development is the most strong and stable compared to democracy and
dependence. This explains why many scholars argue that it is development rather than
democracy or dependence that contributes to peace. More discussion about the

18

Such as Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Fearon (1994, 1995), Werner (1996), Smith (1996; 1998), Schultz
(1999, 2001), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Slantchev (2006), and Weeks (2008, 2012).

68

relationship between the capitalist peace theories and my theory will be addressed in the
next section.
5.4 Robustness checks
I also conduct several sensitivity checks to see whether the result of my model
hold stably. These include the check for multicollinearity of the independent variables,
the use of different conceptualization of regions (including the COW regions and the
Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) regions), looking at politically relevant dyads (Lemke &
Reed, 2001) and politically active dyads (Quackenbush, 2006) at the global level,
controlling for countries’ interest similarity by including their United Nations General
Assembly Voting patterns (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013), and use international crisis
behavior (Hewitt, 2003) as the alternative dependent variable for international conflict.
The results are not shown for brevity. All the robustness checks demonstrate that the
outcome of my models are not sensitive to various checks.

6 Conclusion and Discussion
By looking at only the militarized interstate disputes that caused fatality and by
applying the unified framework of the three-way interaction, my argument bridges the
global-regional gap of the liberal commercial peace effect, that is, it accounts for the
regional variations of trade’s pacifying effect. The key is that the pacifying effect of trade
is conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of development, because
these two factors can simultaneously strengthen the three causal mechanisms that link
trade to the reduction of militarized conflict. Therefore, the pacifying effect of trade
varies across regions because countries’ degrees of democracy and development tend to
be similar within-regionally and different between-regionally.
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Aside from proposing a unified theory of the liberal commercial peace effect, my
argument may also shed light on the debate between the democratic peace theories and
the capitalist peace theories (Schneider, 2014). The capitalist peace theories point out
four theories to claim that it is the capitalist’s concerns rather than the democratic effects
that lead to peace (Mousseau, 2010): peace through trade and free markets (Weede, 1996);
(McDonald, 2004), peace through market-intensive economy (Mousseau, 2000, 2002,
2003; Mousseau et al., 2003; Mousseau, 2009, 2013), peace through financial openness
(Gartzke et al., 2001; Gartzke, 2007), and peace through the limited proportion of
governments’ nontax revenue (McDonald, 2007, 2009); however, proponents of the
democratic peace theories contend that the democratic peace theories have more solid
micro-foundation causal mechanisms to link democracy to peace (Schneider & Gleditsch,
2010; Choi, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2012; Chan, 2012). One of the reasons
why so far the debate has not yet been solved (Gartzke & Weisiger, 2013; Mousseau,
2013; Ray, 2013; Dafoe, Oneal, & Russett, 2013) is that, empirically, the factors of
capitalist peace and democratic peace, such as free market, capital openness, economic
growth, and even shared ideology, have similar origins and form a mutually reinforcing
virtuous circle so that it is very difficult to sort out what belongs to the capitalist peace
and what belongs to the democratic peace (Russett, 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch,
2010). 19 The three-way interaction of my theory – interdependence, democracy, and
development, further confirms that the democratic peace effect and the capitalist peace
effect are very likely to be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. Put
19

Although Russett (2010) has correctly pointed out that the democratic peace effects work only dyadically,
not monadically, and so Weede (2010) thinks that it is safer for the Western countries to promote peace
through establishing economic interdependence rather than through forcing democratization in
nondemocratic countries.
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differently, not only the capitalist peace effect is stronger in more democratic dyads, but
also the democratic peace effect is stronger in more developed dyads. Therefore, the
capitalist peace and the democratic peace are not theories that may replace each other, but
those that are mutually re-confirming to each other.
Given this unified framework (the three-way interaction) of the liberal
commercial peace effect, one of the future research agendas based on my theory is to find
out how my theory can discuss with other theories that specify the preconditions about
how trade leads to peace or conflict. For example, previous studies on the trade-conflict
relationship demonstrate that the preconditions include expectations of future trade
(Copeland, 1996), what states trade (Gasiorowski, 1986; Dorussen, 2006), the difference
between intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade (Peterson & Thies, 2012), different
degree of “exit cost” of both sides in a dyad (Crescenzi, 2003, 2005; Peterson, 2011),
how free the bilateral trade is (McDonald, 2004), and whether both sides have signed
preferential trade agreements (Blanchard, Mansfield, & Ripsman, 1999; Mansfield &
Pevehouse, 2000, 2003; Mansfield, 2003; Bearce, 2003). Given the fact that previous
literature has demonstrated that democracies and developed countries trade more, trade
more diversified goods, have more trade partners (and so lower exit cost), enjoy more
free trade relations with each other, and participate in more regional and global trade
organizations and preferential trade agreements (and so having a more positive attitude
toward future trade) (Alt & Gilligan, 1994; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, & Rogowski,
1996; Keohane & Milner, 1996; Milner, 1997; Mansfield, 1998; Milner, 1999; Mansfield,
Milner, & Rosendorff, 2000, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Milner & Kubota,
2005; Mansfield & Solingen, 2010; Mansfield & Milner, 2012), all these preconditions
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may be part of the intervening variables of the degree of democracy and degree of
development. 20 Thus, compared to these many preconditions proposed by previous
literature, my theory offers a more parsimonious, consistent, and overarching framework
to account for the variations of the liberal commercial peace effect around the world. The
relationship between the three-way interaction and all these preconditions is waiting for
future exploration.

20

Although all the mechanisms can be a reversed and reciprocal one, such as that participating in trade and
international cooperation can further promote democratization and development (Sachs & Warner, 1995,
1997; Li & Reuveny, 2003; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006, 2008), the substantive causal effect of
democracy and development on all these causal mechanisms should be stronger than vice versa given there
is huge amount of literature on the former.
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CHAPTER 3
ASEAN and Southeast Asian Peace: National Building, Economic
Performance, and ASEAN’s Security Management
1 Introduction
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have enjoyed peaceful international
relations for decades, especially after 1979. Although there has been some turmoil, intraand interstate wars during the 1960s and 1970s, there is an academic consensus that East
Asia and Southeast Asia generally have become a very peaceful region since the end of
the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, in terms of the lack of interstate violence and the
exceptionally low levels of battle deaths (Leifer, 1989; Tønnesson, 2009; Kivimäki, 2011;
Goldsmith, 2014). However, even though scholars have consensus to East Asian and
Southeast Asian peace, what contributes to the peaceful situation remains a puzzle
because the main theories of international relations have different explanations to account
for it, while all of them confront with limitations (Solingen, 2007; Tønnesson 2009).
Specifically for Southeast Asia, the literature provides at least three competing
perspectives to explain how the peaceful situation could be achieved. First, the liberal
peace theory emphasizes the pacifying effects of democracy, interdependence, and
intergovernmental-organizations, the so-called Kantian peace (Oneal & Russett, 1999,
2001; Goldsmith, 2007). Second, the constructivist theory of peace underlines the
successful security management of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
due to the mutually-reinforced effects between commonly shared identity, interests,
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values, and norms that form a well-functioned security community through a process of
social construction (Acharya, 2001, 2004; Kivimäki, 2001; Ba, 2009). Third, Southeast
Asian peace may result from the countries that adopt a capitalist development strategy. In
his article which aims to refute the previous two perspectives, Tang (2012) argues that
Southeast Asian peace should be understood as a capitalist trajectory. Because of
Southeast Asian countries’ common interests and preferences of adopting economic
liberalization policy for economic development exert a strong conflict-constraining effect.
In his non-directed dyad-year analysis from 1950 to 2001, he uses a dummy variable
(JntELP) denoting whether both countries in the dyad-year t jointly adopt economic
liberalization policy as his independent variable, 21 and this independent variable (JntELP)
is negative with the probability of militarized interstate conflict (MID) and highly
significant across various models and robustness checks. As Tang (2012) had
demonstrated, there are few democratic dyads in the region, there is a low degree of
interdependence between those countries, and interstate conflict does happen between the
ASEAN members, Southeast Asian stability may be maintained neither by the liberal
peace components nor by the ASEAN security management, but by the capitalist concern
as Tang’s argument.
However, even Southeast Asian peace is not caused by either the liberal peace
components or the ASEAN security management, whether it is achieved by a capitalist
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Tang (2012) adopts Sachs and Warner’s (1995) binary category to define whether both states in a dyadyear t are jointly open trade regime, coded as 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. According to Sachs and Warner
(1995), a country is coded as a closed trade regime if any one of the following criteria is true: non-tariff
barriers cover 40% or more of trade, average tariff rates are 40% or more, the black market exchange rate
depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate during the 1970s or 1980s, a socialist
economy is in place, or a state monopoly on exports exists. The Sachs and Warner data spans from 1950 to
1992, and it is lately expanded by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) through 1999.
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trajectory does not go without question. After a scrutinization of the Southeast Asia states
who adopted economic liberalization, I find two problems that cast Tang’s argument in
doubt. First, observations of JntELP dyads are few. Second, most of the JntELP dyads
are those that never have any conflict record before they become JntELP; and among the
JntELP dyads who have experienced conflict before they adopt economic liberalization
policy, they had resolved the conflict before they switched to economic liberalization
policy. Therefore, I posit that Southeast Asian peace may not be maintained by this
capitalist trajectory. Instead, according to the suggestion of previous research and
empirical evidences, I argue that the ASEAN security management has its contribution to
the Southeast Asian peace, but its ability of conflict-constraining in the region is
conditioned by the economic performance of Southeast Asia states. Unlike the European
countries, most of Southeast Asian countries were colonies of European countries which
suffered from low level of development and the lack of national autonomy before the end
of World War II. Given such a background, when they were independent after World
War II, national building and economic development became the most important goals of
those countries. Besides, as newly-independent national states where the political elites of
various standpoints are still struggling under their unstable political regimes, leaders and
their ruling coalitions must strive to fulfill these goals to keep incumbent. This is also the
reason that these countries want to form and join ASEAN, to achieve these two goals
through international cooperation with their regional partners with similar backgrounds.
When the leaders are able to provide economic growth under the ASEAN cooperation
and security management, they do not have to consolidate their ruling legitimacy through
emphasizing national building issues such as old grudges and territorial disputes with
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each other. However, if the leaders are not able to maintain economic performance, they
not only lose their confidence in ASEAN but also face the pressure to result to national
building issues in order to keep their ruling legitimacy, which compromises ASEAN’s
ability of security management and so increase the probability of conflict. These
entangled economic development and national building issues are leaders’ most
important concern for political survival, which distinguish Southeast Asia from the other
regions in the world, and we cannot know the whole picture of Southeast Asia if failure to
take this regional characteristic into concern.
I proceed this argument as following. In the next section I re-appraise Tang’s
(2012) argument by investigating the Southeast Asian countries who adopt economic
liberalization policy, showing that Southeast Asian peace may not be well-explained by
the capitalist trajectory. Then, I present my argument that the security management of
ASEAN does play an important role in the maintenance of Southeast Asian peace,
however, ASEAN’s influence on conflict-constraining in the region is conditioned on the
economic performance of Southeast Asian states. Next, I explain my research design and
present the statistical results using data from 1950 to 2001 of all the 11 Southeast Asian
countries 22 along with the substantive effects and various sensitivity checks. In the last
section I summarize this article and discuss my finding with previous literature as a
concluding remark.

22

The 11 Southeast Asian countries in my sample from 1950 to 2001 include Brunei (1984~), Cambodia
(1953~), Indonesia, Laos (1953~), Malaysia (1957~), Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore (1965~),
Thailand, North Vietnam (1954~), and South Vietnam (1954~1975), and all of them became ASEAN
members by 1999 when Cambodia finally got the admission.
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2 Explaining Southeast Asian peace
2.1 The capitalist trajectory revisited
After investigating into the 11 Southeast Asian countries, Tang (2012) argues that
neither the constructivist theory of peace which emphasizes the security management of
ASEAN nor the liberal peace theory, which underlines the pacifying effects of democracy
and economic dependence, can well account for the Southeast Asian peace. Instead, he
argues, it is those states’ “motivations and preferences to promote national economic
development on the liberal capitalist trajectory” (Tang, 2012, p. 390) that has a
significant influence on the formation of Southeast Asian peace, because those Southeast
Asian leaders’ “failure of promoting national wealth may jeopardize their ruling
foundation” (Tang, 2012, p. 390). The reason, Tang claims, is that because these
Southeast Asian leaders’ domestic ruling coalition “prefers the liberal capitalist approach
of economic development,” and because “the success of the liberal capitalist development
approach hinges on a stable, open, and adaptable economic environment and market”
(Tang, 2012, p. 390). Therefore, these leaders will be less likely to act belligerently since
doing so hurts this capitalist development strategy.
To access his argument, Tang first uses empirical evidences to demonstrate that
the Southeast Asian peace from 1950 to 2000 may not be well explained by democracy,
economic interdependence, and ASEAN, because in Southeast Asia, democratic dyads
are very few (only 44 of the total 1,998 non-directed dyad-years, as shown in his Figure
1), economic interdependence is generally very low (as shown in his Figure 2), and there
are still 11 of the total 85 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that occurred between
joint ASEAN dyads (as shown in his Figure 3). These empirical evidences are the starting
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point that Tang thinks that there may be another factor that promotes Southeast Asian
peace.
However, after scrutinizing the empirical evidences about Tang’s argument, 23 I
find two problems that may compromise the validity of his argument, that is, whether
Southeast Asian peace is formed by a capitalist trajectory should be put into doubt. The
first problem is that, observations of JntELP dyads are rather few. Among the total 1,998
dyad-year observations in the sample, only 258 of them are JntELP dyads (less than 13%).
In his article, Tang (2012) claims that “such low frequency of democratic dyads gives rise
to a suspect about the implication of democratic peace in Southeast Asia” (Tang, 2012, p.
392). By the same logic, we should suspect about the implication of capitalist peace in the
region as well. Therefore, although JntELP may have a very strong pacifying effect, it
may not be the main reason that maintains the regional peace.
The second problem is about whether adopting economic liberalization policy
does make the country more reluctant to use force as the capitalist peace theory claims. I
review this effect by tabulating the dyadic and the monadic MID records before and after
both countries or one of the country adopted economic liberalization policy. Table 3.1
presents the dyadic result. As we can see in Table 3.1, among the total 55 dyad
combinations in Southeast Asia, only 10 of them are JntELP dyads. Besides, among the
10 JntELP dyads, only 2 of them, “Malaysia – the Philippines” and “Malaysia –
Indonesia,” had experienced MID before they both adopted economic liberalization
policy, and the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia had been solved long before
they became a JntELP dyad. As a result, among the whole sample there is only 1

23

I replicated Tang’s (2012) data in the same way according to his description.
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Table 3.1 MID onset between JntELP countries before and after JntELP, 1950~2001
JntELP Dyad

Thailand – Malaysia
Thailand – Singapore
Thailand – Philippines
Thailand – Indonesia
Malaysia – Singapore
Malaysia – Philippines
Malaysia – Indonesia
Singapore – Philippines
Singapore – Indonesia
Philippines – Indonesia

Year
of
becoming
JntELP
1963
1965
1989
1971
1965
1989
1971
1989
1971
1989

Number of MID occurred
before becoming JntELP (Year of
MID)
0
0
0
0
0
5 (1968, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1988)
3 (1963,1964, 1965)
0
0
0
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Number of MID
occurred
after JntELP (Year
of MID)
0
0
0
0
1 (1992)
0
0
0
0
0

dyad-year that had MID after they became JntELP, Malaysia and Singapore. Therefore
Tang’s independent variable JntELP will be statistically significant for sure under any
sensitivity check since there is only 1 MID among the total 258 JntELP dyads. Put
differently, when most of the JntELP dyads are those who had never had any MID before
or had resolved the conflict issue before they became JntELP, the pacifying effect of the
capitalist peace factor may be over-emphasized.
According to Tang’s (2012) argument, Southeast Asia states that adopt economic
liberalization policy are less likely to act belligerently in foreign policies because “the
success of the liberal capitalist development approach hinges on a stable, open, and
adaptable economic environment and market” (Tang, 2012, p. 390). In other words, the
pacifying effect of the capitalist approach should be not only a dyadic phenomenon but
also a monadic one. Table 3.2 presents the monadic analysis, comparing the frequency of
MID before and after the countries’ adoption economic liberalization policy. Among all
of the 5 countries who adopted economic liberalization policy in the 52-year sample
space, only the Philippines experienced more total MIDs and had a higher probability of
experiencing a MID prior to liberalization. All the other 4 countries actually are more
likely to experience MID after market opening. In sum, both the dyadic and monadic
analyses of MID record suggest that the capitalist trajectory may be misleading. 24
By re-investigating Tang’s (2012) empirical evidences, I find that Southeast Asian
peace may not follow a capitalist trajectory as Tang claims. JntELP dyads are few in the
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There might be a strategic effect in the monadic level of analysis that other states may be more likely to
provoke conflict against the countries adopting economic liberalization policy since the former knows that
the latter does not want conflict and thus is more likely to make a concession. This strategic effect in the
monadic level further puts Tang’s argument into doubt that Southeast Asian peace is made of a capitalist
trajectory.
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Table 3.2 Monadic MID onset analysis of countries who adopt economic liberalization policy, 1950~2001
Country

Total number of
MID occurred

Year of adopting economic
liberalization policy

Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

4
10
9
1
51

1971
1963
1989
1965
1950

Number of MID occurred before/after
adopting economic liberalization policy
(MID per year, before/after)
1/3 (0.045/0.097)
0/10 (0.000/0.256)
7/2 (0.175/0.154)
0/1 (0.000/0.027)
0/51 (0.000/0.981)

Note: Among the total 11 Southeast Asian countries, 6 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
North Vietnam, and South Vietnam) never adopt economic liberalization policy during the sample period
from 1950 to 2001.

81

region. Most of the JntELP dyads are those that had never had any conflict record before
they become JntELP, and among the JntELP dyads who had experienced conflict before
they became JntELP, they had reached stable resolution before they became JntELP.
Therefore, I posit that there must be other factors that contribute to Southeast Asian peace.
As Tang (2012) had demonstrated, democratic dyads are few in the region and
interdependence between Southeast Asian countries is generally at a very low degree.
Given the liberal peace factors are less likely the answer to Southeast Asian peace, and
many scholars have emphasized the contribution of ASEAN security management, I posit
that the answer to Southeast Asian peace should lie on a re-appraisement of ASEAN’s
role in the region, especially on how to explain the variation of ASEAN’s effectiveness in
security management. In the next section, I will review the debate about ASEAN and
construct a theory to bridge the different views about the ASEAN’s ability of security
management in the region.
2.2 The debate about ASEAN
When it comes to Southeast Asian peace, literature leads us to the debate of
whether ASEAN’s security management exerts a meaningful pacifying effect. Opponents
criticize its inability and weak institutionalization, while upholders emphasize its
importance of socialization that creates “the ASEAN way” of conflict resolution. Both of
them can find empirical evidences to support their contradictory perspectives: while
scholars find that ASEAN did constrain conflict in the region in terms of frequency of
conflicts, number of battle deaths, and conflict termination (Kivimäki, 2011), others
demonstrate that failed coordination and militarized conflict did happen between ASEAN
members (Leifer, 1989; Khong, 1997; Acharya, 1998, 2001), and that ASEAN did not

82

have a statistically significant pacifying effect, at least in the dyadic level of analysis
(Tang, 2012). These two contradictory perspectives suggest that ASEAN sometimes
works well but sometimes does not, and that a correct understanding about ASEAN
should not be arguing whether it works to stabilize the region, but finding out what are
the preconditions that mediate its effectiveness in interstate-coordinating and conflictconstraining. Therefore, to explain Southeast Asian peace, it is crucial to figure out what
enables and disables ASEAN in collective security management.
As an international regime, different perspectives of international relations
theories have different explanations about the evolution and decline of ASEAN. Realists
hold the perspective that the predominance of individual foreign policies has
compromised the collective actions of ASEAN since the very beginning (Rüland, 2000;
Jones & Smith, 2007). However, this realists’ perspective does not explain why
sometimes individual countries are prone to act collectively but sometimes less so,
especially when there are no clear relative power dynamics in the region (Gilpin, 1981).
The liberals who start from a functional approach may predict that, as an international
regime, in ASEAN, cooperation and institutionalization will deepen and legalization and
contractualization will increase as time goes by (Mitrany, 1948; Keohane, 1984); those
who are based on the pluralistic domestic approach may content that it depends on the
attitude of domestic coalitions of each member state (Solingen, 2008). Still we need a
theory to explain why this “deepening” effect does not embody in ASEAN like its
European Union counterpart and what changes the attitude of domestic coalitions in each
country.
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The constructivists’ explanation about the role of ASEAN is the most accepted
view, which distinguishes the uniqueness of the “ideational” Asia from the “material”
Western world (Acharya, 2001; Khoo 2004; Tan 2006; Kivimäki 2008; Stubbs 2008;
Narine 2008; Johnston, 2012; Kohno, 2014). Through the emphasis on the social
construction for consensus among common interests, values, and norms, ASEAN
maintains the regional peace by constructing a “security community” (Deutsch, 1961;
Adler & Barnett, 1998) which promotes peace through socialization instead of sanction or
coerce. Since a security community is built on the process of socialization, “[w]hether
any specific security community will continue to function in the long run will depend on
the ability of its facilities for peaceful adjustment to keep ahead of the strains and burdens
which any growth of social transaction may throw upon them” (Deutsch 1961: 103).
These “strains and burdens” could result from internal and external, such as the failure of
consensus building or the adding of new unsocialized actors and the consequent new
material burdens. However, this constructivist approach does not go without challenge.
What determines the success or failure of internal consensus building and whether the
adding of new actors will compromise the original consensus remain a question the
constructivists have not well answered. For example, the security community argument
does not give us clear and consistent answers about the questions of ASEAN: why the old
ASEAN member the Philippines and Thailand have more battle deaths after they joined
ASEAN while all the other Southeast Asian countries have largely reduced them
(Kivimäki, 2011); why Indonesia and the Philippines had experienced more conflicts
after they joined ASEAN (Kivimäki 2011, 75); why MID, especially the fatal ones, did
happen between joint ASEAN countries (Tang 2012, 395); why after 1996 the ASEAN
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principle of non-interference in domestic affairs was not as clear as before (Kivimäki,
2001); why the mechanisms of peace that have existed after the founding of ASEAN are
in a process of erosion while there is no direct threat to peace in the region (Kivimäki,
2001); and why the 1997 financial crisis largely compromised the leadership of ASEAN.
Answering these questions by the failure of internal consensus building seems ad hoc,
and explaining them by the adding of new unsocialized members is not able to account
for the variation after each wave of ASEAN expansion. For these reasons, I argue that the
constructivist’s perspective about the ASEAN security community is not sufficient to
explain the variation of the effectiveness of the ASEAN security management, and that
its effectiveness should be a conditional one depending on other preconditions.
What is the most important precondition that mediates ASEAN’s ability of
security management in the region? In this article I argue that ASEAN’s conflictconstraining ability is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance.
Since Southeast Asian countries were independent from their colonizers after the end of
World War II, due to their special historical and socioeconomic background, national
building and economic growth have been the most important goals of the leaders and
their ruling coalitions. When leaders in Southeast Asian countries are able to maintain
good economic performance, they thus have enough legitimacy for their political survival.
However, if they are not able to keep economic growth, they are forced to pursue national
building issues such as claiming ownership of disputed territory with neighboring
countries or emphasizing on the priority of their own ethnic groups, and so compromising
ASEAN’s ability of consensus building and increasing the probability of conflict. The
importance of pursuing national building and economic growth distinguishes Southeast
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Asian countries from all the other countries or regions in the world because of their
unique historical and socioeconomic background. I content that to get a whole picture of
ASEAN’s role in the region we must take this special background into concern.
Why are national building and economic performance the most important concern
of leaders in Southeast Asian countries but not in the others? Taking a look at their initial
situation at the moment of independence after the end of World War II is informative.
Table 3.3 summarizes this initial condition of Southeast Asian countries at the moment of
their independence. There are four unique preconditions that explain why national
building and economic performance are the most important goals of Southeast Asian
countries: their experience of being colonized, their variety of domestic ethnic groups,
their thirst of emerging from poverty, and their disputed territorial issues due to fractured
geography. When these countries become independent after World War II, these four
preconditions create domestic coalitions focusing on national building issues and
requiring for economic performance. Thus Southeast Asian leaders must fulfill these
goals for their own political survival.
Different from the other regions in the world, all the Southeast Asian countries are
colonized by the European countries. The only exception is Thailand. However, although
nominally Thailand is an independent country, actually as an artificial buffer zone it is
under control by Britain (in India) and France (in Indochina). Long being colonized by
the Western countries and then occupied by Japan during World War II, people in
Southeast Asian countries have been treated unequally across different ethnic groups,
have been in poverty, and have longed for their own autonomy. Meanwhile, their variety
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Table 3.3 Background of Southeast Asian countries in their early years after independence

Country

Colonized before
independence

Ethnic groups

Religion groups

Year of
independence

GDP per
capita in
the 1950s
and in 2000

Territorial dispute
with other
Southeast Asian
countries
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Brunei

Yes, by Britain
and Japan

Malay 65.7%, Chinese 10.3%, other indigenous
3.4%, other 20.6% (in 2011)

Muslim (official) 78.8%, Christian
8.7%, Buddhist 7.8%, other (includes
indigenous beliefs) 4.7% (in 2011)

1984

17,358 (in
1984)
19,022

Yes, with
Malaysia and
Vietnam

Cambodia

Yes, by France
and Japan

Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5%, Chinese 1%, other
4%

Buddhist (official) 96.9%, Muslim
1.9%, Christian 0.4%, other 0.8% (in
2008)

1953

1,680 (in
1953)
2,042

Yes, with
Thailand and
Vietnam

Indonesia

Yes, by
Netherland and
Japan

Javanese 40.1%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malay 3.7%,
Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%,
Minangkabau 2.7%, Buginese 2.7%, Bantenese 2%,
Banjarese 1.7%, Balinese 1.7%, Acehnese 1.4%,
Dayak 1.4%, Sasak 1.3%, Chinese 1.2%, other 15%
(in 2010)

Muslim 87.2%, Christian 7%, Roman
Catholic 2.9%, Hindu 1.7%, other 0.9%
(includes Buddhist and Confucian),
unspecified 0.4% (in 2010)

1945

936 (in
1950)
3,642

Yes, with
Malaysia and
Philippines

Laos

Yes, by France
and Japan

Lao 55%, Khmou 11%, Hmong 8%, other (over 100
minor ethnic groups) 26% (in 2005)

Buddhist 67%, Christian 1.5%, other
and unspecified 31.5% (in 2005)

1954

1,730 (in
1954)
1,367

Yes, with
Thailand

Malaysia

Yes, by Portugal,
Britain, and Japan

Malay 50.1%, Chinese 22.6%, indigenous 11.8%,
Indian 6.7%, other 0.7%, non-citizens 8.2% (in
2010)

Muslim (official) 61.3%, Buddhist
19.8%, Christian 9.2%, Hindu 6.3%,
Confucianism, Taoism, other traditional
Chinese religions 1.3%, other 0.4%,
none 0.8%, unspecified 1% (in 2010)

1963

1,971 (in
1954)
9,919

Yes, with
Singapore,
Indonesia,
Philippines, and
Vietnam

Myanmar

Yes, by Britain
and Japan

Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%,
Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5%

Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist
3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4%,
Animist 1%, other 2%

1948

309 (in
1950)
829

Yes, with
Thailand

Philippines

Yes, by Spain, the
United States, and
Japan

Tagalog 28.1%, Cebuano 13.1%, Ilocano 9%,
Bisaya/Binisaya 7.6%, Hiligaynon Ilonggo 7.5%,
Bikol 6%, Waray 3.4%, other 25.3% (in 2000)

Catholic 82.9% (Roman Catholic
80.9%, Aglipayan 2%), Muslim 5%,
Evangelical 2.8%, Iglesia ni Kristo
2.3%, other Christian 4.5%, other 1.8%,
unspecified 0.6%, none 0.1% (in 2000)

1946

1,343 (in
1950)
3,425

Yes, with
Indonesia,
Malaysia, and
Vietnam

Singapore

Yes, by Britain
and Japan

Chinese 74.2%, Malay 13.3%, Indian 9.2%, other
3.3% (in 2013)

Buddhist 33.9%, Muslim 14.3%, Taoist
11.3%, Catholic 7.1%, Hindu 5.2%,
other Christian 11%, other 0.7%, none
16.4% (in 2010)

1965

3,086 (in
1965)
27,186

Yes, with
Malaysia

Thailand

No, but controlled
by Britain, France,
and Japan

Thai 95.9%, Burmese 2%, other 1.3%, unspecified
0.9% (in 2010)

Buddhist (official) 93.6%, Muslim
4.9%, Christian 1.2%, other 0.2%, none
0.1% (in 2010)

1932

837 (in
1953)
6857

Yes, with Laos,
Cambodia, and
Myanmar

North
Vietnam
(Vietnam)

Yes, by France
and Japan

Kinh (Viet) 85.7%, Tay 1.9%, Thai 1.8%, Muong
1.5%, Khmer 1.5%, Mong 1.2%, Nung 1.1%, others
5.3% (in 1999)

Buddhist 9.3%, Catholic 6.7%, Hoa Hao
1.5%, Cao Dai 1.1%, Protestant 0.5%,
Muslim 0.1%, none 80.8% (in 1999)

1945

1162 (in
1954)
1,812

Yes, with
Malaysia,
Philippines, and
Cambodia

South
Vietnam

Yes, by France
and Japan

1945

814 (in
1954)
988 (in
1975)
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Note: GDP per capita is the real GDP per capita in 1996 US dollar value, data from Gleditsch (2002). As a comparison, GDP per capita of the United
States in 1950 is 10,703, and 33,293 in 2000. Data of ethnic groups in each Southeast Asian country is from The World Factbook of the CIA
website: https://www.cia.gov/index.html. Data of territorial disputes is from Amer (1998).

of domestic ethnic groups divided by different religions further complicated their national
identity building. The Western colonizers and Japan selected certain ethnic groups and
made them leaders of their puppet regimes in order to facilitate their ruling in these
countries, which further exacerbated the animosity between the ruling ethnic groups and
the ruled ones. Besides, the ruling ethnic groups also took advantage of their power to
expropriate the wealth of the ruled, making the societies more unequal and stratified. As
we can see in Table 3.3, in the 1950s when they became independent, most of them had a
yearly GDP per capita less than 2,000 USD (in 1996 value) while the United States had
more than 10,000 at that time, let alone the wealth is highly concentrated on the ruling
groups. As a consequence, at the moment of their independence from the Western and
Japanese colonizers, Southeast Asian countries faced extreme difficulty in national
building and badly needed to get out of poverty.
Given these preconditions, for Southeast Asia leaders, the best way to stabilize
their ruling foundation is by making progress of economic growth. Only by doing so can
the leaders improve the faith of various domestic groups in their undemocratic political
regimes. When they are not able to do so, their ruling legitimacy will soon be in danger.
A good example is that the 1997 financial crisis made many long-lasting nondemocratic
governments in Southeast Asia become overturned or under reform. In Thailand, the
united government was replaced by the Democratic Party and a new constitution was
passed in the same year; in Indonesia, the 32-year long Suharto government was
overturned after the event of May 1998 Riots, in which more than one thousands of
Chinese Indonesians were killed; in Malaysia, the 17-year long Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad had to start a power struggle against his Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
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of Finance Anwar Ibrahim in order to remain in power. 25 In Southeast Asia where the
political regimes are still in search of an equilibrium, economic downturn forces the
leaders to find a way out of legitimacy crisis. Another set of preconditions that affect
Southeast Asia leaders’ calculation under economic downturn – domestic ethnic conflicts
and international territorial disputes – plays an important role here. Bad economic
performance forces leaders resort to provoking domestic and international disputes in
order to maintain their ruling legitimacy. Among the total 85 Southeast Asian MIDs from
1950 to 2001, 71 of them happened in the year when at least one state in the dyad had a
growth rate less than 3%. Therefore, I argue that to understand the effectiveness of
ASEAN’s security management in the region, we must take national building and
economic performance, the most important goals of Southeast Asian countries, into
concern. Thus, the effectiveness of ASEAN security management should be condition by
Southeast Asian countries’ balance between these two factors. When leaders are able to
maintain growth, they are willing to act through ASEAN to work out a consensus toward
various issues; however, if they are not able to maintain economic performance, domestic
pressure from their ruling coalitions and their political competitors will force them to
seek national building issues for legitimacy, and so compromising the ASEAN way of
consensus building. As Kivimäki (2011) has demonstrated, “the ASEAN diplomatic style
avoids situations where one of the conflicting parties would lose face, and thus it is
reflected in a conflict termination record with a low frequency of defeat of one of the
parties” (Kivimäki, 2011, p. 68). The fact that both conflicting parties are willing to
accept a conflict termination without a substantive solution further reveals that getting
25

Refer to Solingen (2004) to see more detailed discussion about how the 1997 financial crisis reshaped the
domestic politics of Southeast Asian countries.
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what they are fighting for per se is not the main reason for both leaders to engage in a
dispute. If so, we would expect that economic performance does not have a significant
effect on ASEAN’s security management.
Based on the reasons above, the hypothesis derived from my argument to be
tested is:
Hypothesis: The effectiveness of ASEAN’s security management in Southeast Asia
is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance.

3 Research design
3.1 Dependent variable
Following most of the literature on Southeast Asian peace and international
conflict, I use the onset of a new MID between two Southeast Asian states each year as
the dependent variable. This is because the dyadic design can better take different
security threats that different countries face into concern. Thus the unit of analysis is
dyad-year. I use the MID 3.1 data (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates
of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between or among states
involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of
military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). The new MID onset is a dichotomous
variable which is coded 1 for the first year of a new MID in a dyad and 0 otherwise. The
subsequent years of the same MID in the starting year is dropped from the data to reduce
the problem of temporal dependence, because the statistical model I employ in this study,
logit regression, assumes that the conflict events being analyzed are independent of each
other. Because MID onset is a time-series cross-sectional binary variable across time
(years) and space (dyads), in order to produce accurate standard errors and consistent
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coefficients, I estimate the logit regression model with the Huber/White robust standard
error which assumes that observations within the same dyad across years are correlated
but those between different dyads are uncorrelated, adjusting for clustering in dyads. I
also adopt (Carter & Signorino, 2010) method to include peace years, peace years’ square,
and peace years’ cube into the model to control for temporal dependence. 26 As most of
the literature, I estimate all the models with the dependent variable at time t and
independent variables at time t − 1 to mitigate problems of reverse causality.
3.2 Independent variables
My theory argues that the effectiveness of ASEAN security management is
conditioned on Southeast Asian states’ economic performance, therefore, the set of my
independent variables should be composed of three different variables: one denotes
whether the pair of countries are joint ASEAN members, another denotes its economic
performance, and the other the interaction term of the first two to measure the conditional
effect of economic performance on ASEAN security management. Given the dyad-year
design, I create a dummy variable Joint ASEAN to present whether both countries in
each dyad-year are members of ASEAN, coded as 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. According to
my theory, Joint ASEAN alone is expected not to have stable statistically-significant
influence on MID onset in models except for when it is in the interaction term.
Because my theory expects that conflict is more likely to be initiated by countries
with worse economic performance in each dyad-year, I construct the variable Low
growth rate which is the lower value of economic growth rate of the two states in each
dyad-year to measure Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance. This
26

I also estimate all the models using Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) peace years and cubic splines to
control for temporal dependence. The outcomes are almost identical.
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conceptualization is called the “weak link” logic (Dixon, 1994; Oneal & Russett, 1997)
which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less
constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & Russett, 1997, p. 273). Data of
economic growth rate is calculated from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade and GDP
data by equation:
Growth

Rate =

GDPt − GDPt −1
.
GDP t −1

Now that the two independent variables are ready, thus the interaction term Joint
ASEAN

× Low growth rate conceptualizes this conditional effect. My theory predicts

that this interaction variable should be statistically significant with a negative sign on
MID onset across all the models. 27
3.3 Competing and control variables
I control for the variables that have demonstrated influence on interstate conflict
onset in previous research to show that my independent variable is still valid after taking
these various factors into concern, and some of them are even variables of competing
explanations against my argument on the maintenance of Southeast Asian peace. The first
set of competing variables is the democratic peace and the Kantian peace component
(Oneal & Russett, 2001) because many research has found that democracy,
interdependence, and international organizations have very strong pacifying effects. Low
democracy is the lower democracy score of the two states in each dyad-year, data from

27

I also create an ordered independent variable ASEAN ranging from 0 to 2, denoting whether none, one,
or two of the countries in each dyad are members of ASEAN, and its conditional effect ASEAN X Low
growth rate. This conditional effect is significant and negative with the probability of MID onset after
1979. However, I do not further investigate this phenomenon since my theoretical argument is mainly about
joint ASEAN dyads.
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the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2013). This democracy score ranges from -10 (the
most autocratic) to 10 (the most democratic). Besides, because democratic peace is better
understood as a strictly dyadic phenomenon (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, &
Morrow, 2003; Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009), that is, the democratic peace effect does not
work in a mixed dyad which is composed of a democracy and an autocracy, 28 I control
for Joint democracy, the interaction term of both countries’ democracy score, to capture
this effect. 29 Low dependence is the lower ratio of the sum of State A’s imports from
and exports to State B over State A’s GDP in each dyad-year, data from Gleditsch’s
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data. IGOs is the number of total shared memberships of
intergovernmental organizations of the two states in each dyad-year, data from
(Pevehouse, Nordstrom, & Warnke, 2004). 30
I then control for contiguity, distance, alliance similarity, and power parity of each
dyad, for these factors are found to be influential on international dispute (Bremer, 1992).
Contiguity is a dummy variable which denotes whether the two countries of the dyad are
contiguous by land, predicted to be positively correlated with conflict onset. Distance is
28

Goldsmith (2014) also finds this similar strategic effect in East Asia.

29

Following Barbieri’s (2002) measurement of the interactive effect of both states’ democratic scores, the
Joint democracy variable is constructed as
Joint Democracy =

 PolityScore A + 10  PolityScoreB + 10 


,
2
2




which ranges from 0 to 100. The reason that she adds 10 to each state’s polity score (ranging from -10 to 10)
is to avoid a negative value.
30

Although I have noticed that previous research about IGOs’ pacifying effect is mixed as Dorussen and
Ward's (2008) review had demonstrated, and that the aggregated count variable of shared IGO membership
may mislead our understanding of IGOs’ role in promoting peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004),
I still include this aggregated count variable in my models in order to further confirm my argument by
considering all the Kantian peace variables at the same time. The statistical results are almost identical with
or without this variable.
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the logged distance (in miles) between capitals of the two states in each dyad, predicted
to be negatively related with conflict onset. I adopt (Signorino & Ritter, 1999) weighted
S-score to construct the variable Alliance similarity, which denotes the level of
similarity of each dyad’s alliance portfolio. 31 Power parity is the weaker state’s CINC
score (Singer, 1988) divided by that of the stronger state to generate a power ratio which
ranges from 0 (total preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Data of
Contiguity, Distance, Alliance similarity, and Power parity are from the COW database
generated by the Eugene software (Bennett & Stam, 2000a). Development is also found
to have a pacifying effect (Rosecrance, 1986, 2010; Hegre, 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, &
O’neal, 2003), so I include Low GDP/pc which is logged GDP per capita of the lower
GDP per capita in each dyad-year to control for development. I also include the
interaction between contiguity and development, Contiguity

× Low GDP/pc, because

economic development decreases states’ incentive for territorial expansion (Gartzke,
2007). Lastly, I create a Cold war dummy variable, taking a value of 1 between 1950 and
1989 to control for the change of international structure which may have a systemic effect
on conflict onset in the region. 32

31

I do not control for strategic alliance (whether the dyad has a defense pact, neutrality, or entente) which is
typically put into control when studying conflict because among Southeast Asian countries, only Thailand
and the Philippines are formal allies due to their military cooperation with the United States, and Thailand
and the Philippines never had any MID during my sample period.
32

Although I include many control variables in my model, this conditional effect of Joint ASEAN X Low
growth rate holds robustly no matter with or without any of or all of the control variables in all the three
different levels of MIDs (These results are not shown here for brevity. Please refer to the replication
archive).

95

4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic analysis
The empirical analysis strongly supports my hypothesis. Table 3.4 shows how the
pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on the economic performance of Southeast
Asian countries. I list the results of three different time periods (Model 1, Model 2, and
Model 3) to demonstrate that this conditional effect can still hold under different temporal
or systemic conditions. The whole sample space ranges from 1950 to 2001 due to data
availability which is shown as Model 1. 33 Model 2 shows the result from 1967 because
the ASEAN is formally established by the founding five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in 1967. Model 3 shows the result after 1979, the
beginning of the prominent Southeast Asian peace. The results of the three different time
periods all support my hypothesis, and even so during the prominent post-1979 peace.
I start interpreting the statistical results based on models without the interaction
term between Low growth rate and Joint ASEAN (not shown for brevity). In models
without the interaction term, neither Low growth rate nor Joint ASEAN have
significant influence on MID onset in all the three different time periods. The only one
variable that has consistent and significant pacifying effect across the three different time
periods is Contiguity × Low GDP/pc, which means that economic development does
reduce the probability of conflict due to territorial expansion in the region. This result,
also not in the prediction of my theory, also confirms my argument that economic factor
plays an important role in the regional peace. When the interaction term is added into
model specification, it is significant in all the time periods as Table 3.4 presents, and its

33

Most economic data is available after 1950 and the COW dyadic MID data is updated through 2001.
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Table 3.4 ASEAN and Dyadic MID onset in Southeast Asia
Dependent Variable: MID Onset t
Model 1
1950~2001

Model 2
1967~2001

Model 3
1980~2001

Low growth rate

-3.183
(3.462)

-0.217
(3.597)

9.801
(7.848)

Joint ASEAN

-0.968
(0.656)

-1.261*
(0.740)

-0.507
(0.975)

-7.917*
(4.514)

-13.204**
(6.198)

-23.496*
(12.013)

Low democracy

-0.599***
(0.169)

-0.543***
(0.194)

-1.338**
(0.587)

Joint democracy

0.112***
(0.034)

0.123***
(0.041)

0.303**
(0.120)

Low dependence

-8.043
(10.480)

0.307
(15.625)

35.401*
(19.244)

IGOs

0.055***
(0.020)

0.021
(0.028)

-0.104
(0.068)

Low GDP/pc

1.139***
(0.430)

0.757
(0.540)

1.128
(0.984)

Contiguity

9.876***
(3.492)

8.751*
(4.778)

21.222***
(5.185)

-1.295**
(0.505)

-1.064
(0.654)

-2.608***
(0.705)

-1.385
(1.744)

-3.098**
(1.359)

-3.710**
(1.877)

-1.385***
(0.350)

-0.731
(0.595)

-0.395
(0.844)

Power parity

0.057
(0.583)

0.939
(0.744)

2.041*
(1.110)

Cold war

0.914*
(0.535)

0.787
(0.571)

1.098**
(0.500)

-0.229***

-0.193*

-0.080

(0.078)

(0.112)

(0.143)

0.009*

0.006

-0.002

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.007)

[Independent Variables t −1 ]

Joint ASEAN

×

Low growth rate

[Control Variables t −1 ]

Contiguity

×

Low GDP/pc

Alliance similarity

Distance

Peace years

Peace years

1

2
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Peace years

3

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Constant

-7.125
-6.325
-16.633
(5.432)
(6.840)
(12.227)
Pseudo R2
0.341
0.300
0.426
Log likelihood
-218.860
-154.815
-65.408
Chi-squared
358.976
367.817
26320.352
Clusters (Dyads)
45
45
36
N
1,649
1,224
692
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The total dyad-year observations of
Southeast Asian countries from 1950 to 2001 should be 1,998; from 1967 to 2001 should be 1,503; and
from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not included in the
regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity
scores of Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987.
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influence remains significant and becomes stronger even after 1979 when the region has
achieved a prominent peaceful status and when the conflict-resolution function of
ASEAN has put into doubt after 1994 (Kivimäki, 2001). The Low growth rate variable
is not significant across all time periods, suggesting that when the coefficient of Joint
ASEAN

× Low growth rate is zero – that is, when states are not joint ASEAN

members, economic growth rate does not have influence on MID onset. This also
confirms the fact that ASEAN is built by Southeast Asian countries who are sensitive to
their economic performance and so want to pursue economic growth through regional
cooperation by putting aside their disputing issues. The coefficient of Joint ASEAN is
significant only in Model 2 where the temporal coverage is from the founding of ASEAN
to 2001, but not in Model 3 which only covers the post-1979 Asian peace, suggesting that
when the coefficient of Joint ASEAN

× Low growth rate is zero, ASEAN generally

has a pacifying effect in Southeast Asia after established. However, after 1979, ASEAN’s
influence on the regional peace maintenance is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’
economic performance.
To further make sure the statistical significance of this conditional effect does not
result from some “cheap MIDs” which involved only low levels of MID such as “threat
to use force” or “display of force,” I also estimate the same models on force MID (those
that actually use force against one another) and fatal MID (those that cause fatality) onset,
the results are presented in Table 3.5. 34 Again, in all the basic models without the
34

Besides, Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre (2000, p. 984) insist that the use of fatality MIDs helps avoid both
coding irregularities and “attention bias” on low-level disputes. Souva and Prins (2006, p. 191) also echo
Toset et al. (2000) that “fatal MIDs offer greater temporal and spatial consistency in the historical recording
of these events. Plus, they avoid very low-hostility disputes that may not reach the attention of
policymakers.” Therefore, there are good reasons to check whether my independent variable can still work
on fatality MIDs.
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interaction term Joint ASEAN

× Low growth rate, neither Joint ASEAN nor Low

growth rate is significant (not shown for brevity). As for models with this interaction
term, as Table 3.5 shows, actually this conditional effect is getting larger with the
increase of the level of conflict. Put differently, this conditional pacifying effect of
ASEAN works the best in constraining high hostility levels of MID. 35
There is some other information in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 worthy of noticing.
The development variable Low GDP/pc is never significant after the foundation of
ASEAN in 1967, which may reinforce my argument that Southeast Asian peace does not
belong to the capitalist trajectory since the capitalist peace theory predicts development to
have a pacifying effect (Mousseau, 2000; Mousseau et al., 2003; Gartzke, 2007). In
addition, the interdependence variable, Low dependence, is significant in all the models
after 1979, but not before, which may suggest that although interdependence in Southeast
Asia is in a low degree in general, a liberal commercial peace effect is gradually growing
in the region after 1979 when the region reached a stable situation. Thus, although
Southeast Asian peace so far is certainly not maintained by the Kantian components
given all of them are at a low degree in the region, it is not the same to say that the
increase of these components does not promote peace in the region. As long as Southeast
Asian states’ economic performance keeps growing stably, chances are that the regional
peace could benefit from the liberal peace factors in the future.
To further demonstrate the substantive effects of Low growth rate on the
pacifying effect of Joint ASEAN during different time periods, I plot the predicted

35

In Table 5 where the dependent variables are “force MID onset” and “fatal MID onset,” I adjust the
Peace years variables according to “force MID onset” and “fatal MID onset” respectively.
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Table 3.5 ASEAN and Dyadic force and fatal MID onset in Southeast Asia
Dependent Variable t

Force MID onset t

Fatal MID onset t

Model 4
1950~2001

Model 5
1967~2001

Model 6
1980~2001

Model 7
1950~2001

Model 8
1967~2001

Model 9
1980~2001

-4.964
(3.764)

-2.504
(4.120)

9.358
(8.619)

3.311
(5.497)

5.088
(5.308)

26.764**
(11.399)

Joint ASEAN

-1.568***
(0.585)

-2.079**
(0.816)

-0.860
(1.088)

-0.467
(1.045)

-0.428
(1.096)

-1.050
(1.410)

Joint ASEAN
Low growth rate

-17.360***
(3.898)

-24.840***
(5.629)

-35.760***
(10.570)

-23.204***
(7.575)

-29.680***
(5.273)

-61.906***
(18.794)

Low democracy

-0.735***
(0.135)

-0.679***
(0.094)

-0.991*
(0.590)

-0.763***
(0.237)

-0.829***
(0.222)

-0.574
(0.744)

Joint democracy

0.139***
(0.031)

0.150***
(0.029)

0.239**
(0.121)

0.176***
(0.052)

0.215***
(0.055)

0.176
(0.189)

Low dependence

-1.034
(10.913)

12.669
(14.992)

36.170*
(18.808)

-371.975*
(195.121)

-603.185***
(140.434)

-438.464***
(168.415)

IGOs

0.070***
(0.019)

0.054*
(0.031)

-0.080*
(0.042)

0.015
(0.022)

-0.002
(0.042)

-0.049
(0.124)

Low GDP/pc

1.106**
(0.451)

0.663
(0.505)

1.114
(0.911)

0.907*
(0.536)

0.142
(0.721)

2.781
(4.442)

Contiguity

9.626**
(3.884)

7.925*
(4.570)

20.161***
(5.099)

-3.601
(4.522)

-9.868
(6.486)

-15.754
(35.954)

-1.243**
(0.561)

-0.989
(0.618)

-2.439***
(0.673)

0.621
(0.671)

1.546*
(0.914)

1.186
(6.331)

-0.134
(1.966)

-1.757
(1.751)

-3.399
(2.134)

-0.639
(2.053)

-2.142
(2.168)

119.791**
(59.718)

-1.379***
(0.431)

-1.027
(0.689)

0.019
(0.914)

-2.548***
(0.450)

-2.371***
(0.717)

-25.193
(22.216)

Power parity

0.053
(0.617)

0.687
(0.763)

1.949*
(1.094)

0.870
(0.946)

2.096*
(1.211)

12.700***
(3.827)

Cold war

1.203
(0.732)

1.222
(0.798)

1.338**
(0.595)

1.020
(0.651)

1.434*
(0.776)

0.781
(1.358)

-0.195**

-0.184*

-0.136

-0.139

-0.130

0.085

(0.081)

(0.110)

(0.201)

(0.107)

(0.122)

(0.352)

0.007

0.006

0.001

0.006

0.005

-0.008

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.010)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.019)

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-10.122
(6.403)
0.375
-178.939
1020.720

-7.233
(6.989)
0.359
-119.318
1501.045

-17.027
(14.072)
0.465
-55.791
21201.238

-1.801
(6.198)
0.360
-113.402
889.253

2.728
(6.968)
0.376
-73.683
1046.502

5.171
(140.907)
0.599
-24.256
.

[Independent Variables t −1 ]
Low growth rate

×

[Control Variables t −1 ]

Contiguity

×

Low GDP/pc

Alliance similarity

Distance

Peace years

Peace years

Peace years

1

2

3

Constant
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood
Chi-squared
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Clusters (Dyads)
45
45
36
45
45
36
N
1,649
1,224
692
1,649
1,224
692
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Peace years variables are adjusted according to force MID
onset and fatal MID onset respectively. The total dyad-year observations of Southeast Asian countries from 1950 to 2001 should be
1,998; from 1967 to 2001 should be 1,503; and from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not
included in the regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity scores of
Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987.
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probability of MID onset as well as the frequency of observations in Figure 3.1 for joint
ASEAN dyads based on the results of Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, holding all
continuous variables at their mean and dichotomous variables at their median. Figure 3.1
shows that the pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on Southeast Asian states’
economic performance: the probability of conflict decreases with the increase of
economic growth rate. The magnitude of this conditional effect holds stably across the
three different time periods. When one of the countries in the dyad has a negative 0.15
economic growth rate in a certain year, the probability of conflict onset between them in
the next year is about 10%. This probability of conflict onset decreases as the increase of
Low growth rate, and the probability of conflict onset is getting closer to zero when
Low growth rate approaches 0.10.
4.2 Robustness tests
In this section I exert several robustness tests to demonstrate that my argument
still holds stably after taking these factors into concern. All the models below span from
1980 to 2001 to show that the pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on Southeast
Asian countries’ economic performance even when the region has achieved a long peace
after 1979. 36 The outcomes of various sensitivity checks are presented in Table 3.6.
Since I have put in doubt Tang’s (2012) argument that Southeast Asian peace is
achieved by a capitalist trajectory, I include his independent variable JntELP, a dummy
variable denoting whether both countries in the dyad adopt economic liberalization policy,
in my model. Model 10 shows that the conditional effect becomes even stronger and

36

I also estimate all the sensitivity check models from 1950 to 2001 and the outcomes are almost identical.
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Figure 3.1 Low growth rate and predicted probability of MID onset at t+1 with 95% confidence interval
in different time periods.

104

more significant with JntELP in the model. Although JntELP is highly significant, as I
have shown in this article, it should not be the main factor that maintains Southeast Asian
peace.
According to the MID data, there are 85 MIDs that happened between Southeast
Asian dyads from 1950 to 2001. Among them, Cambodia was involved in 31 MIDs and
Thailand was involved in 51. Only 18 of the total 85 MIDs in the region have nothing to
do with these two extremely belligerent countries. Thus my statistical results may be
driven by Cambodia and Thailand as the outliers. In Model 11 I include two dummy
variables, Cambodia and Thailand, in the model to denote if the dyad is composed of
Cambodia or Thailand to see whether the effects of my independent variables still hold.
Model 11 shows that this does not change the outcome of my model. 37
Considering that interest (dis)similarity resulting from different political regimes
may influence the relationship between the two countries in each dyad (Bennett & Stam,
2000b; Peceny, Beer, & Sanchez-Terry, 2002), I take their Polity difference, State A’s
polity score minus State B’s polity score in absolute value, into concern in Model 12.
Model 12 shows that the probability of conflict in the region does increase with the polity
difference of the two countries in the dyad, however, it does not change the influence of
my independent variables.
There is a possibility that looking at conflict between all the countries in
Southeast Asia is misleading. According the logic of “opportunity and willingness”
(Most& Starr, 1982, 1989), although the Southeast Asian countries are located in the
same region, it does not mean that each of them has the opportunity to have a dispute
37

I also run the sensitivity check excluding Singapore because it is an outlier which involved in only 1 MID
from 1950 to 2001. The outcomes are almost identical.
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Table 3.6 Robustness checks of dyadic MID onset in Southeast Asia, 1980~2001
Dependent Variable: MID onset t
Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15

Low growth rate

12.175
(8.466)

10.325
(7.697)

11.418
(7.520)

9.910
(7.862)

26.912***
(9.844)

19.956*
(11.896)

Joint ASEAN

-0.979
(0.701)

-0.435
(0.878)

-0.494
(0.954)

-0.501
(1.033)

0.573
(1.519)

-4.576
(3.712)

-30.020***
(11.403)

-23.768**
(11.415)

-25.179**
(11.550)

-25.009**
(12.392)

-39.730**
(16.070)

-89.384**
(38.238)

[Independent Variables t −1 ]

Joint ASEAN

×

Low growth rate

[Sensitivity check variables t −1 ]
JntELP

-9.996***
(2.676)

Thailand

0.506
(1.248)

Cambodia

0.500
(0.619)

Polity difference

0.239**
(0.117)

Politically active dyad

2.847**
(1.185)

Low openness

-6.677*
(3.411)

High trade barrier

73.556
(248.671)

Constant

-28.452
-15.493
-11.075
-13.265
-33.877***
-138.566***
(19.702)
(12.690)
(9.297)
(12.647)
(7.033)
(29.133)
Pseudo R2
0.470
0.428
0.434
0.438
0.280
0.533
Log Likelihood
-60.405
-65.271
-64.498
-64.052
-46.613
-18.073
Chi-squared
41236.316
23390.671
16279.450
25433.616
3220.865
.
Clusters (Dyads)
36
36
36
36
28
21
N
692
692
692
692
532
375
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Other control variables not shown for brevity. The total dyadyear observations of Southeast Asian countries from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not
included in the regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity scores of
Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987.
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with all of the others. For example, the inland Laos would never have a dispute with the
far away island countries like Indonesia or Brunei. Therefore, controlling for this
“opportunity” or “necessary condition” is crucial to grasping the Southeast Asian peace. I
adopt Quackenbush’s (2006) definition of “politically active dyads” and include a
dummy variable Politically active dyad into the model to denote whether the dyad is
capable of having a dispute. 38 Among the total 55 dyads in Southeast Asia, only about
half (26) of them are defined as politically active. Model 13 presents that politically
active dyads do have higher probability of conflict, however, this does not change the
significance and substantive effect of my independent variables.
Besides, although interdependence (Low dependence) does not have a significant
pacifying effect in the region, it is possible that the pacifying effect of trade does not do
so through interdependence, but through the general openness of each state, through the
internationalizing coalition in domestic politics (Solingen, 2001, 2003), or through free
trade (McDonald, 2004). In order to exclude that possibilities, I check whether openness
or free trade affects my argument about the regional peace in Model 14 and Model 15. I
conceptualize the general openness of trade by calculating the trade share of total GDP of
each state (Low Openness), adopting the lower value of openness in the dyad following
the weak link logic. The openness data is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al.
2013). As for the power of internationalizing coalition or free trade, I conceptualize it
using gravity model residuals (High trade barrier), adopting the lower value of the two
38

According to Quackenbush (2006, p. 43), a dyad is defined as a politically active one if at least one of the
following six characteristics applies: (1) The members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through
a colony; (2) One of the dyad members is a global power; (3) One of the dyad members is a regional power
in the region of the other; (4) one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other; (5)
one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other; or (6) one of the
dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other.
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countries in each dyad because that country has higher trade barriers than the other. The
gravity model residuals data is from Peterson and Lassi’s (forthcoming) expanding of the
Hiscox and Kastner’s (2008) trade barriers data. Theoretically, the more the power of
internationalizing coalition in the state, the more free trade and the lower trade barrier it
has, therefore, the dyad will have more trade flows than predicted by the gravity model of
trade. As a consequence, there will be more gravity model residuals (McDonald, 2004;
Kastner, 2007). 39 Model 14 shows that while openness has a significant pacifying effect,
what is interesting is that when including Low openness into the model, the increase of
Low growth rate actually increases the probability of MID, but this conflictual effect is
eliminated by the dominantly conditional pacifying effect of Joint ASEAN Low growth
rate. Simply judging by the coefficient, the inclusion of Low openness actually
strengthens the influence of this conditional effect, which may suggest that leaders in
Southeast Asian countries which have more open markets are more sensitive to their
economic performance. Model 15 shows that when taking High trade barrier into concern,
although it fails to achieve statistical significance, the conditional pacifying effect of Joint
ASEAN Low growth rate gets much stronger than without it. 40
In sum, all the sensitivity checks demonstrate the robustness of this conditional
effect.

39

I do not exclude the rival explanations of the PTA peace arguments (peace through preferential trade
agreements) (Mansfield, Pevehouse, & Bearce, 1999; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2000, 2003; Bearce, 2003;
Mansfield, 2003) in these sensitivity checks because PTAs between Southeast Asian countries also belong
to the ASEAN framework.
40

Due to lots of missing data in Low openness and High trade barrier, Model 14 has only 532 and Model
15 has only 375 of the total 954 dyad-year observations, so we should interpret these results with caution.
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5 Concluding remark
According to literature, there are competing explanations about the formation of
Southeast Asian peace. It is not surprising that the liberal commercial peace does not
work well in the region given the low degree of interdependence and few democratic
dyads. Most scholars refer to the success of ASEAN’s security management and common
identity building as the key to the regional stability, however, empirical evidence does not
support the pacifying effect of ASEAN. Lastly, Tang’s capitalist trajectory argument may
not give us much leverage to understand the regional peace, either, since countries who
adopted economic liberalization policy are not those who were prone to conflict. Based
on literature, I revisit the characteristics of Southeast Asian countries and the spirit of
ASEAN, arguing that to correctly understand ASEAN we should consider the
characteristics of Southeast Asian countries. Due to their special historical and
socioeconomic backgrounds, which make the leaders struggle for national building and
economic development, ASEAN’s ability of security management is conditioned on
Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance.
My argument also explains and unifies the controversy in literature of ASEAN’s
ability of security management. While some scholars applaud “the ASEAN way” that
successfully stabilizes the region, others criticize it for its inability to make the ASEAN
states resolve disputes without the use of force (Leifer, 1989; Acharya, 1999), especially
after 1996 (Kivimäki, 2001). In this paper I try to investigate what causes this variation of
ASEAN’s security management ability and develop a consistent theory that can account
for this variation; that is, whether ASEAN is no more than a “talking shop” depends on
Southeast Asian states’ economic performance. As many scholars have demonstrated
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(Narine 2004; 2008; Haftel 2010), “ASEAN is principally expected to be a platform for
managing regional security for economic development” (Tang 2012, p. 396), when the
Southeast Asian leaders are able to maintain economic development, they would be
willing to put aside their conflictual issues or accept ASEAN’s mediation. Otherwise,
economic downturn compromises leaders’ faith in “the ASEAN way.” Thus my theory
bridges the two contradictory perspectives about ASEAN’s ability of security
management in the region.
My finding also, to some degree, put the constructivist’s perspective about
ASEAN in doubt. For a long time, debate about whether we need new international
relations theories to understand East and Southeast Asia emphasizes on the difference
between the “material” Western and the “ideational” Asia (Kang, 2007; Acharya &
Buzan, 2010; Wang, 2010; Johnston, 2012; Kohno, 2014). Many argue that one of the
important reasons for the European Union (EU) to evolve is due to the fact that most of
the EU countries are democracies (Ikenberry, 2000), which is not the case in Southeast
Asia. Besides, the ideological difference between the European liberal rationalism based
on democracy and the ASEAN communalism and solidarism based on autocratic legacies
may well differentiate ASEAN from the EU (Beeson & Jayasuriya, 1998; Pettman, 2010).
Therefore, many Southeast Asian scholars may agree with Rüland & Jetschke’s (2008)
conclusion that ASEAN “will neither become an Asian EU, nor fall into oblivion. It will
remain ASEAN” (Rüland & Jetschke, 2008, p. 407). However, if the effectiveness of
ASEAN’s security management in the region is conditioned on Southeast Asian states’
economic performance, this East-West theoretical distinction may not be so salient.
Looking back on the history of the EU, sustained economic development plays an
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important role to reinforce European countries’ faith in democracy, cooperation, and trust
building (Ripsman, 2005; Miller, 2005), and so further facilitates the evolving of EU’s
“thick” institution. 41 As such, the conditional effect I demonstrated may suggest that
ASEAN may be likely to move on toward the EU pattern as long as Southeast Asian
countries are able to maintain stable economic growth, and vice versa.

41

For a more detailed discussion about the EU and ASEAN institution and institutionalization, see
Johnston (2012).
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CHAPTER 4
Latin American Peace: Hegemonic Stability during the Cold War and
Capitalist Peace after the Cold War

Q: Why are there no coups d’état in the United States?
A: Because there is no U.S. embassy there.
------ An old joke in Latin America

1 Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the Latin American countries have enjoyed
peaceful international relations for more than a half century (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998b;
Holsti, 1996; Kacowicz et al., 2000; Ray, 2002; Buzan & Wæver, 2003a; Miller, 2005).
According to the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, from 1950 to 2001, there were only 2
wars or 88 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) among the total 9,880 Latin American
dyad-years. 42 In every aspect, the peaceful situation in the region is a phenomenon
worthy of investigating, since it is a region that has never been in lack of war, civil
conflict, coup d’état, and foreign great power intervention for hundreds of years (Hensel,
1994; Mares, 1997, 2001; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b).

42

The two wars are the 1967 Salvador-Honduras Football War and the 1995 Ecuador-Peru Cenepa Valley
War. These two wars are included in the total eighty-eight MIDs. Another evidence to prove the Latin
American peace is the fact that Southeast Asian countries have been known to experience peaceful
international relations during the same period (1950-2001)(Acharya, 2001; Kivimäki, 2001; Tang, 2012),
but there were 85 MIDs between the total 1,998 Southeast Asian dyad-years, compared to the 88 MIDs
among the total 9,880 Latin America dyad-years.
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According to literature, there are four main reasons that account for the Latin
American peace. First, peace is achieved by the successful settlements of territorial
disputes between enduring rivalries. Second, the progress of democratization and
international integration since the 1980s largely reduces the Latin American leaders’
incentive to deal with conflictual issues with force. Third, the cultural or constructive
approach attributes peace to a construction of shared identity and values among the Latin
American countries. And fourth, the most controversial one, is the role that the United
States played in security management in the region.
While many studies acknowledge that the United States has a salient influence on
the international relationship among the Latin American countries, whether the Latin
American peace should attribute to the hegemonic stability trajectory lead by the United
States is an unsolved puzzle. Generally speaking, there are three competing models about
the United States’ role in stabilizing the region: the hegemonic stability argument
emphasizes the United States’ peace keeping; the whirlpool model argues that the United
States is only involved when its interests are compromised and disengages soon after the
events are solved; and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the
one who provokes conflicts in the region. This problem remains unsolved because we can
always find different empirical evidences that support or refute any of the three
arguments about the role of the United States.
Given the two mainstream controversies in the literature about Latin American
peace, the goal of this research is twofold. The first one is to find out what causes the
discrepancies in different schools of literature regarding the role the United States played
in the regional peace, and the second one is to explain what makes the regional peace
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according to the contemporary IR theories. I argue that, during the Cold War period,
Latin American peace should attribute to the hegemonic stability effect lead by the
United States; however, this does not mean that the United States has sufficient ability to
restrain conflict in each of the Latin American states. In countries that have higher degree
of economic dependence on the United States, the United States has enough influence
and economic leverage on the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in
countries that have lower degree of economic dependence on the United States, the
United States does not have sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the
hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ security management becomes less salient.
Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the region is
a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough economic
leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior. In sum, the
United States actually played a positive role in maintaining the regional peace, but its
ability of security management is a conditional one. But this hegemonic stability effect
became less salient after the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War when
Latin America lost its strategic importance to the United States, the “capitalist peace”
effect starts to become a prominent factor that explains the regional peace as well as the
regional integration.
To demonstrate my argument, the structure of this research is as following. In the
next section, I first discuss the competing arguments about the role of the United States in
the region as well as the limitations of them; and then I propose my argument and the
hypotheses to be further tested. I test the hypotheses derived from my argument in the
third section, using data concerning the onset of militarized interstate dispute (MID)
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among the total 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001. 43 More detailed
empirical results will be discussed in the fourth section. The last section is the concluding
remark.

2 Regional peace and the role of the United States
In this section I first discuss what makes Latin America become a peaceful region
after the end of World War II based on literature, highlighting the unsolved controversies
regarding the role the United States played in the regional peace. I then investigate
whether the liberal factors contribute to Latin American peace by analyzing the
relationships between the number of MIDs and the Kantian peace factors – democracy,
interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations, in which I find that none of them
should have a substantive effect on conflict-constraining in the region. Since the liberal
factors may not be the main reason to explain Latin American peace, I then turn to
analyzing realists’ hegemonic stability argument to discuss the possible influences that
the United States exerts on the regional peace.
2.1 What makes for Latin American peace?
According to literature, there are at least four explanations about how the region
reaches a stable peace. The most popular explanation is that the region achieves a stable
peace because of the successful settlements of territorial disputes between enduring
rivalries. For example, Hensel (1994) finds that Latin American peace is due to the
settlement of recurrent MIDs between the same adversaries. Kacowicz (1998a, 2000)
highlights the importance of the conciliation between main regional powers, the “ABC
43

The 20 Latin American countries included in this research are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Triangle” of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as the main reason that stabilizes the region.
Ray (2002) argues that the lack of war in the region is due to the fact that Latin American
countries have enough states with definitive boundaries. Miller (2005) offers a slightly
different argument that peace in the region is because the Latin American countries have
reached a regional state-to-nation balance, where the demand for states does not exceed
the supply of state thus avoiding wars of secession, and the supply of states does not
exceed the demand for states thus avoiding wars of unification. However, Miller calls
Latin American peace a “normal peace” instead of a “warm peace” because he thinks that
although the main conflictual issues in the region had been resolved, contingency plans
for war and possibility of return to war still exist due to limited degree of integration.
The second set of explanations is that the progress of democratization and
international integration since the 1980s largely reduces the incentive of the Latin
American leaders to deal with conflictual issues with force. For example, Kacowicz
(1995) argues that democracy tend to be satisfied with the status quo, and with the
settlement of territorial disputes and spread of democracy, Latin America gradually
becomes a zone of peace. Miller and Elgün (2011) demonstrate that many international
conflicts in the region result from leaders’ diversion due to the domestic threat of coup
d’état, thus with the spread of democratic consolidation in the region, the number of
conflicts decreases because the leaders’ survival is more secured in democratic regimes.
The third set of explanations is based on the cultural or the constructive
perspective, which is partly related to the spread of democratization. One of the reasons
that facilitates the Latin American countries’ settlement of territorial disputes is due to the
commonly accepted principle of uti possidetis, which means that the Latin American
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countries recognize the colonial borders as their post-independence international frontiers
(Ireland, 1938; Child, 1985). Besides, there is also a common normative and cultural
framework derived from a long practice of diplomatic management of resolution of
international disputes between these countries (Ebel, Taras, & Cochrane, 1991). In
addition, the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 44 and
Mercusor (the South America regional trade agreement) in 1991, 45 due to their
commonly-shared identity as American or Latin American countries, also contributes to
conflict management in the region.
Lastly, the fourth set of explanations about the role that the United States plays in
the regional peace is the most controversial one. Most of the research about the Latin
American peace either does not count on the influence of the United States as an
important factor to the regional peace or questions the United States’ intentions and
consistency of peacekeeping in the region (Kacowicz, 1995; Mares, 1997, 2001; Buzan &
Wæver, 2003b), although all of them recognize its peacekeeping endeavor during certain
periods. The role of the United States in the regional peace is debatable due to two
contradictory facts. One the one hand, successfully or not, it did try to punish regional
aggression and mediated interstate conflict in the region, or endeavored to promoted the
conflict management function of OAS; on the other hand, during the Cold War period it

44

The Organization of American States (OAS) originated in the 1889-1890 First International Conference
of American States which established the International Union of American Republics, renamed the Union
of American Republics in 1910, and then was formally established in 1948 by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which highlighted the collective security function to facilitate the
regional peace.
45

Mercosur originated in 1985 when Argentina and Brazil signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and
Economics Cooperation Program (PICE) and then was established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción,
which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto.
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even rewarded or provoked interstate conflict in the name of anti-communism (Mares,
1997, 2001), and the United States itself is also a source of threat to Latin American
peace via a covert or overt intervention or coup d’état initiation (Rabe, 2010). 46 The
United States’ capricious behaviors toward the region make its role in the regional peace
a controversial issue.
What we see in the previous literature is that, at the local level, Latin American
peace can attribute to the conflict resolution between each of the enduring rivalries.
However, at the system level, the relative explanatory power between the realists’
hegemonic stability arguments and the liberals’ peace theories is not clear. Are the liberal
factors the main reason that contribute to the regional peace? Or is peace actually
maintained by the United States’ hegemonic security management? In the next part I will
investigate both the liberal factors and the hegemonic stability factors, showing that the
former may not be the main reason that contributes to the conflict resolution between the
enduring rivalries during the Cold War period, and that the latter is a conditional one,
which depends on whether the United States has sufficient economic leverage on the
Latin American countries.
2.2 Do the liberal factors contribute to Latin American peace?
The liberal triangulating peace argument highlights the pacifying effect of trade,
democracy, and intergovernmental organizations (Oneal & Russett, 2001). However, the
explanatory power of these three Kantian factors in Latin America is not beyond question,
given the facts that interdependence between the Latin American countries tends to be
46

According to Rabe’s (2010, p. 448) record, the United States tried and largely succeeded in overthrowing
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua during the Cold War period, and it continued doing so in Panama, Haiti,
and Venezuela after the Cold War.
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low, that few of them are consolidated democracies, and that the number of MIDs does
not decrease with the increase of their shared intergovernmental organization
memberships.
In Figure 4.1 I demonstrate the number of MID onset between the six different
regime combinations of all the 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001, data from
the MID 3.1 dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) of the Correlates of War
database. 47 Figure 4.1 shows that, among the total 9,880 dyad-year observations, only
2,161 (21.9%) of them are composed of democratic countries. Besides, what is worthy of
paying attention to is that, actually the probability of MID onset among the democratic
dyads is higher than any other kinds of dyads except for the anocratic ones. Both the facts
that democratic dyads are rather few among Latin America and that democratic dyads are
not more peace-prone strongly suggest that the Latin American peace may not hinge on
the democratic peace effect. This finding is in line with Mares’ (2001) conclusion that in
Latin America, democracies are not more peaceful than nondemocracies.
If Latin American peace is not maintained by the democratic peace effect, is it
done by trade and intergovernmental organization, the other two pillars of the Kantian
peace? The empirical evidences may suggest that neither of them work. Table 4.1 shows
the highest average degrees of interdependence of the Latin American dyads during the
half century. As we can see in Table 4.1, during the past fifty years from 1950 to 2001,
interdependence among Latin American countries remains at a low degree. Among the
total 190 non-directed dyads made by 20 Latin American countries, only 15 of them have
47

I define the three different political regimes (democracy, anocracy, and autocracy) and the six different
regime combinations (democracy-democracy, democracy-anocracy, democracy-autocracy, anocracyanocracy, anocracy-autocracy, and autocracy-autocracy) as the definition of the POLITY IV dataset
(Marshall et al. 2013).
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Figure 4.1 Different political regimes and MID onsets in Latin America (1950~2001, non-directed dyads)
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Table 4.1 The highest average dependences of Country A on Country B from 1950 to 2001
Country A
Uruguay
Paraguay
Bolivia
El Salvador
Paraguay
Panama
Uruguay
Dominican Republic
Chile
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Argentina
Chile
Honduras

Country B
Brazil
Argentina
Argentina
Guatemala
Brazil
Venezuela
Argentina
Venezuela
Argentina
El Salvador
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Brazil
Brazil
Guatemala

Average dependence of Country A on Country B (%GDP)
0.022 (2.2%)
0.021 (2.1%)
0.018 (1.8%)
0.017 (1.7%)
0.016 (1.6%)
0.015 (1.5%)
0.013 (1.3%)
0.013 (1.3%)
0.012 (1.2%)
0.011 (1.1%)
0.011 (1.1%)
0.010 (1.0%)
0.010 (1.0%)
0.010 (1.0%)
0.010 (1.0%)
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trade flows with the other more than 1% of their gross domestic product (GDP), and the
average interdependence among the 9,980 dyad-years is low at 0.0016 (0.16%) of their
GDP. In addition, among the 15 most interdependent dyads, only three of them are
composed of large economic entities, which means that except for these three dyads (in
bold in Table 1), the high dependence of Country A on Country B may be due to the
result of small scale GDP in the denominator. Given this low degree of interdependence
in the region, the Latin American peace may not be well explained by the liberal
commercial peace effect, either.
As for whether the intergovernmental organizations (IGO) promote peace in the
region, I plot the average number of MID onset per year between each dyad against the
average number of their shared IGO memberships in Figure 4.2, which explicitly shows
that, despite the dyads that had never experienced any MID, for those who had at least
one MID during the past half century, with the increase of shared IGO memberships
actually comes more MIDs. Although the pacifying effect of shared IGO memberships
(Dorussen & Ward, 2008) and the aggregated count variable of the sum of it (Boehmer,
Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004) are called into question, it is obvious that Latin American
peace is not achieved by their most important regional IGO, Organization of America
States (OAS), which includes all the Latin American countries and whose core purpose is
to solve conflictual issues among the Latin American states peacefully. So far, based on
empirical evidences, we have seen that none of the Kantian peace elements has
meaningful influence on the Latin American peace. Democratic dyads are few and
actually have higher probability of conflict, trade interdependence between Latin
American dyads is at a low degree by and large, and shared IGO memberships seem to go
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each dyad in Latin America, 1950~2001
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with the increased frequency of conflict. Therefore, the results strongly suggest that Latin
American peace is not promoted by the liberal peace components. Instead, there must be
another concern that constrains the Latin American countries from the use of force as a
dispute-constraining or dispute-resolving measurement. That is, I argue, the hegemonic
stability effect of the United States’ security management.
2.3 A hegemonic stability trajectory?
Early since the 19th century, the international relations between the Latin
American countries have been known to be in the shadow of the power of the United
States. Due to the interests concern of economy (to get the agricultural and mineral
products) and geopolitics (to exclude the influence from the European great powers), the
United States has played the role of “regional police” since the 1880s (LaFeber, 1995;
Smith, 1996; Schoultz, 1998; Mace, 1999; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b; Walker, 2011). After
the end of World War II, because of the decline of the European great powers, the surge
of the United States, along with the threat of Soviet communism, the influence of the
United States in the region reached a new peak (Atkins, 1999). In almost all regional
security literature regarding Latin America, the influence of the United States is always
the main part of the regional security (Lake & Morgan, 1997; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b;
Kelly, 2007).
However, although few put into doubt the “regional police” role that the United
States played, whether the regional peace attributed to the United States’ hegemonic
security management is an open question. Generally speaking, there are at least three
different points of view in the literature regarding the role the United States played in the
regional peace: the hegemonic stability argument emphasizes the United States’ peace
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keeping; the whirlpool model argues that the United States is only involved when its
interests are compromised and disengages soon after the events are solved, a whirlpoollike trajectory; and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the
one who provokes conflicts in the region (Gilderhus, 1992; Friedman, 2003; Pastor &
Long, 2010; Rabe, 2010; Walker, 2011; Schmidli, 2012).
Proponents of the hegemonic stability argument contend that the regional peace is
due to the hegemonic stability effect led by the United States, because it restrains many
small-scale local conflicts from escalating to large-scale warfare. Besides, the United
States also promotes nonviolent conflict resolution in the region through the OAS.
However, the others demonstrate that, according to the empirical evidences, the
relationship between “the United States hegemony” and “the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of war and MID” in the region is not significant (Mares, 2001, pp. 55–83).
The mixed empirical evidences result from the inconsistency of the role the United States
played in different Latin American countries. During the post-World War II period, the
United States successfully constrained many disputes from escalating in some countries,
while in another it failed to do so, and in the others the United States was even accused of
instigating one country to use military measures against another, especially the anticommunist warfare in the 1960s and the 1970s. 48 These contradicting findings call into
question the hegemonic stability argument about the role the United States played in the
regional peace. For the hegemonic stability argument to be valid, we should see the
United States not only constrained the Latin American states from engaging in militarized
conflict, but also encouraged conflict as a means of proxy war or buck-passing to punish

48

Refer to Rabe (2010) to see a more detailed review of these events.
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the state not toeing the line. However, except for some successful “regime change”
throughout the Cold War, 49 most of the time this “hegemonic security management” is
not the case. After a scrutiny of all the Latin American militarized conflicts to see
whether the use of force in Latin America “results from the unique influence of the
United States,” Mares (2001) concludes that:
“Force is used when the U.S. wants it, and also when the U.S. opposes
its use. The strongest evidence exists for the anti-communism
argument. Indeed, the period of the Cold War sees increased military
conflict in the region. However, though U.S. anticommunism matters,
it fails to explain the use of force, since force is used before and after
the Cold War, and during the Cold War on issues entirely unrelated to
communism. Though the U.S. is uniquely powerful, it is not a hegemon
that provides the collective good of peace among nations of the region
which have their own interests” (Mares, 2001, pp. 82–83).
If neither the liberal factors nor the United States’ hegemonic security management
worked in maintaining the regional peace, then the question becomes, how do we explain
the reduction of conflict between the once-warlike Latin American countries in this half
century? In the next section, I will demonstrate that Latin American peace does follow
the hegemonic stability argument, while this effect is a conditional one – depending on
whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin American
countries to influence the latter’s decision of conflictual behavior. I will also make

49

According to Rabe's (2010) calculation, the United States “tried and largely succeeded in overthrowing
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua” (Rabe, 2010, p. 448).
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another argument that, the regional peace gradually follows a “capitalist peace” trajectory
in the post-Cold War period.
2.4 A hegemony with conditional ability
Whatever the true motivation of the hegemon is, all the different hegemonic
stability theories implicitly assume that the hegemon has all the ability to influence all the
other countries on conflict-constraining, either through coercing or through leading, by
the hegemon’s hard-power or soft-power (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976; Gilpin,
1981; Lake, 1993; Ikenberry, 2011). However, although the hegemony may have
sufficient power and ability to constrain all the others from engaging in large scale wars,
this does not mean that it has the same ability (e.g. resource, time, etc.) to refrain all the
others from having small scale skirmishes, just like the prediction of the whirlpool model
which suggests that the United States only involves in when it feels that it is necessary to
do so. So the questions becomes, why does the United States selectively involve in the
Latin American interstate disputes? Specifically, what are the factors that determine
whether the United States chooses to involve or not to involve? And, how could we
explain why the United States successfully constrains the Latin American interstate
conflicts most of the time but sometimes it fails to do so? In this research, I argue that
Latin American peace is maintained by the United States’ hegemonic security
management; however, this “hegemonic stability” effect is a conditional one, which is
conditioned on whether the United States has sufficient economic leverage on the Latin
American leaders to constrain their conflictual behavior.
I construct a game-theoretical model to demonstrate the conditional hegemonic
security management of the United States in maintaining the regional peace. The game is
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played by two actors: the aggressor, typically a certain Latin American state that has an
incentive to initiate a militarized conflict against another Latin American target, and the
United States. The aggressor has two options: to initiate a militarized conflict or not to
initiate. And the United States, once seeing the aggressor initiated a conflict, has two
options as well. The United States can choose to interfere or not. Therefore, there will be
three different outcomes in the game. First, if the aggressor chooses not to initiate a
militarized conflict, the outcome will be “the status quo.” Second, if the aggressor
chooses to initiate a militarized conflict and the United States chooses not to interfere, the
outcome will be “invasion,” which means that the aggressor invades the target. Lastly, if
the aggressor chooses to initiate a militarized conflict and the United States chooses to
interfere, the outcome will be “interference,” which means that the United States gets
involved into the conflictual event. “Interference” includes both the successful and the
unsuccessful United States’ interferences.
The payoff structure is as following. As for the outcome of “the status quo,” the
aggressor gets a payoff of α because it enjoys the peaceful and harmony relationship
with the target, and the United States gets a payoff of H because it enjoys the hegemonic
status in the region as well as its strategic benefits, despite what the strategic benefits are.
As the outcome of “invasion,” the aggressor get a payoff of B − α , where B denotes the
utility the aggressor can get by invasion and − α denotes the loss of the peaceful and
harmony relationship with the target.
As for the outcome of “interference,” the payoff structure depends on whether the
United States is able to punish the aggressor for invading. Let p denote the probability
that the United States successfully punishes the aggressor, and 1 − p denotes the
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probability that the United States fails to punish the aggressor. The aggressor gets B − α
if the United States is not able to punish the aggressor and − α − C Aggressor if the United
States is able to do so, where − C Aggressor means the cost of the aggressor when being
punished. The United States gets H − CUS if it successfully punishes the aggressor and
− H − CUS if it fails to do so, where − H means the United States’ hegemonic status in
the region is compromised and − CUS means the cost the United States pays for exerting
the punishment. Therefore, under the “interference” situation, the expected utility payoff
of the aggressor is (1 − p )( B − α ) + ( p )( −α − C Aggressor ) and the expected utility payoff of
the United States is ( p )( H − CUS ) + (1 − p )( − H − CUS ) . Figure 4.3 is the game-theoretical
model.
My argument claims that, in Latin America, peace is achieved by two manners.
First, the aggressor does not initiate militarized conflicts against other Latin American
countries; and second, the United States goes to interfere aggressions and constrains the
aggressor. I then solve the game-theoretical model according to these two situations.
I use backwards induction to solve this game-theoretical model. I start from
whether the United States chooses to interfere or not to interfere. For the United States to
choose to interfere, the payoff of “interfere” must be higher than the payoff of “not to
interfere.”
U The

United States

(Interfere > Not to interfere)

 ( p )( H − CUS ) + (1 − P )( − H − CUS ) > − H
 p>

CUS
2H

Equation (1) shows that, for the United States to choose to interfere rather than not to
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The Aggressor

Initiate

Not to initiate

The United States

Status Quo
(α , H )

Not to interfere

Invasion

Interfere

Interference (successful or not)

(B −α ,− H )

(1 −

p )( B − α )+( p )( − α − C Aggressor ),

( p )( H − CUS )+( 1 −

Figure 4.3 The game-theoretical model
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p )( − H − CUS )

interfere, the probability that it can successfully punish the aggressor must be higher than
the cost divided by twice the benefit of keeping a hegemonic status in the region. That is,
the smaller the cost and the higher the benefit of keeping a hegemonic status in the region,
the more likely that the United States will choose to interfere in the conflictual events in
Latin America.
In the second stage of the backwards induction, I compare whether the aggressor
chooses to initiate or not to initiate. For the aggressor to choose not to initiate, the payoff
of “not to initiate” must be higher than the payoff of “initiate.”
U The

Aggressor

(Not to initiate > Initiate)

 α > B −α
α>

B
2

(2)

or

α > (1 − p )( B − α ) + ( p )( −α − C Aggressor )

or

p>

B − 2α
B + C Aggressor

(3)

Equation (2) and (3) show that, for the aggressor to choose not to initiate rather than to
initiate, two preconditions must be matched: either that the peaceful and harmony
relationship the aggressor enjoys with other Latin American countries is higher than at
least half of the benefit the aggressor can get by invading them, or that the probability
that the United States can successfully punish the aggressor must be high enough. For the
probability that the United States can successfully punish the aggressor to be high enough,
according to equation (3), both α (the benefit of the aggressor when enjoying a harmony
relationship with the target) and C Aggressor (the cost of the aggressor when being punished)
must be high enough.
In sum, Latin American peace is achieved by two manners: the aggressor does not
initiate militarized conflicts against other Latin American countries, and the United States
goes to interfere aggressions and constrains the aggressor. According to the solutions of
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the game-theoretical model, five factors are important to the maintenance of the regional
peace: the benefit of the aggressor to have a peaceful relationship with the target is high,
the benefit the aggressor can get from invasion is low, the cost of the aggressor to initiate
an aggression is high, the cost of the United States to interfere is low, and the benefit that
the United States could get from maintaining a hegemonic status in the region is high.
Regarding the role the United States plays in the region, the game-theoretical model tells
that, for the United States to have a strong incentive to deter or to interfere a militarized
conflict, two preconditions must be satisfied: either the benefit of being a hegemon in the
region is high enough, or the cost of interfering the aggressive behavior is low enough.
Typically, states have various policy tools to achieve their international goals.
They can use diplomatic, economic, and/or military tools to persuade or coerce other
states to behave in accordance with their goals. Among the different tools, military tools
are usually the most expensive and regarded as the last resort. In addition, it is more
difficult for leaders to avoid domestic pressure or audience cost by using military
measures than by using diplomatic or economic tools, especially in democratic countries.
As a consequence, most of the time leaders will prefer to achieve their international goals
by using diplomatic or economic tools rather than by using force. This logic applies to the
United States’ hegemonic security management in Latin America. Whenever there is a
conflict between two Latin American countries, the United States, on the one hand,
prefers to manage the conflictual event to maintain its leadership status and strategic
interest in the region, while on the other hand it does not want to get bogged down in the
conflict and its own domestic pressure of using force. Therefore, whether the United
States has sufficient diplomatic and economic tools to influence the Latin American
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countries becomes an important factor to affect its ability as well as its willingness (Most
& Starr, 1989) to manage the ongoing conflict. As long as the United States has enough
diplomatic and economic leverage on the conflict initiator to constrain its conflictual
behavior, the cost of interfering tends to be lower. So as long as the United States still
values the benefit of being a hegemon and enjoying the strategic interest in the region, it
will be more likely to deter or mediate the conflictual events in the Latin American states
who are highly economically dependent on it because it has more leverage to constrain
both sides from engaging in conflict. Instead, in the Latin American states who are not
economically dependent on the United States, it lacks such a leverage to exert its
influence, which makes the cost of interfering too high to be workable. As a consequence,
the United States’ ability and willingness of security management in these Latin
American countries tend to be weak. This is the reason why we observe that the United
States has played an ambiguous role in the regional peace and why most scholars support
the whirlpool model when explaining the United States’ Latin American policy. Thus the
first hypothesis derived from my argument to be tested is:
Hypothesis 1: Latin American countries who have higher economic ties with the
United States are less likely to engage in militarized conflict.
2.5 A capitalist peace trajectory: new development after the Cold War
The game-theoretical model predicts that when two preconditions are satisfied,
the United States is more likely to engage in constraining Latin American leaders from
having militarized conflict: either the benefit of being a hegemon in the region is high
enough, or the cost of interfering the aggressive behavior is low enough. According to
this prediction, two new phenomenon which arise in the region after the end of the Cold
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War may change the path of the regional peace. The first one is that, after the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1989, Latin America as a region has lost the strategic value of
geopolitics it used to have to the United States (Castañeda, 2003). When containing the
spread of communism and the threat of the Soviet Union is no longer a priority after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the benefit of being a hegemon in the region for the United
States is not as attractive as before. By the same token, the United States’ incentive of
interfering in conflictual events in the region should also become less and less salient
after the end of the Cold War.
The second one is the rise of the concern of pursuing economic development in
the region. Aside from the hegemonic security management of the United States, the
market liberalization reform in the 1980s and 1990s in almost all the Latin American
countries and the advance of international integration in the South America since the mid1980s (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998a, 2000) strongly suggest that pursuing economic growth is
a shared consensus among the Latin American leaders since the last years of the Cold
War, which implies that a tendency of the capitalist peace may start to emerge.
The capitalist peace theories point out four arguments to claim that it is the
capitalist’s concerns rather than the democratic effects that lead to peace (Mousseau,
2010): peace through trade and free markets (Weede, 1996; McDonald, 2004), peace
through market-intensive economy (Mousseau, 2000, 2002, 2003; Mousseau, Hegre, &
O’neal, 2003; Mousseau, 2009, 2013), peace through financial openness (Gartzke, Li, &
Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke, 2007), and peace through the limited proportion of
governments’ nontax revenue (McDonald, 2007, 2009). Despite which of the reasons is
the main cause that contributes to the regional peace, Latin American countries since the

134

1980s did undergo economic reforms that contain all the four ingredients. For scholars
who work on linking the internal and external factors to explain states’ foreign policy
regarding conflict and peace (Solingen, 2001, 2003, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; McDonald, 2004; Brooks, 2013), a state’s economic policy is
“not merely a projection of a leader’s personal political calculations and interests, but
rather it is a combination of political/economic interests and preferences (philosophy and
prospects) shared by a leader, political officials, and a group of individuals within society
about how to achieve national prosperity and growth” (Tang, 2012, p. 398). Based on this
internal-external linkage, the adoption of economic liberalization reform and the progress
of international integration among the once-warlike Latin American countries since the
1980s may also imply that there is a gradual change of the preference of these countries.
After the end of the Cold War when Latin America lost its strategic importance to the
United States due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of the capitalist
peace concern in the region, we should see the influence of the United States in the region
keeps decreasing. Therefore, I posit that, first, in the post-Cold War period, not only the
United States’ economic leverage but also the capitalist peace concern should have a
significant pacifying effect on the regional peace; and second, the substantive effect of
the latter should be more salient than the former since the strategic importance of the
region is not as critical as it was during the Cold War period. Thus the second and third
hypotheses to be tested are:
Hypothesis 2: Latin American dyads who have higher degree of development are
less likely to engage in militarized conflict in the post-Cold War period.
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Hypothesis 3: The substantive effect of the capitalist peace concern is larger than
the substantive effect of the United States’ economic leverage in the reduction of
militarized conflict in the post-Cold War period.
In the coming third section, I will explain how I design the statistical models to
test the three hypotheses derived from my argument, and the fourth section is the
empirical results of the Latin American conflicts from 1950 to 2001.

3 Research design
3.1 Dependent variable: force MID onset
Following most of the literature on international conflict, I use the onset of a new
MID between two Latin America states each year as the dependent variable because the
dyadic design can better take different security threats that different countries face into
concern. Thus the unit of analysis is dyad-year. I derive the MID data (Ghosn et al., 2004)
from the Correlates of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between
or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or
actual uses of military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). Because of the fact that
almost all the militarized conflicts between Latin American countries are recurrent ones
from previous conflicts (Hensel, 1994), I look at only the MIDs that go to at least the
levels of “use of force” and “war” to avoid the noisy information and coding problems
pervasive in the low levels of conflicts, 50 especially among the Latin American dyads
where “threats to use military force” is not an expensive concern for many of the
nondemocratic leaders. Thus, the dependent variable I use is Force MID onset, a

50

Relative discussion about the miscoding concern of low-level MIDs refer to Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre
(2000, p. 894), Souva and Prins (2006, p. 191), and Johnston (2012, pp. 56–58).
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dichotomous variable coded 1 for the first year of a new force MID in a dyad and 0
otherwise. The subsequent years of the same force MID in the starting year is dropped
from the data to reduce the problem of temporal dependence, because the statistical
model I employ in this study, logit regression, assumes that the conflict events being
analyzed are independent of each other. Because force MID onset is a time-series crosssectional binary variable across time (years) and space (dyads), in order to produce
accurate standard errors and consistent coefficients, I estimate the logit regression model
with Huber/White robust standard error which assumes that observations within the same
dyad across years are correlated but those between different dyads are uncorrelated,
adjusting for clustering in dyads. I also adopt Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method to
include peace years, peace years’ square, and peace years’ cube into the model to control
for temporal dependence. 51 As most of the literature, I estimate all the models with
dependent variable at time t and independent variables at time t − 1 to mitigate problems
of reverse causality.
3.2 Independent variables
My theory predicts that it is the country that has less economic ties with the
United States that determines the militarized conflict during the Cold War period, and
that countries that are more developed are less likely to have militarized conflict after the
Cold War, so my independent variables will include the countries’ degree of economic
links with the United States as well as their degree of development. I operationalize the
former by measuring the Latin American states’ degree of trade dependence on the
United States in proportion to their gross domestic product (GDP), Dependence on the
51

I also estimate all the models using Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) peace years and cubic splines to
control for temporal dependence, the outcomes are almost identical.
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United States, which represents how the former is economically dependent on the United
States and how much economic leverage the latter has to influence the former. Data of
the trade share is from the COW bilateral trade data, version 3.0 (Barbieri, Keshk, &
Pollins, 2009; Barbieri & Keshk, 2012).
As for the degree of development, following most of the capitalist peace literature,
I measure the Latin American countries’ degree of development by their GDP per capita,
GDP/pc, and log it to adjust the skewness. Data of GDP per capita is from Gleditsch’s
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data.
In the following models I estimate the independent variables following the “weak
link” logic 52 and include both the lower value (Low dependence on the United States)
and the higher value (High dependence on the United States) of the two countries in
each dyad-year.
3.3 Control variables
Also following most of the studies on international conflict, I control for the
variables that are demonstrated to be influential. I control for both countries’ degree of
interdependence (Dependence), 53 degree of democracy (Polity score), 54 the number of
their joint intergovernmental organization memberships (IGOs), 55 their power parity

52

The “weak link” logic is originally designed by Dixon (1994) and then followed by Oneal and Russett
(1997) and many other following studies on international conflict, which assumes that “the likelihood of
dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal &
Russett, 1997, p. 273).
53

Data from Gleditsch (2002).

54

Data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013).

55

Data from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004).
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(Power parity), 56 whether they are contiguous (Contiguity), 57 and the distance between
their capitals in logged miles (Distance). 58
Specifically for my theory, I also control for several rival explanations to
demonstrate my independent variables are still valid even after taking these factors into
concern. My theory predicts that whether the United States has enough economic
leverage on the Latin American countries determines the latter’s conflict propensity, but
it is possible that the latter’s degree of trade dependence on the United States is resulting
from whether they have already been in a good relationship with the United States, or it is
possible that it is the distance between them and the United States that determines their
trade ties with it. Therefore, controlling for their interest similarity with the United States
and their distance to the United States is necessarily for my argument to be persuasive. So
I include the following two control variables: Interest similarity with the US is the
difference of ideal points between the Latin American countries and the United States in
terms of their voting pattern in the General Assembly of the United Nations, data from
Strezhnev and Voeten (2013). Distance to the US is the distance between the two
capitals in logged miles, data from the COW database.

4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic analysis
Table 4.2 shows the results of the three models I estimate. Model 1 is the full
model which includes the whole sample space from 1950 to 2001. My theory predicts
56

Data from Singer (1988).

57

Data from Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, and Gochman (2002).

58

Data generated by the Eugene software, Version 3.204 (Bennett & Stam, 2000).
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that the probability of conflict decreases with the increase of Latin American countries’
dependence on the United States during the whole sample period. The result of Model 1
confirms my argument that it is the Latin American country that has less economic ties
with the United States that determines the probability of conflict, while all the other
realism and liberal factors do not have significant effects on conflict-constraining.
Model 2 shows the result during the Cold War period from 1950 to 1989, and my theory
predicts that during this period the most important factor that promotes the Latin
American peace is whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin
American countries to constrain their conflictual behavior. The result of Model 2
confirms my argument that Latin American countries who have higher economic ties
with the United States are less likely to engage in conflict. Again, all the realism and
liberal factors seem to be irrelevant in the reduction of the probability of conflict.
Model 3 contains only the samples after the end of the Cold War from 1990 to 2001, and
my theory predicts that after the end of the Cold War both the United States’ economic
leverage and the capitalist concern are the key factors to the regional peace. The result of
Model 3 confirms my claim that, after the Cold War, the higher the United States’
economic leverage on the Latin American countries and the more developed they are, the
less likely they engage in conflict. The substantive effects (in the next section) also
demonstrate that since 1990 economic development becomes the most important conflictconstraining factor in the region. Latin American countries gradually walk from the path
of hegemonic stability toward the capitalist peace trajectory.
As for the results of the rival explanation variables and the control variables, as
we can see from Table 4.2, except for one variable, none of them has a consistent effect
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Table 4.2 Determinants on force MID onset between Latin American countries
[Dependent variable t ]

Force MID onset
Model 1
Full Model
1950~2001

Model 2
During the Cold War
1950~1989

Model 3
After the Cold War
1990~2001

-22.893***
(6.326)

-25.970*
(13.619)

-27.515**
(10.783)

High dependence on the United States

2.065
(3.262)

6.167
(5.069)

-2.753*
(1.612)

State A’s GDP/pc

-0.130
(0.501)

0.640
(0.486)

-2.393***
(0.578)

State B’s GDP/pc

0.261
(0.693)

0.868
(0.686)

-1.632**
(0.702)

State A’ Interest similarity with the United States

0.367
(0.267)

0.690*
(0.365)

0.240
(1.057)

State B’ Interest similarity with the United States

-0.449**
(0.189)

-0.861**
(0.368)

-0.204
(0.698)

State A’s distance to the United States

0.497
(1.166)

0.462
(1.384)

-0.471
(1.512)

State B’s distance to the United States

-1.628
(1.021)

-1.925*
(1.152)

-1.486
(2.021)

State A’s dependence on State B

46.354***
(17.811)

61.551***
(17.024)

43.406
(31.231)

State B’s dependence on State A

-41.419*
(24.082)

-66.700**
(27.596)

22.220
(41.984)

State A’s polity score

-0.022
(0.030)

-0.030
(0.033)

0.007
(0.101)

State B’s polity score

-0.018
(0.030)

-0.013
(0.032)

-0.059
(0.099)

0.075***
(0.028)

0.064*
(0.035)

0.176**
(0.071)

0.342
(0.662)

0.721
(0.644)

0.567
(1.135)

2.476***
(0.813)

4.331***
(0.624)

0.314
(0.607)

[Independent variables t −1 ]
Low dependence on the United States

[Control variables t −1 ]

IGOs

Power parity

Contiguity
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Distance

-0.336
(0.221)

Cold War

0.546
(0.365)

Peace years

Peace years

Peace years

1

2

3

Constant
Pseudo R-squared
Log likelihood.
Chi-squared
Probability > Chi-squared
Number of dyads
Number of observations

-0.391
(0.239)

0.328
(0.863)

-0.174***

-0.153

-0.096

(0.066)

(0.111)

(0.148)

0.006

0.008

0.001

(0.004)

(0.009)

(0.009)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.353
(4.789)
0.373
-234.314
1288.293
0.0000
190
9,462

-7.352
(6.672)
0.411
-161.725
708.848
0.0000
190
7,410

34.726**
(13.752)
0.479
-51.286
552.647
0.0000
190
2,052

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The total number of observations of
the 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001 should be 9,880, from 1950 to 1989 should be 7,600,
and from 1990 to 2001 should be 2,280.
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on the probability of force MID across the three different time periods. The only one
variable which has a consistent effect on force MID onset between Latin American dyads
is one of the Kantian peace factors – the number of shared intergovernmental
organization memberships (IGOs), and it is positive with the probability of conflict.
In sum, all the empirical result confirms the two points I make. First, Latin
American peace is mainly maintained by the hegemonic stability effect of the United
States’ security management, and this American hegemonic stability effect is conditioned
on whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin American
countries to constrain their conflictual behavior. Second, after the end of the Cold War,
pursuing for economic growth and development becomes the most important reason that
reduces Latin American leaders’ incentive to engage in conflict.
4.2 Substantive effects
To further demonstrate the substantive effects of the independent variables, in
Table 4.3 I list the predicted probabilities of force MID onset when each of the
independent variables moves from its minimum to maximum, holding all other
continuous variables at their means and assuming contiguity. In sum, during the half
century, the most important and consistent factor that promotes the regional peace is
Latin American states’ degree of dependence on the United States; and after the end of
the Cold War, the capitalist peace concern, states’ degree of development, becomes the
dominant effect that reduces the probability of conflict in the region.

5 Concluding remark: capitalist peace and its threats
In this research I propose an argument to explain the ambiguous role the United
States has played in the regional peace, that is, a hegemony who maintains the regional
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Table 4.3 Substantive effects of the independent variables
Variable
(MinMax)
Low dependence on the United States
High dependence on the United States
State A’s GDP/pc
State B’s GDP/pc

Model 1
1950~2001
-0.0201724

Model 2
1950~1989
-0.0222253

Model 3
1990~2001
-0.0025403
-0.0006865
-0.0473534
-0.0291378

Note: The predicted probabilities of force MID onset are calculated by holding all the continuous variables
at their means and assuming contiguity. The baseline probability of force MID onset is 0.0061 (46 conflicts
out of 7,600 dyad-years) before the Cold War and 0.0075 (17 conflicts out of 2,280 dyad-years) after the
Cold War.
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peace with conditional ability. In countries that have higher degree of economic
dependence on the United States, the United States has enough influence and economic
leverage on the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in countries that
have lower degree of economic dependence on the United States, the United States does
not have sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the hegemonic
stability effect of the United States’ security management becomes less salient in these
countries. Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the
region is a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough
economic leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior.
My argument also demonstrates that after the Cold War, Latin American peace
largely follows the capitalist peace trajectory. Moving toward this path, as long as the
Latin American countries are able to keep the pace of economic growth, the regional
peace may be able to evolve, in Miller’s (2005) phrase, from the “normal peace” of
conflict resolution to the “warm peace” of deep international integration. However, when
the United States has lost its strategic incentive to afford the cost for maintaining the
regional peace since the end of the Cold War, the capitalist peace concern may become
the only salient factor that reduces the Latin American leaders’ incentive in solving their
disputes with force. Thus, whether the Latin American countries can sustain their
economic performance may become the key to the regional peace. If it is the case, then
two sources of threats to the regional economic development may be critical to the
international relations among the Latin American countries.
The first one comes from the international. In the past decades, Latin American
economy has been sensitive to the world economic circle as well as to the reoccurring
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financial crises. Therefore, the probability of militarized conflict in the region may
increase when the regional economy is affected by the negative turbulences of the world
economy. The second one comes from the domestic. Many Latin American countries are
notorious for having a highly-unequal society and an unstable democracy. Thus the
potential unrest resulting from domestic redistribution issues may arise when the Latin
American countries are not able to keep their growth pace, which may further
compromise their peaceful international relations based on sustainable economic
performance.
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CHAPTER 5
The Embedded Liberalism and the International Relations between the
European Union Countries
1 Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the European Union countries have been the most
developed, democratic, and peaceful region in the world. This long and salient peace
between the European Union counties is composed of many factors that mutually
reinforce as a virtuous circle. According to realisms, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) collective security and their common enemy – The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – maintain the peaceful situation between the
European Union countries. For the liberals, the peaceful relationship attributes to their
democratic regimes, high degree of interdependence, and successful international
integration through the European Community. As for the constructivists, they highlight
the contribution of the constructive process of security community. In any perspective,
the European Union countries are the most peaceful region in the world after World War
II.
Although the European Union countries are the most peaceful region in the world,
this does not mean that there is not any conflict happened between them. However,
previous research on this regional peace seldom discusses the variations of the
international relations between the European Union countries. One of the reason, I argue,
is due to the limitation of data availability. The most popular conflict data in
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contemporary international relations research, militarized interstate dispute (MID) of the
Correlates of War database, records only the data of militarized conflict. As a consequent,
if researchers look at the international relations between the European Union counties,
there is no variation in the dependent variable because there are simply too few
militarized conflicts happened between them, especially that there is not a single MID
occurred so far since the end of Cold War. 59 The lack of militarized conflicts between
the European Union countries precludes researchers from further investigating the
variations of their international relations.
However, even though there is a lack of militarized conflict, especially after the
end of Cold War, non-militarized conflicts do occur among the European Union countries
from time to time. What are the reasons that cause the variations between the
international relations among the European Union countries? Why do conflicts still exist
in a region that is the richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated place in the
world? In this research, I make an argument to link the logic of the embedded liberalism
with international relations between the European Union countries. I argue that the main
conflictual issues among the European Union countries mainly result from trade and
international integration, which involves the struggle between their domestic
internationalizing and backlashing coalitions on market opening issues. Due to the market
opening and international integration concerns, countries who participate in the regional
integration deeper and simultaneously maintain higher domestic compensation (in terms
of social expenditure) tend to have less conflicts with other countries. This is because of
two main reasons. The first reason is that, people in countries with higher domestic
59

The last militarized interstate dispute occurred between the European Union countries is the 1986 fishery
dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain.
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compensation have less risks due to a larger safety net. Therefore, they are more likely to
support for market opening and international integration, thus reduce the number of
conflict resulting from these two issues. The second one is that, higher domestic
compensation also means that the governments are more responsive to domestic demands,
and these kind of governments are less likely to act belligerently against others. Due to
these two reasons, among the European Union countries, those who have higher
interdependence on the others tend to have more conflicts with the others, and those who
have higher domestic compensation tend to have less conflicts with the others. The
interaction between these two factors, the degree of interdependence and the degree of
domestic compensation, accounts for the number of conflicts between the European
Union countries. Thus, my argument explains the variations of the international relations
in the most peaceful region in the world.
To proceed my argument, the structure of the research is as following. The second
section is the theory, in which I explain how the logic of the embedded liberalism can
help predict European Union countries’ international relations in terms of the number of
different kinds of interstate conflict. I proceed this argument by looking at both the
pacifying effect and the conflictual effect of trade and domestic compensation. The goal
of this section is to demonstrate that trade and domestic compensation are the most
important political issues among the European Union countries, establishing the base for
the following analysis. Then, in the third section I propose the research design to test my
argument, in which I lay out how I apply the 10 million international dyadic events (IDE)
dataset to conceptualize different levels of interstate conflicts to perform the empirical
tests. The fourth section is the statistical analysis. The data I use to test my argument
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includes conflicts between the total 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2004. The
15 European Union countries include Germany, Netherland, Belgium, Luxemburg,
France, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden,
Finland, and Austria. Lastly, the final section is the concluding remark. The contribution
of this research is, on the one hand, to conceptualize different levels of interstate conflict
between the European Union countries by applying a useful dataset, and one the other
hand, to supplement the insufficient literature about the missing part of the international
relations in the most peaceful region in the world. The finding of this research confirms
Garrett (1998), Pitruzzello (2004) and Ruggie’s (1982) conclusions that, since the end of
World War II, the embedded liberalism has been and will still be an important concern of
international security in this highly globalized world.

2 Embedded liberalism and international relations
In this part I first explain my argument about why we can predict the international
relations between the European Union countries by looking at their degree of
interdependence and degree of domestic compensation, and then I point out the
hypotheses derived from my argument to be further tested in the next section. I begin
with a discussion about the post-WWII development of their arrangement of economic
system at both the domestic level and the international level, and then posit the possible
causal mechanisms that link this post-War arrangement to their international relations. In
brief, the post-WWII development of the embedded liberalism, the consequence of
interdependence, and the reasons that states do domestic compensation, together form an
internal-external linkage as the domestic explanations of international relations between
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the European Union countries, the most democratic, developed, and integrated place in
the world.
I build my argument by answering three related questions: First, why trade,
international integration, and domestic compensation are the most important political
issues among the European Union countries? Second, what are the consequence in terms
of states’ international relations if they are highly interdependent? Third, what are the
reasons that the states maintain a high or a low degree of domestic compensation? The
answers of these three questions suggest four hypotheses about the variation of their
international relations.
2.1 The balance between the two contradictory goals of each state and the post WWII
peace between the European Union countries
The first question is, why trade, international integration, and domestic
compensation are the most important political issues among the European Union
countries? The answer to this question can be traced back early to the French Revolution
and the Industrial Revolution which set up the grand socioeconomic background and
party alignment in the West European countries (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Boix, 1999;
Cox, 2001; Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2007; Kreuzer, 2010; Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice,
2010; Boix, 2010). Here I only focus on the post-WWII arrangement because it is more
directly related to the trade and international integration issues today among the European
Union countries.
Early since the end of the Napoleonic War in 1816, after every systemic war the
victorious countries will convene a conference to design a new post-war international
system, and the goal of this new post-war system is to avoid the causes of the war from
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happening again (Ikenberry, 2000). The Bretton Woods System was designed by the
same reason (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 163-214). One of the main causes of World War II is
due to the trade competition between the European countries resulting from two
contradicting goals: the economic nationalism and the liberalism of the gold standard and
free trade (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393). The economic nationalism emphasizes the priority of
domestic policy, neglecting the fact that pursuing domestic policy may cause negative
externalities to other countries and therefore leads to international conflict. A good
example is that, in the 1930s the European countries one another adopted policies of
raising their trade barriers and devaluating their currencies in order to protect their
domestic markets, which resulted in international disputes and became the main cause of
World War II (McDonald, 2004; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). The liberalism of the
gold standard and free trade pursues the stability of exchange rate in order to facilitate
trade, neglecting the importance of domestic social stability, therefore makes the state not
able to use fiscal and monetary policies to adjust their trade deficit or implement
Keynesian policies to stimulate economic growth. As a consequent, the state will undergo
social instability, and social instability will further force leaders to adopt economic
nationalism, which draws the state into a vicious circle of international conflict.
In order to avoid international conflicts resulting from these two contradicting
goals, how to find a balance between these two contradictory goals of each state in
participating in the global market is the key to peace. In order to fulfill this goal, the
designers of the post-World War II order set up the so-called “Bretton Woods System.”
Bretton Woods System constructed a multilateral international regime, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), to supervise and coordinate member states’ trade and monetary
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policies. If a state has trade deficit, IMF can either offer loans or approve the state of
changing its exchange rate to adjust its trade deficit by other member states’ agreement.
As a consequence, the member states do not necessary have to use trade barriers or
devaluate their currencies to alter their trade deficit, therefore avoid international conflict
resulting from the struggle between the economic nationalism and the liberalism of gold
standard and free trade. Due to the fact that the European countries’ economy was
severely destroyed by the war, the United States took the responsibility to take over the
leadership of the new international system (Kindleberger, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Gilpin,
1987).
After World War II, the Bretton Woods System successfully brought peace and
economic prosperity to advanced industrial countries for more than thirty years. The
Success of the Bretton Woods System makes many people think that trade and market
openness is indispensable for countries who struggle for economic growth. Therefore,
when it comes to helping the underdeveloped and the developing countries, they drum for
free trade and liberalized financial and monetary policies, the “the Washington
Consensus” (Williamson, 1989). But the paradox is that, the reason of the success of the
Bretton Woods System is not due to unlimited free trade, but the limitation of trade
(Gilpin, 1987, 2001). Free trade and unlimited market openness is never the goal of the
Bretton Woods System designers. The designers of the Bretton Woods System set up
trade statues which leaves huge amount of policy space for each member countries to
build their own capitalisms according to their different political economic environments,
which includes their distinct approaches to corporate governance, labor markets, tax
regimes, business-government relations, and welfare state arrangements (Hall & Soskice,
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2001; Hancké, 2009). As Rodrik’s (2011) description, the original goal of the most
important international regime of the Bretton Woods System globalization, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is designed to:
“…leave each trading nation room to pursue its social and economic
objectives relatively unencumbered by external constraints, albeit with
a loose framework of international cooperation. When trade threatened
domestic distributional bargains, trade would give way…….GATT’s
purpose was never to maximize free trade. It was to achieve the
maximum amount of trade compatible with different nations doing
their own thing” (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 48-49).
In other words, GATT gives each member state the priority to deal with their own
domestic issues. States can choose to open their market to the degree that they are wellprepared for the impact caused by trade. Before they open their specific industries, they
are able to have enough policy space to handle the social risks of market opening such as
unemployment, distribution, welfare, and infant industries. Garrett (1998) concludes the
reason why globalization under the Bretton Woods System is so successful is due to its
policy of fixed exchange rates with capital controls:
“Bretton Woods facilitated the twin goals of trade liberalization and
domestic compensation by combining fixed exchange rates with capital
controls. Fixed rates promoted trade by stabilizing expectations about
future price movements. Capital controls gave governments the
macroeconomic autonomy to smooth business cycles through
countercyclical demand management” (Garrett, 1998, p. 797).
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The way the Bretton Woods System facilitate trade globalization and economic
prosperity is called “the embedded liberalism” by (Ruggie, 1982, 1994). The embedded
liberalism is a compromise between the extreme nationalism and the extreme liberalism,
in which neither of them are able to bring long-term stability and prosperity to
international relations. In Ruggie’s own words,
“The task of postwar institutional reconstruction……was to maneuver
between these two extremes and to devise a framework which would
safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability without, at the
same time, triggering the mutually destructive external consequences
that had plagued the interwar period. This was the essence of the
embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of
the thirties, it would be multilateral in character unlike the liberalism of
the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be
predicated upon domestic interventionism” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393).
The spirit of the embedded liberalism is just like the concept of “the double movement”
emphasized by Polanyi (1944) when he discussed about the emergence of industrial
democracies in the 19th century, which means that the state fulfills two components
simultaneously:
“One component was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at
the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of
the trading classes, and using largely laissez faire and free trade as its
methods; the other was the principle of social protection, aiming at the
conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization,
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relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by
the deleterious action of the market, and using instruments of
intervention as its methods” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 132).
That is, the state opens its domestic market and supports free trade, while at the same
time compensates those who are hurt by market opening with welfare policies, therefore,
people can enjoy the economic prosperity from free trade and the losers of trade do not
necessarily go against market openness.
The logic of the embedded liberalism is further empirically confirmed by
Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985), and Rodrik (1998). Looking at 18 advanced
capitalism countries, Cameron (1978) found that except for those with large domestic
market or those far away from their main trade partners, countries with higher degree of
market openness have larger public sectors. This is the reason, he claimed, that the public
sector of these countries expanded so quickly after World War II. Katzenstein (1985)
investigated the trade policy of seven small states in Europe, finding that in order to
survive in the volatile world economy, those European small states chose to largely
participate in the world market, and meanwhile increased their government spending to
compensate for the harmful effects of market openness, which made the economic growth
more insured. Rodrik (1998) further verified the causal mechanisms between market
openness and public sector expansion. Because the domestic economy is very sensitive to
international economy dynamics in an open economy, therefore, people in democratic
countries require the government to compensate the risks of market opening. In order to
fulfill this kind of demand, government in an open economy builds a large scale social
security network.
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In sum, by market opening and domestic compensation, countries one the one
hand enjoy the benefits of globalization, and on the other hand compensate the losers of
trade by part of the revenues from the benefits. This “Keynesian welfare state” approach
gives countries a “win-win” situation by social insurance and social expenditure, and this
so-called “the compromise of embedded liberalism” is the reason that makes
globalization under the Bretton Woods System and economic integration between the
European Union countries run so successfully. As a consequence, trade, international
integration, and domestic compensation become the most important political issues and
conflicts in the European Union countries since the end of WWII (Kriesi et al., 2008,
2012).
2.2 The consequence of high degree of interdependence: pacifying and conflictual effects
Due to the successful liberal factors – interdependence, democracy, international
regimes and international integration, the European Union countries become the most
peaceful region in the world after the end of WWII (Mitrany, 1948a; Deutsch, Burrell,
Kann, & Lee, 1957; Haas, 1958; Deutsch, 1961; Haas, 1964a; Mitrany, 1966; Adler &
Barnett, 1998; Miller, 2005). According to the most popular conflict dataset, the
militarized interstate dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004, p. 3) of the
Correlates of War database, there are only 1 dyadic MIDs happened without any fatality 60
among the total 2,154 non-directed dyad-year observations of the 15 European Union
countries from 1950 to 2001. And till today there has not been any single MID happened
between the European Union countries since 1986 when the last MID occurred. Although
there is a lack of militarized conflict among the European Union countries, they do
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That is the 1986 Britain-Spain fishery dispute.
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cooperate and compete with each other day by day. The lack of militarized conflict is by
no means equal to saying that there is no variation in their international relationship.
Some countries have more conflictual issues with others, while some have less, although
these conflictual issues never escalate to the degree that involves the use of force. If their
international relations do vary, how do we explain the variation of the international
relations between the European Union countries? What are the factors that drive the
relationship between the world’s most developed, democratic, and integrated countries?
The answers to the rest two of the three questions, I argue, can help explain the variations
of the international relations between the European Union countries, where trade and
international integration are the most important issues in their political arena.
The second question is, what are the consequences in terms of states’ international
relations if they are highly interdependent? According to the liberal commercial peace
theories, generally speaking, trade can promote peace in terms of the reduction of
militarized interstate disputes (Oneal & Russett, 1999; Maoz, 2009; Hegre, Oneal, &
Russett, 2010). This is due to three causal mechanisms (Kastner, 2005). The constraint
arguments state that as interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also
increases due to the loss of valuable assets and trade flows (Papayoanou 1996; Oneal and
Russett 2001a; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Smith 2014). The informational arguments claim
that interdependence enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve
through threatening to use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of
dangerous miscalculations about each other’s resolves (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999;
Morrow, 1999, 2003; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Powell, 2002; Gartzke & Li, 2003;
Gartzke, 2003; Stein, 2003). The transformative arguments posit that interdependence can
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reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’ interests and
preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives or through
changing the balance of domestic political coalitions (Mitrany 1948; 1966; Haas 1958;
1964; Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1961; Adler and Barnett 1998b; Solingen 2001; 2003;
2007; Simmons 2003). Therefore, as their degree of interdependence increases, the
European Union countries should enjoy the peace in terms of the lack of militarized
interstate disputes.
However, in addition to this pacifying effect, trade has a conflictual effect as well.
This is due to two main reasons. The first reason is that, as Chapter 2 in this research has
demonstrated, the pacifying effect of trade is only limited to the reduction of militarized
conflicts that cause fatality. When it comes to “militarized conflicts that do not cause
fatality” or “other non-militarized conflicts,” trade actually increases them. 61 This is
because trade, or the degree of interdependence, is also a measurement of the interaction
density between both sides. Therefore, the more frequently countries interact, the higher
the probability that they will have conflictual issues simply due to frequent interaction.
The second reason that trade brings conflicts to states is that, trade brings both the
positive impacts as well as the negative ones to the society. Besides the pacifying effect
at the state level as I discussed above, trade has also the distributive effects at the
individual level. Although trade generally provides aggregates benefits to both states, this
does not mean that all the people in both states can also enjoy the benefits resulting from
trade (Kleinberg & Fordham, 2010; Fordham & Kleinberg, 2011). The reason is, no
matter how beneficial trade is to the society, there will always be winners and losers due
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to their different factor endowments or their different positions in the economy. Based on
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) demonstrate that the relative
price increase of a certain product leads to the increase of the reward and the actual price
this certain product intensively-used when producing, which decreases the reward and the
actual price of another factor. That is, although trade may increase the total welfare of the
society, it increases the income of some people with a certain factor while simultaneously
decreases the income of the other with another factor. In other words, trade always
creates losers as well as winners in the society. Also based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model,
Rogowski (1989) demonstrate that trade and the different return of factors caused by
trade will further push people to form political coalitions and thus lead to the consequent
political conflict. Aside from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, other different models have
different conclusions about who the winners or losers are. The Heckscher-Ohlin model
claims that those who possess abundant factors are the winners and those who possess
scarce factors are the losers (Ohlin 1933); the Ricardo-Viner-Jones model claims that
who the winners and losers are is determined by class-cleavage instead of factor-cleavage
(Jones 1971; Samuelson 1971); and the Krugman-Helpman model contends that firms
who have economics of scale are the winners of market openness and those who do not
are the losers (Krugman, 1996). Although different models have different predictions
about who the winners and losers are, it is beyond controversy that trade will create
domestic winners and losers despite how beneficial it is to the state.
What will the winners and the losers do? If we model them as rational actors who
want to maximize their profits, the winners will try to maintain the trade policy that
makes them rich and the losers will try to change the trade policy that is not in favor of
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them. Typically, the winners of trade want more openness, for they are very competitive
and a more opened market simply gives them more chance to make money, and the losers
want to reduce the degree of market openness since it hurts them and want more welfare
expenditures to compensate their loss caused by trade. If the government takes good care
of the losers by welfare expenditure such as compensation and education, the country can
enjoy the benefits from trade without sacrificing the social cost. Instead, if the
government does not take good care of the losers, trade will cause severe social problems
such as unemployment, inequality, class opposition, social and political polarization, etc.,
so that sows the seeds of future conflict. Besides, these social problems caused by trade
may well further enhance the strength of the backlash coalitions in domestic politics
(Solingen, 2001, 2003), so that raise trade barriers and attenuate the country’s inclination
of joining in the international market (Alt et al, 1996, pp. 35–36), and both of them are
found to increase the probability of militarized conflict (McDonald, 2004; Brooks, 2013).
In addition, once this “globalization promised” economic development does not come
true, the enduring conflict between “the Lexus and the olive tree” (Friedman, 2000) may
escalate, 62 and many people and politicians may resort to nationalism and blame their
trade partners for hurting their economy. All of these trends monadically become a
vicious circle that compromises the pacifying effect of trade. Therefore, whether the state
is able to well manage the negative impact of trade on the society and simultaneously
take advantage of the profits from trade determines the effectiveness of the pacifying
effect of trade.
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The conflict between the Lexus and the olive tree is similar to the conflict between the internationalizing
coalition and the backlashing coalition (Solingen, 2001, 2003) in the political arena.
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In sum, interdependence should have both the pacifying effect as well as the
conflictual effect in international relations, and the logic of the embedded liberalism
strongly suggests that the balance between these two opposite effects should be a
conditional one, which hinges on the degree of domestic compensation. In the next part, I
will discuss how the degree of domestic compensation may condition the pacifying effect
of trade. This will be done by answering the third question.
2.3 The reasons of high degree of domestic compensation: pacifying and conflictual
effects
The last question is, what are the reasons that the states maintain a high or a low
degree of domestic compensation? According to literature, there are many explanations
that account for the causes and the dynamics of domestic compensation responding to
trade, and these explanations are also found to have influence on international relations.
The main reason is that, the degree of domestic compensation is also a measurement of
how responsive the states’ are to the needs of their societies. And this kind of
responsiveness have both the pacifying effects as well as the conflictual ones on
international relations.
At most of the time, high degree of domestic compensation, which means high
degree of states’ responsiveness to society, has a positive effect on international relations.
This is due to several reasons. First, higher domestic compensation means better safety
net for people who are hurt by market opening, thus increasing people’s support for trade
(Hays, Ehrlich, & Peinhardt, 2005; Burgoon, 2009). As a consequence, there will be less
conflicts resulting from the negative impacts of trade (Ruggie, 1982).

162

Second, high degree of domestic compensation also reflects the weight that
governments place on aggregate social welfare versus private interests (Grossman &
Helpman, 1994, 1996, 2005; Gawande, Krishna, & Olarreaga, 2009; Taydas & Peksen,
2012). Given the fact that most of the society favor a peaceful situation rather than
conflict, this kind of governments are less likely to initiate conflicts for some narrow
private interests (Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Brooks, 2013).
Third, high degree of domestic compensation could also be a result of effective
input from the society to the government. For example, Hicks and Swank (1992) find that
countries that have voter turnout, powerful central and left parties, high strength of
democratic oppositions, and neocorporatist institutions are more likely to have higher
welfare spending. These factors are also demonstrated as the same conditions that make
leader more constrained and less likely to engage in international conflict (Schultz, 1999,
2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).
Due to these reasons, the increase of domestic compensation should have a
pacifying effect in the reduction of international conflict. This pacifying effect has been
demonstrated by empirical evidence using the MID data from 1950 to 1992 (Peet &
Simon, 2000). In sum, the literature suggests that the reasons that states maintain a high
degree of domestic compensation are also the same reasons that reduce the probability of
international conflict.
However, like trade can bring about both the positive impacts and the negative
ones, high domestic compensation also has negative effects on international relations.
When the degree of interdependence increases, the increase of domestic compensation is
associated with the reduction of conflict resulting from the negative impacts of trade.
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However, when the degree of market openness or interdependence is at a low level while
domestic compensation keeps increasing, the probability of conflict could increase due to
the following reasons. First, low level of market openness or interdependence with high
level of domestic compensation means that there is an over-input of domestic demand for
protection, and protectionism is found to be related to the increase of the probability of
conflict, either due to trade dispute or due to a conflict-prone domestic coalition
(Solingen, 2001, 2003; McDonald, 2004). Second, low level of market openness or
interdependence with high level of domestic compensation could also mean that the
government is transferring a disproportional amount of money to certain interest groups
that are not hurt by trade, which means that the government is less responsive to the most
of society in general and is more responsive to some narrow private interests. This effect
is similar to leaders with a relative small winning coalition in terms of the logic of
political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Under this situation, conflict is more
likely to happen either because that the interest groups urge the leaders to defend their
interests internationally or because that the leaders are less constrained after they
successfully provide interests to their winning coalition. In sum, whether high degree of
domestic compensation contributes to more harmonious international relations should
depend on its balance against the degree of interdependence.
2.4 Synthesizing the effects
The discussion about the influences of interdependence and domestic
compensation suggests that, trade brings both the pacifying effect and the conflictual
effect to both sides, and that the relationship between trade and domestic compensation
affects the balance between these two opposite effects. When both the degree of
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interdependence and the degree of domestic compensation are at a high level, the number
of dyadic conflicts will be few due to the success of the embedded liberalism. On the
contrary, when both the degree of interdependence and the degree of domestic
compensation are at a low level, the number of dyadic conflicts will be few as well, this is
due to two reasons. First, low degree of interdependence means both sides interact not
very frequently, so the number of conflicts will be few due to their low interaction
density. Second, low degree of interdependence also means that, although the conflictual
effect of trade will be low, the pacifying effect of trade will be low as well. Thus we
should see that there may be few, but not none, conflicts occurred between both sides.
Therefore, the first set of hypotheses to be test are:
Hypothesis 1 (the positive interaction effect): Among the European Union
countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and
domestic compensation are both at a high level will have the least number of conflicts
with their trade partners.
Hypothesis 2 (the passive interaction effect): Among the European Union
countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and
domestic compensation are both at a low level will have few number of conflicts with
their trade partners.
How will the international relations be “when the degree of interdependence is
high and the degree of domestic compensation is low” or “when the degree of
interdependence is low and the degree of domestic compensation is high”? My argument
hypothesizes that, first, when the degree of interdependence is high and the degree of
domestic compensation is low, the conflictual effect of trade will increase due to the
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negative impacts of trade on society. As a consequence, the number of conflict will
increase as well. And second, when the degree of interdependence is low and the degree
of domestic compensation is high, it denotes the situation that the pacifying effect of
trade is low, the degree of protectionism is high, and the power of backlashing coalition is
strong. As a consequence, the number of conflict will increase as well. However, high
degree of domestic compensation also means the governments are responsive to their
social purpose, thus the number of conflict should not overtake the number of conflict
under the previous situation where the degree of interdependence is high and the degree
of domestic compensation is low. Therefore, the second set of hypotheses to be test are:
Hypothesis 3 (the interdependence effect): Among the European Union countries,
all things being equal, countries who have high degree of interdependence and low
degree of domestic compensation will have the most number of conflicts with their trade
partners.
Hypothesis 4 (the protectionism effect): Among the European Union countries, all
things being equal, countries who have low degree of interdependence and high degree of
domestic compensation will have a few number of conflicts with their trade partners.
Table 5.1 demonstrates the four situations that the four hypotheses propose. In
short, we should see that the number of conflict should be the most when interdependence
is high and domestic compensation is low; the number of conflict should be the second
most when interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high; and the number of
conflict should be the least when both interdependence and domestic compensation are
low or high. In the next section, I will test these four hypotheses using data of dyadic
conflict onset between the total 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2004.
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Table 5.1 The influences of interdependence and social expenditure on the number of international
conflicts

Low
Interdependence
High

Domestic compensation
Low
High
Number of conflicts: Few
Number of conflicts: A Few
(The passive interaction effect)
(The protectionism effect)
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 4
Number of conflicts: The most
Number of conflicts: The least
(The interdependence effect)
(The positive interaction effect)
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 1
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3 Research design
Given the fact that the European Union countries are the richest, the most
democratic, and the most developed countries in the world, with the highest degree of
interdependence, the most successful alliance (NATO), and multiple shared international
organizations, they are the least-likely ones to have interstate conflicts according to
international relations theories. Therefore, looking at the European Union countries per se
is similar to applying the least-likely case design (McKeown, 1999) to test my argument.
The research design and model specification are as following.
3.1 Dependent variable
Regarding the dependent variable of interstate conflict, I do not adopt the
popularly-used militarized interstate dispute (MID) data (Ghosn et al., 2004) for two
reasons. The first reason is that, as I have discussed above, there is a lack of militarized
interstate dispute between the European Union countries since the end of WWII, and
there is not a single MID occurred between them after 1986. So if we look at MID data,
the dependent variable does not vary simply due to no militarized conflict. But this does
not mean that the European Union countries do not have any non-militarized levels of
conflict. Therefore, dataset that contains the information of non-militarized conflicts must
be concerned.
And here comes the second reason. My argument contends that high
interdependence is correlated with more conflicts simply due to frequent interactions, so a
dataset that contains both the information of “the number of non-militarized conflict
events” as the dependent variable and “the number of status quo events” as the control
variable will be the most ideal one to match my theoretical need. According to my theory,
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in short, countries that have high degree of interdependence or emphasize on domestic
compensation tends to have more disputes with other countries due to intensive economic
interaction and domestic pressure, while at the same time have less conflicts due to the
fact that domestic compensation enhances trade’s pacifying effect. Therefore, I need both
the information of the number of conflict events and the number of non-conflictual
dyadic interaction events. I find Gary King and Will Lowe’s (2003) “10 Million
International Dyadic Events (IDE) data” perfectly matches this theoretical requirement.
The IDE data uses machine coding to code all the events reported by Reuters in a
daily base. According to King and Lowe, the coding method is that “(e)ach event is
summarized in the data as ‘Actor A does something to Actor B’, with Actors A and B
recording about 450 countries and other (within-country) actors and ‘does something to’
coded in an ontology of about 200 types of actions” (codebook). King and Lowe adopt
Goldstein’s (1992) modification of McClelland’s (1979) World Event Interaction Survey
(WEIS) categories to categorize all the recorded events in the IDE data into sixty-one
different categories, and then assign each event a “Goldstein score” to denote how
conflictual or cooperative the event is. In Goldstein’s (1992) conflict-cooperation scale,
each dyadic event is assigned a Goldstein score ranging from -10 (the most conflictual) to
8.3 (the most cooperative). I adopt Crescenzi’s (2003, 2005) criteria to distinguish Lowlevel conflict from High-level conflict to further investigate whether my argument is
sensitive to different kinds of international conflict. According to Crescenzi’s definition,
Low-level conflict includes the use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an
attempt to persuade or coerce another state, and High-level conflict includes the use of
military tools to do so (Crescenzi, 2005, pp. 46-47). I count only the number of events in
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which both sides are reported as “state actors.” The IDE data records observations in a
daily base. Therefore, in order to transfer it into the dyad-year unit of analysis to match
with other dyad-year variables, I sum up how many low-level conflicts and high-level
conflicts there are between two states in each dyad-year to be the “dyad-year event counts”
dependent variables. Besides, given the fact that not all dyads have conflictual events in
every year, I fill in the missing values of the number of dyadic conflictual events with 0 if
there is not any conflictual events reported by the data in any dyad-year.
Because the two dependent variables, the number of low-level conflicts and highlevel conflicts per year, are time-series cross-sectional count variables across 15
European Union countries and 15 years, 63 I adopt the negative binomial model for event
counts (Long, 1997) and the general estimating equation (GEE) model which allows the
modeling of temporal (year) and within-panel (dyad) correlations (Zorn, 2001). The
combination of these two models is a general estimating equation with a negative
binomial functional link. To account for the possibility that the count of disputes in
previous year affect the count in subsequent years, I model the data assuming a first-order
autoregressive process (AR1) as most time-series research did. In addition, to adjust for
clustering in dyads, I use the Huber/White robust standard error clustered on each dyad
which assumes that observations within the same dyad across years are correlated but
those between different dyads are uncorrelated. Lastly, as most literature on conflict
study, I estimate all the models with the dependent variables at time t and independent
variables at time t − 1 to mitigate problems of reverse causality.

63

Maybe the biggest flaw of the IDE data is its short span. The IDE data only contains dyadic events from
1990 to 2004, only 15 years.
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3.2 Independent variables
My theory predicts that the pacifying effect of trade interdependence in European
Union countries is conditioned on their domestic compensation for the losers of trade.
Therefore, my independent variables should be composed of three variables. The first one
denotes the degree of interdependence between the two counties in each dyad, the second
one denotes the degree of domestic compensation the governments endeavor to do, and
the third one is the interaction term between the previous two variables.
Regarding the degree of interdependence, following the most research in the
relationship between trade and conflict, I adopt High dependence, the higher ratio of the
sum of State A’s imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP, to measure the
economic importance of interdependence between the two countries in each dyad (Dixon,
1994; Oneal & Russett, 2001, 1997), following the “weak link” logic (Dixon, 1994;
Oneal & Russett, 1997, 2001) which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is
primarily determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal &
Russett, 1997, p. 273). In Dixon (1994) and Oneal and Russett’s (1997) research, their
liberal peace theories suggest that it is the country with the lower degree of dependence
that determines the likelihood of dyadic conflict. However, different from their liberal
peace theories, my argument contends that in the European Union countries, it is the
country with higher degree of dependence that determines the likelihood of dyadic
conflict. Therefore, I adopt “high dependence” as my independent variable instead of
their “low dependence.” I calculate High dependence in each dyad-year observation by
using the Bilateral Trading Data 3.0 from Barbieri et al. (2009) and Barbieri and Keshk
(2012) as well as the GDP data from the 2013 World Development Indicators (WDI) of
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World Bank. I also include Low dependence, the lower ratio of the sum of State A’s
imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP, to the model to have full
information about both sides’ economic ties with the United States.
The second independent variable is the degree of domestic compensation. I use
the portion of states’ social expenditure over their GDP to measure the degree of their
domestic compensation. Data of social expenditure is from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) website. Following the same “weak
link” logic, I adopt the lower social expenditure value in each dyad-year observation to
construct the independent variable Low social expenditure, because my theory predicts
that it is the country with lower degree of social expenditure that determines the
likelihood of dyadic conflict.
Since both the interdependent variable and the domestic compensation variable
are defined, their interaction term, High Dependence × Low social expenditure, is my
main independent variable. According to my theory, the interaction term should be
statistically significant with a negative sign, which means that trade’s pacifying effect is
increased with the increase of domestic compensation.
3.3 Control variables
Following most research on dyadic international conflict, I control for contiguity,
distance, alliance, power, development, and major power status, all of which are
demonstrated to have an influence on international conflict. I do not control for states’
polity scores (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013) since all the European Union countries
are highly democratic states with polity scores more than 9 (out of 10) in my sample
space from 1990 to 2004. Contiguity is a dummy variable which denotes whether the
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two countries of the dyad are contiguous by land, predicted to be positively correlated
with conflict onset. Distance is the logged distance (in miles) between capitals of the two
states in each dyad, predicted to be negatively related with conflict onset. Alliance is a
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the two states in each dyad have signed a defense
pact, neutrality, or entente in the year, and with a value of 0 if otherwise. Among the
European Union countries in my sample period, Alliance actually denotes whether the
both countries are joint NATO dyad. Power parity is the weaker state’s CINC score
(Singer, 1988) divided by that of the stronger state to generate a power ratio which ranges
from 0 (total preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Data of
Contiguity, Distance, Alliance, and Power parity are from the Correlates of War (COW)
database. Development is also found to have a pacifying effect (Rosecrance, 1986, 2010;
Hegre, 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, & O’neal, 2003), so I include both countries’ GDP per
capita (GDP/pc) which is their logged GDP per capita to control for development.
Because major power countries are more prone to involve in international disputes
(Bremer, 1992; Xiang, Xu, & Keteku, 2007), I create a dummy variable None major
power dyad to control for this influence of power, taking a value of 1 is both states in the
dyad are none major powers, and 0 if otherwise (if including Britain, France, and
Germany in the dyad).
I also control for both countries’ import-to-GDP ratio because high domestic
compensation is demonstrated as a salient result from high import-to-GDP ratio
(Cameron, 1978; Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). I control for the import-to-GDP ratio
instead of trade openness (trade-to-GDP ratio) because imports and exports should have
opposite effects on government spending. According to (Hays et al., 2005), “Rising
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imports create losers – displaced workers in import competing industries – that may have
to be compensated, rising exports do not” (Hays et al., 2005, pp. 476–477). 64 ImportGDP ratio is simply the percentage of import share of the countries’ total GDP. Data of
Import-GDP ratio is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013).
To further make sure the number of dyadic conflicts does not intermingled by
their interaction density, I control for several variables that demote how frequently the
two countries interact (Hegre, 2009). Because dyads with more population are more
likely to interact more intensively than those with fewer population, so the former tend to
have more conflicts than the latter simply due to more interactions. Therefore, I control
for both countries’ Population, their number of population in millions after logged. 65
Data of Population is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013). Both countries’
degree of development also affects their ability of interaction, and I already have both
countries’ GDP per capita as the control variables. Lastly, I include the variable Total
number of non-conflictual events as well to control for the dyadic interaction density
revealed by the IDE data. This variable is simply the total number of all the recorded
dyadic events in the IDE data that are coded as status quo events according to the
Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale. This variable offers the information about how
many events happened in each dyad-year, the frequency of dyadic interaction density.

64

By the same token, “falling exports are harmful to domestic employment in a way that declining imports
are not” (Hays, Ehrlich, & Peinhardt, 2005, p. 477).
65

I add 1 to each observation of population in millions before taking log to avoid negative values, because
some countries have the number of population less than 1 million.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Basic analysis
Table 5.2 includes all the models with different levels of conflicts as the
dependent variables. The first dependent variable is Low-level conflict, which includes
the use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce
another state. Model 1 looks at the influences of High dependence and Low social
expenditure on the number of dyadic low-level conflict, and Model 2 includes both the
two independent variables as well as their interaction term. Model 1 shows that, as my
argument predicts, both the increase of the degree of high dependence and the degree of
low social expenditure increase the number of low-level conflict. However, Model 2
shows that, this conflictual effect of both the degree of high dependence and the degree of
low social expenditure will be compensated by their interaction term. That is, although
high degree of interdependence and social expenditure will incur more low-level conflicts
between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient domestic compensation will
have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in terms of the reduction of the
use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce
another state.
The second dependent variable is High-level conflict, which includes the use of
military tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce another state. Model 3
looks at the influences of High dependence and Low social expenditure on the number
of dyadic high-level conflict, and Model 4 includes both the two independent variables as
well as their interaction term. The result of Model 3 partially supports my argument that,
only the increase of the degree of high dependence increases the number of high-level

175

Table 5.2 GEE negative binomial models of different levels of international conflicts between the European
Union countries, 1990~2004
[Dependent variable t ]

Low-Level Conflict

High-Level Conflict

All Conflict

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

High dependence

0.049*
(0.023)

0.173***
(0.029)

0.087**
(0.034)

0.352***
(0.071)

0.058*
(0.026)

0.217***
(0.032)

Low social expenditure

0.031*
(0.021)

0.083***
(0.022)

0.006
(0.032)

0.135**
(0.049)

0.035*
(0.019)

0.100***
(0.023)

[Independent variables t −1 ]

×

-0.006***
(0.002)

High dependence
Low social expenditure

-0.013**
(0.004)

-0.008***
(0.002)

[Control variables t −1 ]
Total number of non-conflictual events

0.005*
(0.002)

0.005*
(0.002)

0.001
(0.003)

-0.000
(0.003)

0.005*
(0.002)

0.004*
(0.002)

State A’s Import-GDP ratio

-0.004*
(0.004)

-0.000
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.011)

0.005
(0.010)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.001
(0.005)

State B’s Import-GDP ratio

0.000
(0.004)

-0.000
(0.003)

-0.010*
(0.009)

-0.011*
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.004)

-0.003*
(0.004)

State A’s GDP/pc

0.044
(0.301)

-0.077
(0.310)

-0.051
(0.585)

-0.327
(0.629)

0.031
(0.278)

-0.126
(0.290)

State B’s GDP/pc

-1.116***
(0.307)

-1.131***
(0.329)

-1.366*
(0.844)

-1.338*
(0.870)

-1.077***
(0.306)

-1.066**
(0.325)

State A’s Population

0.767***
(0.131)

0.786***
(0.132)

0.600*
(0.264)

0.629*
(0.247)

0.732***
(0.130)

0.747***
(0.128)

State B’s Population

0.612***
(0.122)

0.638***
(0.120)

0.442*
(0.266)

0.513*
(0.278)

0.557***
(0.117)

0.589***
(0.114)

0.227
(0.373)

0.272*
(0.352)

0.017
(0.337)

0.034
(0.355)

0.185
(0.351)

0.255*
(0.325)

Distance

-0.403***
(0.108)

-0.416***
(0.110)

-0.485*
(0.223)

-0.545*
(0.266)

-0.411***
(0.114)

-0.423***
(0.119)

Alliance

0.040
(0.193)

0.124
(0.191)

-0.302
(0.478)

-0.024
(0.464)

0.027
(0.198)

0.147*
(0.190)

Power parity

0.772**
(0.284)

0.742**
(0.288)

1.786***
(0.449)

1.696***
(0.461)

0.969***
(0.271)

0.927***
(0.269)

None major power dyad

-0.206*
(0.223)

-0.237*
(0.220)

-0.402*
(0.349)

-0.460*
(0.339)

-0.233*
(0.197)

-0.282*
(0.194)

Constant

7.456*
(3.601)
726.654
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

7.591*
(3.681)
747.589
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

11.529*
(6.116)
202.167
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

11.189*
(6.494)
345.531
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

7.619*
(3.306)
709.785
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

7.555*
(3.428)
723.589
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

Contiguity

Chi-squared
Probability > Chi-squared
Number of clusters (dyads)
Observations per cluster: Min
Observations per cluster: Mean
Observations per cluster: Max
Number of observations

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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conflicts. However, Model 4 shows that, when both the two independent variables and
their interaction are taken into concern, the two independent variables both have
conflictual effects, and their conflictual effects will be compensated by their interaction
term. That is, although high degree of interdependence and social expenditure will incur
more high-level conflicts between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient
domestic compensation will have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in
terms of the reduction of the use of military tools by one state in an attempt to persuade
or coerce another state.
The third dependent variable is All conflict, which is the sum of the total number
of both the low-level conflict and the high-level conflict. Model 5 looks at the influences
of High dependence and Low social expenditure on the total number of dyadic conflict,
and Model 6 includes both the two independent variables as well as their interaction term.
The results of Model 5 and Model 6 are similar to previous models.
Overall, all the model results of Table 5.2 suggest that, whether which kinds of
conflict we are looking at, high degree of interdependence or social expenditure will
incur more conflicts between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient domestic
compensation will have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in terms of
the reduction of the events where one state attempts to persuade or coerce another state.
In sum, the results support the general idea of the embedded liberalism, which
emphasizes on the point that whether states can balance the two different goals of
economic nationalism and liberalism is the key to harmony international relations.
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4.2 Substantive effects
Table 5.3 records the substantive effects of variables that are statistically
significant on each of the three dependent variables.
To further demonstrate how well the empirical evidences fit the prediction of my
argument in Table 5.1 (about the four situations), in Figure 5.1 I show the 3-dimensional
plots of the influences of High dependence and Low social expenditure concerning
their interaction effect on the predicted numbers of each of the three dependent variables,
holding all other variables constant. Figure 5.1 shows that, when looking at Low-level
conflict, the predicted number of conflict perfectly match the prediction of my argument.
That is, the number of conflict is few when both independent variables are at their high
levels or at their low levels, the number of conflict increases a little bit when
interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high, and the number of conflict is
the most when interdependence is high and domestic compensation is low.
However, my prediction is differing a little from the empirical evidences when
looking at only the High-level conflict in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 shows that, high-level
conflicts only occurred between European Union countries when interdependence is high
and domestic compensation is low, which matches the prediction of my theory. The
difference is in the situation when the degree of interdependence is low and the degree of
domestic compensation is high. My theory predicts that there will be a small number of
conflict in this situation, while empirical evidences show that the number of conflict is as
low as the situations when both variables are at their high levels or at their low levels.
Although a little different from the prediction of my theory, this should not be a real
threat to my argument since high-level conflict, which means that countries use military
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Table 5.3 Substantive effects of variables that are statistically significant on each of the three dependent variables
Variables

Min

Max
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High dependence
Low social expenditure
High dependence X Low social expenditure

0.039717
12.5
0.7665377

35.14153
30.7
800.8185

Total number of non-conflictual events
Stata A’s Import-GDP ratio
Stata B’s Import-GDP ratio
Stata A’s GDP/pc
Stata B’s GDP/pc
Stata A’s Population
Stata B’s Population
Contiguity
Distance
Alliance
Power parity
None major power dyad

0
17.58554
17.58554
9.453781
9.453781
0.3229708
0.3229708
0
4.682131
0
0.168211
0

272
113.0623
113.0623
11.10362
11.10362
4.425138
4.425138
1
7.644919
1
0.9994754
1

Model 2
Low-level conflict
IRR
Min  Max
+ 17.8%
+624.8%
+ 8.7%
+158.3%
- 0.6%
-480.0%

Model 4
High-level conflict
IRR
Min  Max
+ 40.8%
+1432.2%
+ 14.2%
+ 258.4%
- 1.3%
-1048.1%

+ 0.2%

+ 54.4%

- 65.3%
+111.3%
+ 85.0%

-107.7%
+456.6%
+348.7%

+ 85.7%

- 34.4%

-102.0%

+ 96.4%

+ 80.1%

Model 6
All conflict
IRR
Min  Max
+ 22.1%
+ 775.8%
+ 10.4%
+ 189.3%
- 0.72%
- 576.0%
+ 5.8%

+1577.6%

+ 351.6%

- 62.2%
+104.0%
+ 77.4%

- 102.6%
+ 426.6%
+ 317.5%

- 41.8%

- 123.8%

- 34.4%

- 101.9%

+401.3%

+ 333.6%

+128.0%

+ 106.4%

Note: Only the variables that reach statistical significance at 95% level (two-tails) are listed in the table. IRR refers to incident rate ratio.

Low social expenditure

High dependence

Figure 5.1 Predicted mean number of Low-level conflict per dyad-year

High dependence

Low social expenditure

Figure 5.2 Predicted mean number of High-level conflict per dyad-year

High dependence

Low social expenditure

Figure 5.3 Predicted mean number of All conflict per dyad-year
Note: The unit is % GDP for the independent variables, and number of conflict for the dependent variable.
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tools to persuade or coerce others, is a very rare event among the European Union
countries given their very peaceful nature. Among the European Union countries,
conflicts that result from the protectionism effect (Hypothesis 4) do not escalate to the
level of the use of force.
As a comparison, Figure 5.3 shows the predicted number of the sum-up of both
the low-level and the high-level conflicts. The outcome of Figure 5.3 is similar to Figure
5.1 when looking at only the low-level conflicts. Overall, generally speaking, the
analyses of the substantive effects support the prediction of my argument.
4.3 Robustness checks
To make sure my models are not sensitive to various concerns, I do some
robustness tests to see whether they change the outcomes of my models. These robustness
checks include adding in a lagged dependent variable, concerning only the politically
active dyads, taking states’ different ideal points into concern, and implementing the
zero-inflated Poisson regression model to control for the under-estimate of zero given the
fact that more than 66.7% observations of the dependent variables are zero. 66 All the
models for robustness checks are shown in Table 5.4 with a replication of Model 6 in
Table 5.2 as the original model to be compared.
Although Achen (2000) demonstrates that including a lagged dependent variable
may suppress the explanatory power of independent variables, many previous research
use a lagged dependent variable when dealing with time-series cross-sectional data to
control for the threat of autocorrelation. In Model 7 I include a lagged dependent variable
into the model to test whether my argument still holds. Model 7 shows that the inclusion
66

Specifically, 69% of Low-level conflict observations are zero, 90% of High-level conflict observations
are zero, and 67% of All conflict observations are zero.
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Table 5.4 Robustness checks models of All conflict between the European Union countries, 1990~2004
All conflict

[Dependent variable t ]
Model 6

Model 7
Lagged
Dependent
Variable

Model 8
Politically
Active
Dyads

Model 9
Distance
of
Ideal Points

Model 10
Zero-Inflated
Poisson
Model

High dependence

0.217***
(0.032)

0.200***
(0.031)

0.220***
(0.032)

0.186***
(0.032)

0.081*
(0.036)

Low social expenditure

0.100***
(0.023)

0.099***
(0.022)

0.105***
(0.023)

0.101***
(0.022)

0.002
(0.024)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.002)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.006***
(0.002)

-0.004*
(0.002)

[Independent variables t −1 ]

×

High dependence
Low social expenditure

Lagged dependent variable

0.057**
(0.021)

Politically active dyads

1.504
(0.774)

Distance between ideal points

0.699***
(0.212)

Constant
Chi-squared
Probability > Chi-squared
Number of clusters (dyads)
Observations per cluster: Min
Observations per cluster: Mean
Observations per cluster: Max
Number of observations

723.589
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

6.590*
(3.274)
870.549
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

6.083
(3.455)
741.052
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

3.215
(3.649)
937.719
0.0000
105
7
12
14
1,257

11.367***
(3.132)
502.44
0.0000
105

1,362

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Other control variables are all
included in all the models, but not shown for brevity.
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of the lagged dependent variable does not cause a significant change of the result. All the
independent variables remain similar effects on the dependent variable.
There is a possibility that looking at conflict between all European Union
countries is misleading. According the logic of “opportunity and willingness” (Most &
Starr, 1982, 1989), although the European Union countries are located in the same region,
it does not mean that each of them has the opportunity to have a dispute with all of the
others. For example, the insular Ireland would never have a dispute with the inland
Austria or Luxembourg. Therefore, controlling for this “opportunity” or “necessary
condition” is necessary. I adopt Quackenbush’s (2006) definition of “politically active
dyads” and include a dummy variable Politically active dyad into the model to denote
whether the dyad is capable of having a dispute. 67 Although among the total 105 dyads
in European Union countries, only 5 of them are defined as none politically active, I still
put Politically active dyad into concern to further demonstrate that the outcomes do not
change. Model 8 shows that all the independent variables remain similar effects on the
dependent variable.
In addition, the number of interstate conflict may also result from the interest
(dis)similarity between both sides. To exclude this threat to my argument, I control for
the distance between both countries’ ideal points. I adopt Strezhnev and Voeten’s (2013)
“Dynamic Ideal Point Estimates from United Nations General Assembly Votes” dataset

67

According to Quackenbush (2006), a dyad is defined as a politically active one if at least one of the
following six characteristics applies: (1) The members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through
a colony; (2) One of the dyad members is a global power; (3) One of the dyad members is a regional power
in the region of the other; (4) one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other; (5)
one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other; or (6) one of the
dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other
(Quackenbush, 2006, p. 43).
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to measure the distance of the two countries’ ideal points in each dyad-year. They
measure countries ideal points each year according to their voting behavior in the United
Nations General Assembly and assign each of them a score, which can be interpreted as
states’ positions towards the U.S.-led liberal order. I construct the variable Distance
between ideal points by calculating the absolute value of country A’s ideal point score
subtracting country B’s ideal point score in each dyad-year to measure their interest
difference. Model 9 shows that, the inclusion of the Distance between ideal points
variable largely increase the explanatory power of my original model (judging by the
increase of the Chi-squared value). However, even though the influences of all my
independent variables do not change significantly.
Lastly, there is a concern that, given the fact that most of the dyad-year
observations of the number of interstate conflict are zero, the GEE negative binomial
regression model may not be a proper choice to estimate the dependent variable.
According to my data, among the total 1,380 dyad-year observations from 1990 to 2004,
953 (69%) of the number of low-level conflict are zero, 1,239 (90%) of the number of
high-level conflict are zero, and 920 (67%) of the number of all conflict are zero. To
model the possibility that the zero and non-zero observations are generated by different
process, I use the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model (Long, 1997,
pp. 243–249) to re-run model 6 to see whether this changes the result. The limitation of
the ZINB model is that it cannot assume an AR1 process when dealing with the timeseries cross-sectional data, although the Huber/White cluster standard error is still
workable in the ZINP model. The outcome is shown in Model 10. Generally speaking,
although the coefficients and significances of my independent variables change in a great

184

deal, the direction of the influences of them still hold. Given the fact that the ZINP model
does not control for temporal dependence, we should not read too much into Model 10.
In sum, all the robustness checks demonstrate that the influences of my
independent variables on the number of all interstate conflict between the European
Union countries are not sensitive to various potential threats.

5 Conclusion
By investigating the logic of the embedded liberalism – the balance between states’
degree of interdependence and degree of domestic compensation – as well as applying the
IDE dataset, in this research I construct an argument that explains the variations of the
international relations between the European Union countries, a missing part of previous
literature. I demonstrate that the European Union countries are most peaceful when their
degree of interdependence and degree of domestic compensation are both at a high level
or both at a low level, that the number of dyadic conflict will increase when
interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high, and that conflict will be the
most likely to occur when they have a high interdependence and a low domestic
compensation. The finding of this research confirms Ruggie (1982), Garrett (1998), and
Pitruzzello’s (2004) conclusions that, since the end of World War II, the embedded
liberalism – states open their market while simultaneously compensating the losers of
trade – has been and will still be an important concern of international security in this
highly globalized world.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
The findings in previous chapters demonstrate how regions become peaceful and
how to explain the within-region variation of the regional international relations in the
viewpoint of trade. In this concluding chapter, I summarize all the findings in this project
and then discuss how they could contribute to the understanding of the rise of China, the
most important issue in the study of international relations of our time, as a theoretical
implication of this research.

1 Summarizing the findings
In Chapter 2 I construct a theory which states that trade’s pacifying effect should
be simultaneously conditioned on the degree of democracy and the degree of
development. Therefore, trade’s pacifying effect is stronger in regions with more
democratic and more developed countries and weaker in regions with less democratic and
less developed countries. Besides, the three-way interaction model also suggests that, all
things being equal:
1. With the increase of trade:
(1) Poor-democratic dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict.
(2) Poor-autocratic dyads are less likely to have fatal conflict.
(3) Rich-democratic dyads are less likely to have fatal conflict.
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(4) Trade’s effect on fatal conflict is not evident in rich-autocratic dyads.
2. With the increase of democracy:
(1) Poor-and-highly-interdependent dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict.
(2) Trade’s effect on the occurrence of fatal conflict is not evident in all the other
three situations.
3. With the increase of development:
(1) Development has a stable and consistent pacifying effect in reducing the
occurrence of the fatal conflict in all the four scenarios, especially in rich-democratic
dyads.
(2) The capitalist Peace effect and the democratic peace effect are mutually
reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.
In Chapter 3 I demonstrate that ASEAN’s ability of security management in
Southeast Asia is conditioned on whether the Southeast Asian countries are able to
maintain their economic performance, which solves a long-lasting debate about whether
the regional peace should attribute to ASEAN’s successful security management. Thus
my argument puts into doubt the argument that a non-Western international relations
theory is necessary to understand the international relations of the Asia Pacific. My
argument also predicts that before they have reached “democratic consolidation”
(Huntington, 1991), the future of ASEAN and whether it will evolve to an Asian edition
of the European Union should hinge on whether the Southeast Asian countries are able to
maintain their economic performance.
In Chapter 4 I demonstrate that the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’
security management in Latin America is a conditional one, which hinges on whether the
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United States has sufficient economic leverage to influence Latin American leaders’
conflictual behavior. This explanation of conditionality accounts for why the United
States seemed to have an ambiguous attitude toward the Latin American countries and
why most scholars support the “whirlpool” model when explaining the role that the
United States played in the region. My argument also predicts that after the end of the
Cold War when the region gradually moves toward a “capitalist peace” trajectory,
whether the Latin American countries are able to maintain their economic growth and
sustainable redistribution is the key to the regional peace.
In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that among the European Union countries, the
interactive effect between market opening and domestic compensation will affect their
international relations. According to the findings, my theory predicts that as long as the
European countries maintain a good balance between these two factors, a more harmony
and deeper degree of international integration is an expectable future of the European
Union. However, this situation can also be a reversed one if the governments of the
European Union countries are not able to maintain a good balance between these two
factors resulting from the power imbalance between their internationalizing and
backlashing domestic coalitions.
In sum, trade plays slightly different roles in moderating the variation of the
regional peace in different regions according to their different main domestic political
issues. The theoretical framework in the viewpoint of trade I proposed is demonstrated as
a useful one to understand regional peace and to predict regional international relations.
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2 About the rise of China
Since China adopted the “reform and open” policy in 1979, the rise of China has
been the most important issue in contemporary studies of international relations. Will
China rise peacefully? Or a large-scale conflict is eventually unavoidable between China
and the United States or between China and other East Asian countries? While most of
the realists argue that it is very unlikely for China to rise peacefully due to the reasons
such as security dilemma, imbalance of power, or power transition dynamics, the liberals
believe that the gradually-increased economic ties between China and other major powers
will make China’s rising peacefully (Friedberg, 1993, 2005, 2011; Christensen, 2006;
Goldstein, 2013; Khong, 2013). Based on the debate between the realists and the liberals,
two important questions are worthy of investigating. First, will the increased economic
interdependence between China and the US make conflict less likely to happen? Second,
will the increased economic interdependence between China and other East Asian
countries bring peace to the region? My research may offer some answers to these two
questions.
According to the findings of Chapter 2, there are bad news as well as good news
regarding China’s rising and international security. The bad news is, although the degree
of interdependence between China and the United States or other East Asian countries
keeps increasing, high degree of interdependence may not help to reduce the probability
of militarized conflict between China and those countries. This is because the degree of
interdependence is also the degree of interaction density, so countries that interact more
frequently are also more likely to have disputes. However, this is only half of the picture.
According to my theory, the good news is, although the degree of interdependence

189

between China and the United States or other East Asian countries may not help to reduce
the probability of militarized conflict, it is very likely that it will decrease the probability
for those militarized conflicts to cause fatality.
Besides, my findings also point out two possible scenarios regarding how the
change of development and democracy may affect whether China will have a peaceful
rise. First, based on the point of view of development, as long as China keeps its
economic growth, East Asia may enjoy at least a “negative peace” since my theory
predicts that development has a very strong pacifying effect despite the degree of
democracy and the degree of interdependence. Second, based on the point of view of
democracy, the situation will be more dangerous if China undergoes democratization and
becomes a newly-democratic regime before it gets rich enough, because my theory
predicts that poor-and-democratic dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict with the
increase of interdependence and that poor-and-highly-dependent dyads are more likely to
have fatal conflict with the increase of democracy. This prediction is somehow in
accordance with the literature about the conflict propensity of the new democracies
(Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Wolf, Weede, Enterline, Mansfield, & Snyder, 1996; Ward
& Gleditsch, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003, pp. 215–272).
Therefore, for China to have a peaceful rise, becoming democratized or becoming more
economically tied with other countries is not as important as becoming richer. By the
same token, the United States and the East Asian countries should not emphasize too
much on relying upon democracy and interdependence if they want to “guide” China to
rise peacefully. According to my findings, accommodating China and letting it enjoy the

190

growth with the help of the existed system is the most ideal policy for the United States
and for the East Asian countries.
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